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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The View from the Ethics Committee
Seymour Wishman provides us with the following vignette
revealing a particular prosecutor's ethical sensitivity:
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[The former prosecutor turned defense lawyer was discussing a
notoriously crooked cop with a group of other lawyers, includ-
ing Wishman.]
"I convicted Whelan when I was in the prosecutor's office,"
Darren said.
"I went to trial [on the charge].... I poured it on in the
summation. I was screaming, 'This worm of a cop, this blight
on the reputation of many honest, dedicated men in blue.' I
probably even said 'rotten apple.' I got the conviction and it
was a terrific win."
. . "Well, right after that I left the D.A.'s office, and the
first person who came and asked me to represent him was
Whelan."
"And since I had a new job, defending criminals, he asked
me to represent him on the appeal. I told him he had to be out
of his mind."
"You can't try to reverse a conviction you were responsible
for," Ashley said. "It'd be a clear conflict of interest."
"Right. That's what I told the guy. Then he asked me to
handle his civil service appeal. He'd been a cop for eighteen years
with a lot of money tied up in a pension he'd lose because of the
conviction. Although it was only a civil appeal, I didn't think I'd
be allowed to take it, but I agreed to send a letter to the ethics
committee. I figured I'd tell them the facts and leave it up to
them."
"That's hopeless," Ashley said. "If you have a serious ethical
question, they never give you an answer in time."
"You're right. It took seven months, but in this case the civil
service appeal had to wait for the outcome of the criminal appeal
anyway."
"So what happened?" Norman asked.
"As usual, my letter and the response from the ethics com-
mittee were published in the law journal for the benefit of the
entire bar. The committee, in its collective wisdom, said, in essence,
'What kind of lawyer would even ask such a question?' I called
Whelan and told him I couldn't get his pension back for him. 'No
problem,' he said. He'd learned that morning that his conviction
had been reversed on the grounds that the prosecutor had been
too inflammatory and overreaching in his summation."
"So you not only got the guy's conviction, but his acquittal
and pension, too," Ashley said.
"Terrific!" I said. "Some lawyer!"'
SEYMoUR WLSHM", CONFMSSIONS OF A CRimNL LAwYER 189, 190-91 (1981).
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Clearly, practitioners need more than an old-fashioned ethics
committee that speaks through the bar journal every other month.
They need an ethics hotline providing qualified and meaningful
advice "on tap." 2 On the other hand, Wisliman's dialogue also
suggests that a lawyer may know the "correct" answer, but may
want to use the ethics committee for public relations purposes.
In my experience, lawyers use the ethics committee as a light-
ning rod to draw the anger of the client-they use the committee
to provide a necessary and authoritative "no" answer that the
lawyer would rather not give the client directly. Worse still, instead
of struggling with the Code or Rules, too many lawyers use the
committee as a crutch, and ultimately as a justification for over-
looking conflicts and other ethical problems. I call such lawyers
"frequent fliers." They will take any case no matter the circum-
stances, send in a request for an "Advisory Opinion" to the ethics
committee to cover themselves, and ignore the problem until the
ethics committee intervenes. All that can happen, they think, is
that the court (or in a worst case scenario, the disciplinary tribunal)
will grant them the benefit of some hardship exception (avoiding
disqualification) or a defense in a disciplinary proceeding, especially
in light of the fact that the fault lies with "that damned Ethics
Committee." This is nothing less than systematic professional ir-
responsibility, for the business of "resolving conflicts of interest is
primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the represen-
tation." 3
A fair percentage of the "frequent fliers" are part-time pro-
secutors. 4 Somewhere between 25 and 35 percent of all requests
for advisory opinions that are sent to the Kentucky Bar Association
Ethics Committee come from prosecutors. 5 On the other hand, I
must also concede that part-time prosecutors face a mind-boggling
array of conflicts rules, cases and opinions, and that they have
2 See Richard H. Underwood, Confessions of an Ethics Chairman, 16 J. LEGAL PROF.
125 (1992).
' MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] Rule 1.7 cmt.
14 (1983); Ky. SuP. CT. R. 3.130, Rule 1.7 cmt. 14 (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1992).
4 Cf. Ethics Comm. of the Kentucky Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Kentucky Op.] E-
350 (1992): "We note that in the past, prosecutors have tended to take cases ... and then
request ethics opinions. The thought seems to be that representation is proper until such
time as the Committee responds to the particular scenario ...."
' See Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.530 ("Advisory Opinions-Informal And Formal") (Michie/




little to go by in the way of readily available guidelines. 6 This
article attempts to provide some guidelines.
7
B. The Tactical and Practical Significance of the Conflicts
Rules for Part-Time Prosecutors
There is no "prosecutorial exception" in the Model Code or
in the Model Rules s and charges of prosecutorial misconduct are
6 The Kentucky Bar Association is preparing a collection of the state's ethics opinions,
judicial ethics opinions, and selected rules and statutes governing the regulation of lawyers
and judges, with indices and some limited commentary, for publication as the KENTUCKY
BAR ETHICS HANDBOOK. The need for such a handbook was noted by the Model Rules
Committee in a report recommending the adoption of a version of the ABA Model Rules.
As chairman of that committee, and as editor of the preliminary draft of this handbook, I
hope to see it in circulation by the end of 1992 under the auspices of the Lawyer's
Professionalism Committee.
Law review articles on prosecutors and conflicts of interest are few and far between.
Among the most straightforward are John 0. Kizer, Legal Ethics and the Prosecuting
Attorney, 79 W. VA. L. Rnv. 367 (1977); H. Richard Uviller, Commentary: The Virtuous
Prosecutor In Quest Of An Ethical Standard: Guidance From The ABA, 71 MICH. L. Rv.
1145 (1973); and Timothy W. Bjorkman, Comment, The Part-Time State's Attorney in
South Dakota: The Conflict between Fealty to Private Client and Service to the Public, 27
S.D. L. RPv. 24, 28 (1981). The leading texts on "prosecutorial misconduct" pay remarkably
little attention to the details of the subject. See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSM&AN, PROSECUToRIAL
MISCONDUCT (1985); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985). Of the ethics
texts dedicated especially to prosecutorial ethics, only JOHN J. DOUGLASS, ETHIcAL ISSUES
IN PROSECUrION (1988), deems conflicts of interest a topic worthy of a survey, devoting an
entire chapter to the subject.
Useful A.L.R. annotations include: Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Disciplinary
Action Against Attorney For Misconduct Related To Performance Of Official Duties As
Prosecuting Attorney, 10 A.L.R. 4th 605 (1981); Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Prosecuting
Attorney As A Witness In Criminal Cases, 54 A.L.R. 3d 100 (1973); T.J. Griffin, Dis-
qualification Of Prosecuting Attorney On Account Of Relationship With Accused, 31
A.L.R. 3d 953 (1970); R.F. Chase, Annotation, What Constitutes Representation Of Con-
flicting Interests Subjecting Attorney To Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R. 3d 835 (1968); B.C.
Ricketts, Annotation, Constitutionality And Construction Of Statute Prohibiting A Prose-
cuting Attorney From Engaging In The Private Practice Of Law, 6 A.L.R. 3d 562 (1966);
and W.C. Moldoff, Annotation, Constitutionality And Construction Of Statute Against
Public Attorney Representing Private Person In Civil Action, 82 A.L.R. 2d 774 (1962).
7 I focus most of my attention on part-time prosecutors, but the coverage is neces-
sarily general in some places. I also rely to a very large extent on Kentucky materials, and
to a lesser extent on personal experiences. Nevertheless, the part-time prosecutor problem
is neither local nor parochial. Accordingly, I refer to cases, statutes, and interpretive gloss
from around the country. The notes show that, for the most part, the results should be the
same in both Code and Rules jurisdictions.
' See CHARLES W. WoiYsRA, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.2 (1986); see also
RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WumAm H. FORTUNE, TIAL ETHICS § 14.4.4 (1988 & Supp.
1992); Advisory Comm., Missouri Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Missouri Op.] 98 (1980),
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:5253; Eclavea, supra note 6.
Ethics opinions from all 50 states dealing with the subject of prosecutors' conflicts of
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common in criminal cases-a common defense tactic, if you will.9
While critics of the disciplinary system complain that prosecutors
are rarely punished for their misconduct, 0 severe disciplinary sanc-
tions have been imposed on part-time prosecutors who have ignored
conflicts of interest.1
Furthermore, the tactical implications of conflicts of interest
cannot be ignored. A hard won conviction may be reversed. 2 On
the private side of the practice fence, the prosecutor who takes a
civil case in the face of an obvious conflict 3 invites a disqualifi-
cation motion. Even if the motion does not succeed, the private
client's case may be prejudiced by serious delay, and the client
may suffer unnecessary expense as a result of collateral or "satel-
lite" litigation. If the motion succeeds, the private client will also
be deprived of a lawker who has become knowledgeable about the
case.' 4 Conflicts will be exploited by the prosecutor's opponent.
One commentator on prosecutorial misconduct opines in a black-
letter "Comment," or tip (albeit in the context of the defense of
criminal cases, when the prosecutor is performing in his public
clothes): "Disqualification of the prosecutor may be an important
tactical consideration, as well as an appropriate sanction. Any
disruption of the prosecution team should benefit the defendant.
Clearly, a motion to disqualify should not be frivolously made,
but in the right circumstances, counsel should be mindful of its
dual purpose."'15 The reader should take note that the appropriate-
interest, including most of the opinion; noted in this article, can be found in digest form
in either OLVAX MARu, DIOST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETmcs OPINIONS (American Bar Found.,
6 vols. to 1980) [hereinafter cited as MARu] or the Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct
(ABA/BNA, opinions from 1980 to date) [hereinafter cited as ABA/BNA Man.]. Citations
to ethics opinions will include both the original reference and any applicable digest reference.
9 See EvAN THOMAS, Tim MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT W.uAMS: ULTIRATE
INSIDER; LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 419-20 (1991) ("Williams was so aggressive about
accusing the prosecutors of misconduct that the assistant U.S. attorneys on the case began
referring to the lawyer writing Williams's motions as 'Worse Yet.' After every paragraph
alleging some unpardonable act of prosecutorial misconduct, the next paragraph would
begin, 'Worse yet .... ').
10 GERsmAN, supra note 6, at ix ("Misconduct is commonly met with judicial passivity
and bar association hypocrisy."); cf. LAWLESS, supra note 6, at 601 ("Bar associations seem
to have a fear of disciplining prosecutors. It may be because of the political connections of
the individual prosecutor or those of the chief prosecutor.").
" See cases cited infra note 18.
12 See discussion infra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Griffin, supra note 6.
" See, e.g., discussion infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text; see also Griffin,
supra note 6.
14 MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETcs 184 (1990).
"1 LAWLEss, supra note 6, § 13.16.
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ness of the sanction seems to be a secondary consideration. The
emphasis is on the tactical benefit to be gained by making the
motion.
6
The comments to the draft of the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers list the following "Sanctions and remedies
for conflicts of interest":
(i) discipline, malpractice and fee forfeiture;
(ii) disqualification from participation in a matter;
(iii) rescinding a prohibited contract, gift or other transaction;
(iv) criminal sanctions;
(v) denying admissibility of evidence;
(vi) dismissing the client's action;
(vii) reversing the determination of a case.
17
All of these remedies" could have an impact on a prosecutor.
II. COMMONwEALTH OR STATE'S ATTORNEYS, COUNTY
ATTORNEYS, AND CITY ATTORNEYS
Professional standards 9 call for the appointment of full-time,
,s For his part, Freedman appears to focus on the merits, while observing (correctly)
that "[als with any motion, the issue for the court should not be whether the moving party
has a tactical motive for making the motion, but whether the motion is meritorious."
FREEDmAN, supra note 14, at 184. This view is consistent with MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3,
3.1 and 3.2, as well as the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIILITY [hereinafter MODEL
CODE] DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981). All of these standards permit the enjoyment of incidental
delay gain or other tactical benefit, so long as the lawyer is also advancing a non-frivolous
position or is primarily motivated by proper considerations.
1RESTATEmENT (THnw) OF TEE LAW GovmEmRo LAwymas § 201 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
11 For a case involving dismissal of an indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct,
see United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Part-time prosecutors
should also consider the possibility that abuse of the public office for personal benefit or
for the benefit of a private client might result in the loss of prosecutorial immunity. See
LAwLxSS, supra note 6, § 13.07 (1985) (citing Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1981)). On the other hand, Beard was "overruled" (at least to some extent) in Ashelman
v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986), and has not fared well in other circuits. See, e.g.,
Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2323 (1992);
Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1989); Annotation, When Is Prosecutor
Entitled To Absolute Immunity From Civil Suit For Damages Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Post-Imbler Cases, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 640 (1984).
19 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIuMINAL JusncE, THm PROsEcUTION FUNCTION [hereinafter
CRns. JusT., PROsEcuTnON FUNCTION] Standard 3-2.1 (1979) states, under the title "Prose-
cution Authority to be Vested in a Public Official": "The prosecution function should be
performed by a public prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of professional
conduct and discipline." (emphasis added).
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public 20 prosecutors. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The
Prosecution Function, call for full-time prosecutors:
Standard 3-2.3. Assuring High Standards of Professional Skill:
(b) Wherever feasible, the offices of chief prosecutor and
staff should be full-time occupations.
(d)... [C]ompensation for prosecutors and their staffs should
be commensurate with the high responsibilities of the office and
comparable to the compensation of their peers in the private
sector.
Standard 3-2.2. Interrelationship of Prosecution Offices Within
a State
20 Kentucky and a few other rural states still permit the family of a victim to hire a
private lawyer to prosecute. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); State
v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55 (W.Va. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). For the view
that this should not be permitted see State v. Boykin, 259 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. 1979). Needless
to say, "modem" authorities view this state of affairs with alarm. WOLFRAM, supra note
8, § 13.10.1 n.35 (1986) (calling the practice "barbaric"). In America, even the "old writers"
were troubled by private prosecution in capital cases, with Ciceronian observations that
"where life or death is the issue 'it is always more honorable to defend than to prosecute,"'
and that counsel should 'never take blood money."' GEORGE W. WAaEvLLE, EssAYs n
LEGAL ETmcs 142 (1902) (citation omitted). Even those courts that tolerate private prose-
cutors have concluded that "[p]rivate counsel who undertakes the duties of prosecution
may not become involved in any civil matter related to the criminal prosecution." Hubbard,
777 S.W.2d at 884 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B)); Cantrell v. Com-
monwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985) (counsel hired by victim's family-may participate with
leave of court and agreement of public prosecutor but may not initiate a criminal case,
appear before a grand jury, or take part in plea bargaining). Compare WARvELLE, supra,
at 142-43:
[W]hile an attorney may be permitted to assist in a prosecution, it is yet a
privilege that he should exercise with the utmost caution and circumspec-
tion .... If he represents private interests, it has been held in some states,
he cannot be retained to assist in criminal prosecutions growing out of such
interests ... and the rule seems to be eminently salutary and just.... But,
in any event, such retainers should be accepted with reluctance and only in
extraordinary cases, where peculiar circumstances seem to justify the act. There
is something revolting to the moral sense in the spectacle of counsel selling
his talents to enable an individual to satisfy his thirst for vengeance, and this,
in most cases, is just what counsel does when he accepts a private retainer to
assist the prosecuting officer.
and Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-157 and E-151 (1976), MAIu, supra note 8, Nos.
11,127 and 11,133 (Supp. 1980) with Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985);
Atkins, 261 S.E.2d at 58 (lending support to the desire for retribution by noting that "in
certain cases, the victim's family may wish to satisfy itself that the case is being vigorously
prosecuted") and discussion of "over prosecution" in part VII, infra. But see State v.
Riser, 294 S.E.2d 461 (W.Va. 1982) (private prosecutor assisted and also had parallel civil




(a) Local authority and responsibility for prosecution is prop-
erly vested in a district, county, or city attorney. Wherever pos-
sible, a unit of prosecution should be designed on the basis of
population, caseload, and other relevant factors sufficient to
warrant at least one fulltime prosecutor and the supporting staff
necessary to effective prosecution.
21
Nevertheless, while state statutes prohibiting private practice
exist, and have been upheld,2 the economic realities are such that
many state and local governments will continue to rely upon part-
time prosecutors.23 In the discussions that follow, I will concentrate
on the offices of the commonwealth and county attorneys in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. To a lesser extent, reference will be
made to the office of the city attorney.
A. Definitions
Commonwealth and county attorneys in Kentucky are allowed
to have private practices24 unless they serve a metropolitan area.?
22 CRim. JusT., PRosECIioN FuNcTIoN, supra note 19, Standard 3-2.3(b), (c), -2.2(a);
see also NATIONAL DisTucT ATTORNEYs ASSOCIATION [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS] Standard 1.3 A.-Responsibilities:
The office of the prosecutor shall be a full-time profession. The prosecutor
shall neither maintain nor profit from a private legal practice. In those juris-
dictions unable to justify the employment of a full-time prosecutor, the pros-
ecutor may serve part-time until the state determines that the merger of
jurisdictions or growth of caseload necessitates a full-time prosecutor.
The prosecutor shall devote primary effort to his office, and shall have no
outside financial interests which could conflict with that duty.
Selected portions of these standards are reprinted in RENA A. Go.RnI, CoDEs OF PRoras-
SioNAL RnsSPONsmLrrY 409 (2d ed. 1990).
22 Ricketts, supra note 6; Moldoff, supra note 6.
23 See Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 28 (citing inability-or unwillingness-to pay
competitive salaries). Regarding compensation see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.755(4)-(7),
15.765(l)-(3), and 15.770(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
24 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.765(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) ("The county attor-
ney shall not be prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law."); id. § 15.770(3)
("Assistant county attorneys shall not be prohibited from engaging in the private practice
of law.").
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.755(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988):
In each judicial circuit containing a city of the first or second class or
an urban-county government, or a city of the third class and a population of
seventy-five thousand (75,000) or more, the Commonwealth's attorney shall
not engage in the private practice of law. The population of a judicial circuit
shall, for the purpose of this statute, be determined by the most recent federal
decennial census enumeration. All other Commonwealth's attorneys shall not
be prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.
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Under Kentucky law, the commonwealth's attorney attends the
circuit court (Nisi Prius) in his or her judicial circuit and prosecutes
violations of the criminal and penal laws which are to be tried in
that court. 26 The county attorney attends the district court (a court
of limited civil and criminal jurisdiction) in his or her county and
prosecutes criminal and penal laws within the jurisdiction of that
court.
2 7
Kentucky has followed the recommendations of the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice by adopting a "unified and integrated
prosecutor system":
Unified and integrated prosecutor system established.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Commonwealth
to encourage cooperation among law enforcement officers and to
provide for the general supervision of criminal justice by the
attorney general as chief law enforcement officer of the Com-
monwealth, in order to maintain uniform and efficient enforce-
ment of the criminal law and the administration of criminal
justice throughout the Commonwealth. To this end, a unified
and integrated prosecutor system is hereby established with the
attorney general as chief prosecutor of the Commonwealth.2 9
In this system, a commonwealth or county attorney can be
called upon to serve as a special prosecutor outside of his or her
regular jurisdiction:
Each regular Commonwealth's attorney and county attorney shall
be, ex officio, a special prosecutor of the Commonwealth, and
as such shall perform such duties and render such services, at
such time and places, coextensive with the Commonwealth as
may be required by the attorney general. The duties and services
may include, but are not limited to, prosecution of or participa-
tion in action outside of his judicial circuit or judicial district
when directed by the attorney general and assisting the attorney
general in preparation and presentation of the Commonwealth's
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.725(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.725(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988).
u' See CRim. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standard 3-2.2: Interre-
lationship of Prosecution Offices Within a State:
(b) In some states, conditions such as geographical area and population
may make it appropriate to create a statewide system of prosecution in which
the state attorney general is the chief prosecutor and the local prosecutors are
deputies.
19 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.700 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
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position in criminal cases appealed to circuit court, Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court. 0
Furthermore, when a prosecuting attorney is disqualified: "[The
prosecutor] shall certify such fact in writing to the attorney general
who may direct another Commonwealth's attorney or county at-
torney or an assistant attorney general as a special prosecutor to
represent the Commonwealth in that proceeding." 3
In most judicial circuits3 2 the commonwealth attorney is also
expected to represent the interests of the Commonwealth in civil
cases in the circuit court. The county attorney and his or her
assistants3 attend the fiscal court, and when so directed by the
fiscal court they institute, defend and conduct all civil actions in
which the county is interested .4 A county attorney serving in a
county or urban county that is part of a judicial circuit that
includes a county in which there is located a city of the first or
second class or an urban-county government 35 also attends to civil
cases and proceedings in which the Commonwealth is interested.
36
In the past, at least, city attorneys have also been assigned
some prosecutorial duties. 37 In some areas the city attorney also
served as the principal legal advisor to the local police force.
3 1 It
would appear that these roles are no longer assigned to city attor-
neys in Kentucky. Indeed, the work of the city attorney is often
contracted out to a local firm or firms. The specific duties assigned
to a particular contract lawyer may be negotiable. Accordingly,
generalizations about the public duties of the city attorney are
hazardous.
-' Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.730 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); see also infra part
IX.A.2.
11 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.733(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); see also id. § 15.734
(disqualification of prosecuting attorney due to indictment on a felony charge; appointment
of special prosecutor for duration of disqualification).
32 The exceptions are Franklin County (the State Capital) and those counties in which
there is a city of the first or second class, or an urban county government. Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 69.010(1), (2) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1980).
33 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.770 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1987) (called "assistant
county attorneys" in the statute).
34 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69.210(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1987).
" Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1980).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69.210(4)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987).
31 A 1992 statute allows cities to criminalize violations of city ordinances and assign
the prosecution of alternative or parallel civil penalties to city attorneys. 1992 Ky. Acts Ch.
193.




In addition to his or her prosecutorial duties and general ob-
ligation to represent the state and county in civil actions, the
commonwealth or county attorney has a surprising number of
additional duties that are set forth in a large number of unrelated
statutes scattered throughout the books.
Some of these statutory duties are familiar. For example, the
county attorney must advise the fiscal court and the several county
officers concerning county business;3 9 must attend to the prosecu-
tion of juvenile cases in the district court;40 must bring enforcement
actions under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act;41 and must prosecute paternity actions at the request of com-
plainants. 42 The county attorney must assist the petitioner and
represent the interests of the Commonwealth in actions to hospi-
talize the mentally ill 4 and involuntarily admit the mentally re-
tarded;44 and the county attorney has an important obligation to
assist petitioners in guardianship and conservatorship proceedings
involving disabled persons. 45
Other statutory duties are less familiar to many lawyers. For
example, the county attorney is the statutory advisor to the bureau
of highways within his county;" and the commonwealth and county
attorneys may be required to represent the bureau of highways in
a condemnation action. 47
The county attorney plays an important role in the assessment
and collection of taxes. 4" The county attorney also institutes pro-
ceedings regarding escheats. 49
39 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69.210(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987).
K0 Y. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69.210(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987).
" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 407.190, 407.250(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
,2 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.021(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
"3 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202(A).016 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
4 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202(B).019 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
"7 KY. REV. STAT. Am. § 387.560(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.280 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989).
'7KY. REV. STAT. ArN. § 177.082 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); see also Kentucky
Op., supra note 4, E-75 (1973), MAXu, supra note 8, No. 8538 (Supp. 1975); Kentucky Op.
E-241 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3903 (dealing with conflicts prohibiting
the representation of private parties in condemnation cases).
48 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (assessment proceed-
ings); 134.500 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (collection of delinquent taxes); 133.120(7) (Mi-
chie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (assessment appeals); 69.210(4)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987)
(advise collector in regard to motions against delinquent collecting officers).
41 Ky. REv. STAT. ANm. §§ 393.180 - .200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984).
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Some statutes are downright obscure. Commonwealth and
county attorneys may be called upon to represent the Pharmacy
Board in enforcement actions;50 to prosecute violations of the laws
regulating the practice of podiatry;5' to represent the Health Board;
52
to pursue cases involving air pollution control enforcement; 53 to
enforce the fish and game laws;54 and to enjoin the operation of
houses of prostitution.
55
The county attorney may be tapped to represent the commission
heading a sewer construction district 5 6 or the board of trustees of
a subdivision road district.5 7 He or she may cut his or her practice
teeth on some project on behalf of the District Water Commission 5
or the District Fire Protection Board.5 9 The county attorney and
commonwealth's attorney may be asked to provide an opinion to
the Crime Victim's Compensation Board regarding the cooperation
of the victim with the prosecution and the extent of injuries suf-
fered. 60 He or she may bring an action under the Consumer Pro-
tection Act at the request or with the permission of the Attorney
General.61 Or for something a little more exotic, he or she might
be called upon to represent the "affiant" in a tuberculosis control
enforcement action.62
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 315.230(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
5 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.495(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). A dirty job, but
somebody has got to do it.
52 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
5 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 224.450(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
5' KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 150.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987).
55 KY. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 233.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). I am reminded of
the observations of Chief Justice Kelyng regarding treason, when he charged the jury: "By
levying war is not only meant when a body is gathered together as an army, but if a
company of people will go about any public reformation, this is high treason. These people
do pretend their design was against brothels; now for men to go about to pull down
brothels, with a captain and an ensign,,and weapons-if this thing be endured, who is
safe?" CROAxE JAMEs, CuRiosxTIs oF LAW AND LAwYERs 73 (1896).
m Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 76.385 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
- KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 179.730 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989).
"' KY. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 74.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 75.250 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1980). Forest fire abatement
proceedings are apparently handled by commonwealth's attorneys, in case you were won-
dering. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149.410 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrll 1988).
60 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.140(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987). In addition, KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.040(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987) provides that the Board may
direct the prosecutor to determine whether the victim qualifies.
61 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.300 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987). Pyramid Sales Act
violations are within the domain of the commonwealth attorney. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 367.990(13) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
"K KY. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 215.580 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). Fun for everybody.
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C. Implications of Part-Time Practice Generally
In many states, bar committees have attempted to address the
potential conflicts of part-time prosecutors in what I call omnibus
opinions. Such opinions try to answer all questions once and for
all in the hope that the "frequent fliers" will go away. Of course,
all such attempts are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, it is useful
to examine one of these omnibus or summary opinions at this
point. It will give the reader some idea of the complexity of the
part-time prosecutor problem, as well as some appreciation of the
opportunity cost associated with the acceptance of a part-time
prosecutor position.
A few ambitious opinions, like Kentucky Opinion E-275, at-
tempt to set forth general principles applicable to all conceivable
situations, while at the same time cataloguing prior opinions in the
same jurisdiction:
1. Is the contemplated civil representation related in any way
to possible criminal litigation for which the Attorney for the
Commonwealth would be responsible?
2. Is the contemplated civil representation related in any way
to the statutory duty of said prosecutor to represent the Com-
monwealth in companion litigation?
3. Is the contemplated civil representation likely to give the
appearance of impropriety to the public?
4. If the prosecutor has terminated his employment in the
prosecutor's office, and thereafter seeks to represent a client,
civilly or criminally, one must question whether the case is one
in which the former prosecutor had substantial responsibility, or
performed any act for while employed in the prosecutor's office?"
More often, an effort is made to respond to one or more specific
questions, or to collect a set of commonly asked questions. 64 Such
Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983) (emphasis added), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 801:3908.
64 See, e.g., American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics Informal Op. [here-
inafter ABA Inf. Op.] 772 (1964); Idaho St. Bar Comm. on Ethics Op. [hereinafter Idaho
Op.] 133 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:2904; [Unnumbered] Comm. on Ethics
of the Maryland State Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Maryland Op.], 7 MD. B.J. 80 (1975),
MARu, supra note 8, No. 8639 (Supp. 1980); Code of Professional Responsibility Comm.,
Washington State Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Washington Op.] 74 (1960), MARu No. 4593
(1970); Legal Ethics Comm. of the West Virginia Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter West Virginia
Op.] 78-1 (1978), MAtu No. 13,048 (Supp. 1980). For an interesting federal opinion, issued
in connection with the review of a judgment of disbarment imposed by the Standing
Committee of Discipline of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, see
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opinions help, because they provide concrete directives, but any such
opinion or list is necessarily incomplete. 65
In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949). In Patterson, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed a "judgment" of disbarment, but reprimanded an assistant United
States attorney for: (1) representing a plaintiff in a tort case in which defendant set up the
claim that the United States should have been made the party defendant; (2) appearing for
a criminal defendant in a state court in violation of an Attorney General's "manual"; (3)
offering to represent a seaman seeking funds from the registry of the United States District
Court; and (4) recommending an "office associate" to serve as defense counsel for a
criminal defendant in a United States court. Id.
" Compare the following set of guidelines written by the chair of a state bar associ-
ation ethics committee. The author of these 10 rules or guidelines was attempting to
summarize the most common conflicts of interest encountered by prosecutors. In this regard
these guidelines are very much like those found in ethics committee "omnibus" opinions.
(1) A prosecuting attorney may engage in private civil practice, but a lawyer
who attempts to act in both capacities should not accept any private employ-
ment which is in any way inconsistent with or antagonistic to his public
employment.
(2) A prosecuting attorney cannot undertake criminal defense in any court.
(3) A prosecutor cannot profit by information gained in the course of per-
formance of his duties as such: he cannot participate in civil actions when an
investigation involving the situation in question and alleged criminal offenses
was conducted through his office.
(4) The prosecutor cannot ethically use the weight and force of his office to
gain an advantage in private employment; for example, when he represents
the wife in domestic relations matters and brings nonsupport or criminal
charges against the husband. If a crime has been committed, the prosecuting
attorney has a duty to prosecute, but he must withdraw from the civil matter.
If no crime is involved, he violates the disciplinary rule which provides: "A
lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to gain an advantage in a civil matter."
(5) The prosecutor cannot represent a private client against a county commis-
sion, even in those counties where there is a separate county attorney.
(6) The prosecutor cannot represent a private client against a county board of
education, even in those counties where the board of education has its own
counsel.
(7) The prosecutor cannot represent a private client in condemnation proceed-
ings against any state agency, the county, or the board of education.
(8) After he leaves office, the prosecutor cannot represent a defendant whose
case originated, was investigated, or was passed upon while he was a prosecutor
or a member of the prosecutor's staff.
(9) The foregoing rules apply to any lawyer associated with the prosecutor in
private practice. A member of the firm or an associate cannot do that which
any other member of the firm cannot do. If a member (or an associate) of a
firm is on the prosecutor's staff, no other member of the firm nor an associate
thereof may accept any employment which the member of the prosecutor's
staff could not accept. Lawyers who only share offices, though not partners,
have such a relation to one another as to bring Canon 6 of the Canons of
Ethics and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility into play.
(10) The prosecutor must comply with the disciplinary rule relating to the
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We will have occasion to refer back to these "omnibus" opi-
nions, especially Kentucky Opinion E-275, in the discussions that
follow. For now it is sufficient to point out that the possibilities
for overlap between civil cases and criminal cases for which the
prosecutor may be responsible are substantial, and the chance that
a case may implicate some obscure statutory duty of the public
lawyer must be considered. Even without regard to "appear-
ances," 6 it seems that the prudent prosecutor 7 would be well
advised to take a hard look before leaping into a case at the
request of a private party.
III. THE GoVERNING STANDARDS
In many states most prosecutors, whether elected or serving
under contract, will be serving on a part-time basis and will not
be precluded from practicing law on behalf of private clients.0
Ethical difficulties abound in any system dependent on part-time
prosecutors, 69 and the authorities have long warned that prosecu-
tors should avoid mixing public and private business.70 It is unfor-
tunate that the Code and Model Rules are not as helpful as they
might be in illuminating such conflicts.
A. The Code and Rules
Professor Uviller observes that:
[N]ot much of direct bearing can be found in the Code, for
these canons are mainly addressed to the private practitioner and
speak almost exclusively in terms of duty to "client."... [There
is little to be gleaned from this Code of the particular responsi-
duties of a public prosecutor and the rule relating to trial publicity.
Kizer, supra note 6, at 379-80. The author was the chair of the West Virginia State Bar
Committee on Legal Ethics at the time this article was written. Unfortunately, this author
suggested that the basis for his guidelines-"the rule which underlies the foregoing (10
rules)"-is that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
See infra part III.A.
617 The conflicts faced by a former prosecutor are discussed infra part III.A. See also
Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3908.
68 See supra part II.
" Cf. CRim. JusT., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standard 3-2.3(b) cmt.
(1980) ("At present, there are still prosecutors who devote only a portion of their profes-
sional effort to the duties of their office, which causes many problems."); ABA Inf. Op.,
supra note 64, 772 (1964), MARu, supra note 8, No. 5380 (1970); WoLFRAM, supra note 8,
§ 8.9.4.
70 See, e.g., WARVELL, supra note 20, at 143.
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bilities of the prosecutor and his particular temptations. The
peculiar nature of the prosecutor's ethical constraints stems from
the power in his hands, rather than from obligations of fealty to
the interests of a client.
7
1
As we shall see in Parts IV through VII, this perceived weakness
in the Code, and, for that matter, in the successor Rules, can be
cured if we are willing to think a bit and draw an analogy between
the public and the conventional client.7 2 On the other hand, the
point is well taken that the framers of our professional standards
have favored the "broad and open" (also the "indefinite and
difficult to enforce") over the "detailed and specific" (also the
"long but rarely complete").
73
Both the Code and the Rules contain a rule for the former
prosecutor that prohibits successive public and private employment
in matters in which the prosecutor participated personally and
substantially while in the public office. 74 Several cases and ethics
committee opinions include this principle.75 Curiously, no special
mention is made of conflicts resulting from concurrent public and
71 Uviller, supra note 6, at 1160.
A prosecuting attorney 'is the representative of the public in whom is lodged a
discretion ... , which is not to be controlled by the courts or by an interested individ-
ual... ."' Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (citing United States v.
Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. I1. 1945)). See also REsTATEmENT (Tsmwi) OF THE LAW
GOVERhN LAWYERs 216 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) (giving the rationale that
the prosecutor's obligation to his or her office, or to the public, is "analogous to an
obligation to a client"); MODEL RusS and CODE provisions cited infra note 79.
73 Uviller, supra note 6, at 1163; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text
(discussing alternative approaches to the drafting of ethics opinions).
7' MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B), (C), EC 9-3; MODEL RULES, supra note
3, 1.11(a), (b). Comment 3 to Rule 1.11 states:
Where the successive clients are a public agency and a private client, the risk
exists that power or discretion vested in the public authority might be used
for the special benefit of a private client. A lawyer should not be in a position
where benefit to a private client might affect performance of the lawyer's
professional functions on behalf of public authority. Also, unfair advantage
could accrue to the private client by reason of access to confidential govern-
ment information about the client's adversary obtainable only through the
lawyer's government service.
Cf. Kizer, supra note 6, rule 8.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Dorfman, 542 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (former
assistant U.S. attorney may not defend in a matter investigated during his term of office);
American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Op. [hereinafter
ABA Op.] 342 (1975), MARu, supra note 8, No. 10,294 (Supp. 1980); and Kentucky Op.,
supra note 4, E-275 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3908 (discussed supra text
accompanying note 63). A recent example is provided in In re Brodeur, 479 N.E.2d 57
(Ind. 1985), in which the prosecutor filed informations against two suspects in a shooting
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private employment. Instead, the prosecutor will find only the
general (and vague) conflicts, 76 confidentiality77 and advocate-wit-
ness rules78 applicable to any lawyer, plus a few special rules
relating to the proper exercise of the charging function.
7 9
As a public officer or employee, the prosecutor must also
contend with "appearance ethics." That is, it is generally supposed,
and frequently stated in judicial opinions,80 that a prosecutor must
avoid "even an appearance of impropriety" or suffer discipline,
not to mention political embarrassment.8 '
"Appearance ethics" (that a lawyer must avoid even the ap-
pearance of impropriety), which many trace back to the maneu-
verings, political as well as marital, of Julius Ceasar,8 2 seem to
incident and participated in some of the discovery and plea negotiations regarding one of
the defendants, only to leave the prosecutor's office and enter an appearance as defense
counsel for the other defendant, and even file a civil suit on behalf of this second defendant
against the first defendant. The former prosecutor received the much-dreaded public repri-
mand.
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(c) alludes to concurrent service, but only as
regards such matters as negotiating for private employment with a party or an attorney
with whom the government lawyer has been dealing in the course of his or her public
employment.
71 MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 5-101(A) (client's interests in conflict with lawyer's
personal or financial interests) and DR 5-105(A)-(C) (interests of multiple clients in conflict);
MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(a) (direct conflicts between the interests of multiple
clients) and (b) (indirect conflicts between the interests of multiple clients, conflicts between
the interests of a client and some third person, and conflicts between client's interests and
the lawyer's interests). Regarding imputed disqualification, discussed in part VIII infra, see
MODEL CODE DR 5-105(D) and MODEL RUTES Rules 1.10 (imputed disqualification, general
rule) and 1.8(i) (lawyer relatives).
" MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 4-101 and MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 1.6,
1.9.
' MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DRs 5-101(B) and 5-102; MODEL RULES, supra note
3, Rule 3.7.
'9 MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 7-103(A) and ECs 7-13, 7-14; MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 3.8; MODEL CODE DR 7-105(A) and EC 7-21. See also KY. SuP. CT. R.
3.130, Rule 3.4(0 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
0See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Assoc., 613 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.
1981); O'Hara v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 535 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. App. 1975).
81 See Peter Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. Rv. 593 (1992). In this entertaining piece, Professor Peter Morgan
makes the case that "appearance ethics" may be downright counterproductive because of
the "Blifil Paradoxes." The "Petty Blifil Paradox" (the lesser Blifil) results from the use
of the "appearance of impropriety" as a political weapon to attack persons who have, in
fact, done no provable evil. The "Grand Blifil Paradox" (or greater Blifil) involves the
creation of an appearance of "propriety" to mask actual wrongdoing by the venal player
or institution. Blifil was the name of Tom Jones' nemesis in the novel Tom Jones, written
by barrister Henry Fielding. You thought it was just another "ribald" movie, didn't you?
82 When asked why he parted with his wife, Caesar replied: "I wished my wife to be
not so much as suspected." See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 3.2 n.2 (citing
PLUTARCH, Livs (John Dryden trans.)).
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have taken hold in American legal ethics by way of the Code of
Judicial Conduct,83 and, in turn, the 1969 Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.84 In the Model Code, that language ("ap-
pearance of impropriety") appears in the introductory canon that
precedes the DR 9 series of disciplinary rules85 and in the heading,
but not in the actual "rules" set forth as DRs 9-101(A) - (C).
Technically speaking, there is no disciplinary rule supporting dis-
cipline for lawyers who fail to avoid appearances of impropriety.
The "Rule of Ceasar's Wife" may be a good rule to live by, and
the most certain approach for avoiding conflicts of interest; but is
it, or should it be, the law? The drafters of the ABA Model Rules
deliberately dropped the "appearances" lingo,8 6 as did the drafters
of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 7 On
U AMERICAN BAR AW5'N, CODE OF JtmIcsLi CONDUCT (1989).
" "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance Of Professional Impropriety."
MODEL CODE, supra note 16, Canon 9. The Model Code's Ethical Considerations 9-2
provides that "[w]hen explicit guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct
by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
legal system and the legal profession." See also CRIu. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra
note 19, Standard 3-1.2 ("A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict
of interest with respect to official duties."); Uviller, supra note 6, § X.3, at 1164, reproduced
infra at note 108.
" MODEL CODE, supra note 16, Canon 9. See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note
8, §§ 3.2, 3.6.5; WoLFRAM, supra note 8, § 7.1.4.
6 WoFRA, supra note 8, § 7.1.4 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d
1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)): "[M]any courts regard Canon 9 as 'simply too slender a reed
on which to rest a disqualification order, except in the rarest cases.' Academic commentators
have denounced it. The framers of the 1983 Model Rules plainly meant to abandon it as
an independently operating standard." See MODEL Rturs, supra note 3, Rule 1.9 cmt. 5
(1989), which is found at Ky. Sur. CT. R. 3.130, Rule 1.10 cmt. 9 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992). In 1989, the ABA House of Delegates voted to move former Rule 1.10(b) to Rule
1.9(b), and renumber former Rule 1.9(b) as new Rule 1.9(c). A switching and renumbering
of the accompanying Comments necessarily followed. This change accounts for the apparent
inconsistency between the Model Rules and the Kentucky Rules.
97 The Restatement rejects the "appearances" rule, and provides the following expla-
nation:
[The appearance-of-impropriety standard] prohibits conflicts that might create
improper incentives for a lawyer, as well as situations that might appear to
be improper to an uninformed observer but in fact are not. Appearance to
the uninformed or casual observer (because of lack of necessary information
and perspective), as well as to an interested party (because of bias), should
not be accepted as the standard [for determining conflicts of interest]. Indeed,
the appearance of impropriety concept suggests a standard so inherently sub-
jective that it could be used to justify prohibiting, without careful examination,
any relationship that a reviewing tribunal wished to condemn.
RESTATEmENT (THR,) OF THE LAW GovEuNio LAWYERS § 201 cmt. (c)(iv) (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991). Given the reluctance of courts and commentators to disqualify lawyers from
representation based on appearances, one would expect courts and bar authorities to be
even more reluctant to "discipline" (punish) under such a subjective standard.
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the other hand, courts and disciplinary authorities have not been
able to kick the habit,18 in spite of its dangerous side-effects.8 9 But
this is not my concern at the moment.
My concern is that extensive resort by the courts to the "ap-
pearance of impropriety" bromide has invited the argument that
all opinions relying on this test or rule were necessarily reversed
with the adoption of the Model Rules. 9° This rather disingenuous
argument holds that in the absence of a nebulous "standard" that
most commentators have roundly condemned, a prosecutor cannot
be taken to task for misconduct that everyone recognizes as such.
I hope to establish that most of the case law and opinions that
seem to be propped up by the "appearances" rationale are still
good law because they are, on closer examination, supported by
more substantial stuff.
B. Other Professional Standards
There are other unofficial and supplementary ethics codes for
prosecuting counsel, although they, too, are remarkably vague.
The National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) alludes to
conflicts of interest in what it promotes as a set of "[s]tandards
... designed for prosecutors by prosecutors. "91 Somewhat more
concrete are the seventeen "Rules" proposed in Chapter IX [Re-
sponsibilities of Government Lawyers] of The American Lawyer's
Code of Conduct.92 However, the latter code has not been adopted
in any jurisdiction, and while none of its rules are particularly
u See First Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669 (Ark. 1990); Martindale
v. Richmond, 782 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. 1990). In these cases the court reads the "appearances"
standard back into the Model Rules.
9See WoLFRAM, supra note 8, § 7.1.4 ("Use of the phrase in decisions has both
obscured the process by which courts formulate their decisions and, in some instances, has
led to seriously erroneous results.").
90 Cf. Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-350 (1992), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Summer 1992,
at 33 (refuting "suggestions that the adoption of the Rules ... somehow overturned past
committee opinions and court cases").
"1 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Introduction.
92 AMmuc LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (American Trial Lawyer's Found. 1982)
[hereinafter AM. LAw. CODE OF CONDUCT]. Of particular interest are Rules 9.1 (a more
defense-favorable version of MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 7-103(A)) and MODEL RuLEs,
supra note 3, Rules 3.8(a)), 9.2 (a prohibition against "invidious discrimination" in the
charging function), 9.6 (a provision dealing with release-dismissal agreements, see discussion
infra part VII.D.), 9.13 (a parallel to MODEL CODE DR 5-101 and MODEL RULES Rule
1.7(b)), 9.14 (a parallel to MODEL CODE DR 9-101(B) and MODEL RULES Rule 1.11), and
9.15 (a parallel to MODEL CODE DR 5-105(D) and MODEL RULES Rules 1.10 and 1.11, but
which rejects "screening" of the former government lawyer, see infra part VIII).
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controversial, the code might very well be viewed as having been
drafted by the "enemy" and be given short shrift by prosecutors.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function, contain only a few generalizations about conflicts of
interest. 93 Professor Uviller is particularly critical of the ABA Stan-
dards, and with justification: "[regarding Conflicts of Interest] I
find but scant aid in the formulations of the effort .... I [am not]
confident that the articulated standards confront the real dilem-
mas.,,4
C. Statutory Provisions
In some states efforts have been made to supplement the lawyer
codes with statutes "laying down the law" to public prosecutors. 95
In Kentucky, disqualification of prosecuting attorneys is addressed
in some detail in Kentucky Revised Statutes section 15.733, which
provides in pertinent part:
(2) Any prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which he or his spouse, or a member of his im-
"1 The Standards refer to the Model Code and Model Rules for substance:
3-1.2. Conflict of Interest
A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict of interest
with respect to official duties. In some instances, as defined in codes of
professional responsibility, failure to do so will constitute unprofessional con-
duct.
NATIONAL PaosncurioN ST"ARDns, supra note 21, Standard 3-1.2.
Uviller, supra note 6, at 1167.
For a federal law see 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (Supp. 1992), which provides:
Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or
employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or of any
independent agency of the United States, a Federal Reserve bank director,
officer, or employee, participates personally and substantially as a Government
officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommenda-
tion, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other
proceeding, application, or request for a ruling or other determination, con-
tract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter
in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, minor child, general partner,
organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner,
or employee, or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or
has any arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial
interest-Shall be [subject to imprisonment of not more than one year or not
more than five years for willful misconduct, or to fines as set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3571 (Supp. 1992)].
Id. (emphasis added). See also 18 U.S.C. § 216(a) (detailing penalties); 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-
5 (1991) (providing the steps to determining disqualification of a government employee in
specific cases). For other statutes, see infra part VI.
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mediate family either individually or as a fiduciary:
(a) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) Is known by the prosecuting attorney to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding;
(d) Is to the prosecuting attorney's knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding;
(e) Has served in private practice or government service, other
than as a prosecuting attorney, as a lawyer or rendered a legal
opinion in the matter in controversy;
(f) Has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
(3) Any prosecuting attorney may be disqualified by the court
in which the proceeding is presently pending, upon a showing of
actual prejudice.
(4) In the event that a prosecuting attorney is disqualified,
he shall certify such fact in writing to the attorney general who
may direct another Commonwealth's attorney or county attorney
or an assistant attorney general as a special prosecutor to repre-
sent the Commonwealth in that proceeding.9
This statute certainly provides some useful detail, and we will
have occasion to refer to it in the discussion that follows. It
acknowledges the power of the trial judge to disqualify the prose-
cutor in appropriate circumstances, although it is not clear how
one is to make a showing of "actual prejudice" before the fact.
On the other hand, the statute has one rather serious defect. It
only tells the prosecutor what cases he or she may not prosecute.
It does not direct the prosecutor to decline any civil case offered
by a private client. Nor does it direct the prosecutor to withdraw
from any such case in the event that a conflict becomes apparent.
It places no priority on the performance of the prosecutor's public
duty. Indeed, the contrary might be argued. The suggestion is that
the civil case may be kept if a special prosecutor can be securedY
D. The Problem of Consent
Conflicts cannot easily be resolved by consent if one or more
of the "clients" is a governmental entity, or, in criminal cases, is
96 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.733 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
1, Ironically, Professor Uviller's proposals, supra note 6, seem to suffer from the
same defect. See infra note 108. The problem of "priority" will be discussed in part IX.
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"The People." While the commentators complain that a "flat rule
(against consent by a public officer or public body) threatens more
harm than good,""8 there are dangers of "corruption" or "inter-
est" on the part of the consenting official. At a minimum, some
authority superior to the affected individual prosecutor ought to
give the consent; 99 some states rule out the possibility of consent
altogether. 00
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 0' may
prove to be influential in this regard. Comment g(ii) to Restatement
section 202 takes the position that "governmental units [should not
be] per se incapable of consent."'02 On the other hand, the same
comment cites with approval a case in which consent was ineffec-
tual because the prosecutor was using his official position to further
the interests of a private client. 0 It would seem to be a safe bet
that a court will not look with favor upon the efforts of a prose-
cuting attorney to sidestep a conflict on the strength of a "public"
consent given by the prosecutor himself or a close associate.
IV. PROSECUTOR'S PERSONAL INTERESTS
If you were to ask a non-lawyer to describe a hypothetical case
involving the influence of prosecutorial self-interest, you would
probably receive a description of a scenario involving "vindictive-
ness. ' 'Ic °4 However, the risk of unacceptable prosecutorial self-in-
" WoLFRAM, supra note 8, § 7.2, at 348.
" Cf. MODEL RuL~s, supra note 3, Rule 1.13(e) (requiring consent of an organization's
"appropriate official" if there is a potential conflict of interest where the same attorney
represents organization and the individual).
'0 See id. Rule 1.11 cmt. 2 ("[S]tatutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent
to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule .... ."); see, e.g., NEw
JERSEY Ru.ns OF PROFESSIONA CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)(2) (1984), which provides that "a
public entity cannot consent to any such representation"; see also American Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 16 (1929), MAU, supra note
8, No. 16 (1970) ("No question of consent can be involved because the public is involved
and it cannot consent."). But see 18 U.S.C. § 208(b) (Supp. 1992) (providing formal
mechanisms for obtaining such consent).
101 RESTATEMENT (TrImD) oF TH LAW GovaqNIG LAWYERS § 202 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991). The Comments collect cases dealing with this issue.
'°2 Id. § 202 cmt. g(ii).
101 Id. (citing In re La Pinska, 381 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1978)).
20, Ironically, our hypothetical non-lawyer would probably not cite or even be aware
of the classic case of Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 116-18 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1024 (1973), in which a distinguished panel of the Fifth Circuit severely criticized
the motives and antics of Jim Garrison in connection with his prosecutions of Clay Shaw.
So nobody ever said he was a hero, did they? For more mundane discussions of prosecutorial
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terest is present in a wide variety of situations that are not
characterized by express malice or "bad-faith."
As we have seen, the Model Code and the Model Rules warn
that a lawyer must exercise independent professional judgment and
not allow the lawyer's personal, family, or financial interests to
jeopardize the interests of the client. 05 More explicit guidance
would be helpful, even in this area, because "[a] scheme injecting
a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement
process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the pros-
ecutorial decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional
questions."'1° Some specific situations are addressed in state sta-
tutes,' °7 and useful amendments to the professional codes have
been proposed from time to time. 08
"vindictiveness," see Maple Heights v. Redi Car Wash, 554 N.E.2d 929, 931-32 (Ohio App.
1988) (involving earlier threats by the p~rosecutor where the defendant had also filed a
grievance against the prosecutor with the local bar association); May v. Commonwealth,
285 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1955) (stating that another attorney should have tried the defendant
because of longstanding antagonism). See also cases collected at Griffin, supra note 6;
CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(c), supra note 19 (providing that "[i]n making
the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or political
advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or her
record of convictions."); THE AmERICAN LAwYER's CODE OF CONDUCT:
9.2. In exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute, a lawyer serving as
a public prosecutor shall not show favoritism for, or invidiously discriminate
against, one person among others similarly situated.
9.13. A lawyer in public service shall not use the powers of public office for
personal advantage, favoritism, or retaliation.
AM. LAW. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 92, §§ 9.2, 9.13.
"0' See supra note 76; see also MODEL CODE, supra note 16, EC 7-14:
A governmental lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation
should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously un-
fair.... [H]e should not use his position or the economic power of govern-
ment to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results.
101 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980).
10 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.733(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), discussed
supra part III C.; 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. 1992).
101 Uviller, supra note 6, at 1164, states:
Art. X: Conflict of Interest
X.1. It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to participate personally in
any phase of a criminal investigation or prosecution in which he knows or




(d) counsel for the defendant,




A. Prosecutor's Relationships with Parties and Witnesses
In the course of his criticisms of the Proposed ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Professor Uviller
quipped: "I suppose a prosecutor need hardly be told that it is
unseemly for him to prosecute his mother or to try the man who
raped his daughter."' 9 Nevertheless, he included such advice in his
guidelines." 0 Cases,"' statutes,12 and ethics opinions from across
the country suggest that prosecutors do, indeed, need to be told
the obvious.
In a surprising number of instances prosecutors have been
faulted for prosecuting cases in which one of their relatives or
friends"3 was the defendant, or in which the prosecutor felt that
it was necessary to ask the advice of an ethics committee regarding
2. It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to participate personally in
any phase of a criminal investigation or prosecution unless he reasonably
believes that his judgment will be entirely unaffected by
(a) any financial or pecuniary interest held by the prosecutor or by any member
of his immediate family in any business or enterprise which he reasonably
believes might be involved in or materially affected by the case in question;
(b) any consanguinal, marital, professional, or commercial association, past
or present, with any person who is or might reasonably become involved in
the case in any capacity; or
(c) any obligation to or association with any person or organization which has
had or may have any material influence upon the course of his professional
career and which is involved in or materially affected by the case in question.
3. The prosecutor should decline to participate personally in, or if appropriate,
should request the appointment of an independent special prosecutor to relieve
him of responsibility for the prosecution of
(a) any matter in which he believes that, for any articulable reason, he would
be unable to maintain proper professional detachment; or
(b) any matter in which the public is likely to believe that the prosecutor
labors under conflicting interests, obligations, or sentiments which would
impair his proper professional detachment.
Perhaps as a result of Professor Uviller's criticisms of the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, a revised ABA Standard 3-1.3(0 has been proposed which would provide:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to permit his or her professional
judgment or obligations to be affected by his or her own political, financial,
business, property, or personal interests.
See FRnaDr", supra note 14, at 224 n.47.
19 Uviller, supra note 6, at 1162.
-' Id., Art. X.l(a), (b), at 1164.
- See infra notes 113, 115, 118, 120, 121; see also Griffin, supra note 6.
112 See, e.g., Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 15.733(2) (a), (d) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1985),
set forth supra part III.C.
M' See, e.g., People v. Nuzzi, 489 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839-40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (defen-
dant was the first cousin of an assistant district attorney in the city). For a case involving
a close personal friendship between the prosecutor and the defendant and the defendant's
family, see State v. Bell, 370 P.2d 508, 511 (Idaho 1962).
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the propriety of his or her participation in such a prosecution." 4
Of equal interest are cases in which a prosecutor was involved in
a case against a member of his or her own office."5 In one bizarre
case, a prosecutor was disciplined for manipulating the system by
causing charges to be dismissed against another man with whom
the prosecutor had a rather unusual relationship, only to file new
charges "after the relationship ... had soured.""16 The prosecutor
apparently argued that he could be disqualified only if he were the
victim of the offense being prosecuted. The court rejected this
rather silly argument, noting that prosecutors should not prosecute
close friends and relatives."
7
Of course, the prosecutor was correct in noting that the pros-
ecutor should not prosecute if he"8 or a close relative were the
11 But see Advisory Comm. of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n Op. 90-3 (undated),
ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:5505 (county attorney may handle prosecution of his
second cousin if he has no business or social contact with the defendant). Compare KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.733 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (prosecutor may not handle cases
involving members of his or her "immediate family.").
"I In re Davis, 471 N.E.2d 280, 280-81 (Ind. 1984) (marijuana charges against a deputy
prosecutor and his son required a special prosecutor); Williams v. State, 123 N.E. 209 (Ind.
1919) (requiring appointment of special prosecutor when the defendant was a deputy
prosecutor).
116 Nebraska State Bar Assoc. v. Rhodes, 453 N.W.2d 73, 90-91 (Neb. 1990) (prosecutor
withdrew and had another lawyer appointed special prosecutor, but then attempted to
appear for the defendant-dressed in a uniform and wearing a gun!), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 153 (1990).
M' Id. at 89. A lawyer's close business or work relationships can likewise make
prosecution difficult. See, e.g., Comm. on Professional Ethics, State Bar of Wisconsin Op.
[hereinafter Wisconsin Op.] E-86-14 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:9103 (city
prosecutor should get special prosecutor to handle case against city employee who regularly
works with and testifies for prosecutor in other cases).
I Cf. Brooks v. Fitch, 534 F. Supp. 129, 132-33 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding no immunity
from civil rights charges where defendant was prosecuted outside jurisdiction of prosecutor
who sought advantage in civil suit); see also State v. Knight, 285 S.E.2d 401, 407 (W. Va.
1981) (An unpleasant case in which the defendant's conviction for indecent exposure was
reversed, on the ground that the prosecutor should have been disqualified. The defendant
had already been convicted for stealing materials from the prosecutor's houseboat, and had
failed to make restitution as ordered. It is worth noting that the only direct witness against
the defendant in the indecent exposure case was the prosecutor's secretary.); State v. Jones,
268 S.W. 83, 85-86 (Mo. 1924) (disqualifying prosecuting attorney in a case in which the
defendant's drunk driving prosecution stemmed from a collision between the cars of the
defendant and the prosecuting attorney).
On the question of whether an unrelated civil suit between the defendant and the
prosecutor will require disqualification see Wisconsin Op., supra note 117, E-86-17 (1986),
ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:9104 (not necessarily disqualifying). In State v. Shevlin,
195 N.W. 508 (S.D. 1923), the prosecutor deemed himself disqualified in a case because
the defendant had a pending civil case against the prosecutor, the nature of which was not
disclosed in the opinion.
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victim of the crime"' 9 or a material witness to it.120 Other close
relationships between the prosecutor and the victim may also be
disqualifying.'
2 1
Other, more attenuated relationships between the prosecutor
and interested parties or witnesses can also be problematic. A
prosecutor's close contacts with the police may make it difficult
for the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute particular cases
of misconduct. 122 The prosecutor,2 3 or his or her partner in
private practice,' 24 may have represented a prosecution or defense
"' But see General Counsel and Disciplinary Comm'n of the Alabama State Bar Op.
[hereinafter Alabama Op.] 85-61 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:1103 (allowing
an assistant district attorney to prosecute a case involving the robbery of his brother-in-
law's store).
"I Cf. State v. Knight, 285 S.E.2d 401, 407 (W. Va. 1981) (prosecuting attorney's
secretary was the only witness); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.733(2)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1985); Uviller, supra note 6, Art. X.I.(c), at 1164.
121 People v. Superior Court ex rel. Greer, 561 P.2d 1164, 1174 (Cal. 1977) (prosecutor
disqualified in murder case because victim's mother was employed in the prosecutor's office;
prosecution may also have been in aid of employee's position in custody dispute). For a
very interesting ethics opinion see Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics Op.
[hereinafter Virginia Op.] 731 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:8848 (part-time
prosecutor who had represented wife in an earlier custody dispute was "not per se disqual-
ified" from prosecuting her husband, who was charged with her murder, but the case
should be declined because the public might view this as inappropriate).
322 WOLFRAM, supra note 8, § 8.9.2, at 451, discusses the prosecutor's close contacts
with police and the difficulty the prosecutor may have in investigating and prosecuting the
police. This close relationship also figures in the rule precluding prosecutors from doing
defense work. See discussion infra part V.A. There is a "flip-side" to this: See, e.g., Tucker
v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 550 S.W.2d 467, 468-69 (1977) (affirming Kentucky Op. E-137
infra): Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-230 (1980), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3902
(lawyer who represents the Fraternal Order of Police may not do criminal defense work);
Kentucky Op. E-137 (1976), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,113 (1980) (lawyer who is police
captain and legal adviser to the department may not defend criminal cases, and may be
precluded from taking some cases arising out of automobile accidents); Kentucky Op. E-
111 (1975), MARu No. 8574 (Supp. 1975) (lawyer/police officer may not take criminal cases
or those involving personal injuries from car accidents); see also Comm. on Professional
Ethics of the New York State Bar Ass'n [hereinafter New York Op.] 615 (1991), ABA/
BNA Man. 1001:6101 (law firm that employs police officer as "of counsel" may not do
criminal defense work).
I" See MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 4-101; MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rules
1.6, 1.9; see also Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-113 (1975), M.Au, supra note 8, No.
11,089 (Supp. 1980) (prosecutor cannot be police officer or sheriff); New York Op., supra
note 122, at 616 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:6101 (police officer may not
serve as a part-time district attorney in another county).
'1' But see Advisory Comm., Missouri Bar Ass'n Informal Op. [hereinafter Missouri
Inf. Op.] 5 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:5255 (part-time prosecutor not
disqualified from prosecuting defendant although his law partner, also a part-time prose-




witness, or even the defendant 125 in the past. The prosecution
may even be complicated, and in some cases jeopardized, by the
fact that a part-time prosecutor is suing a prosecution witness in
another case in his or her private practice.
1 26
B. Prosecutor's Relationships with Lawyers, Judges and Court
Personnel
A prosecutor's relationship with a judge or administrative of-
ficer of the court is sometimes called into question by opposing
counsel or a disappointed litigant. Today, it is not unusual for a
prosecutor to be related by blood or marriage to another lawyer
who might attempt to represent opposing interests. 27 There is also
some risk that a part-time prosecutor might be tempted to sacrifice
the public interest in order to accommodate other lawyers with
whom he or she must deal in private practice. 28 These relational
conflicts will be discussed in this section.
'12 See infra part VI.B.; cf. Professional Ethics Comm. of the Kansas Bar Ass'n Op.
[hereinafter Kansas Op.] 85-6 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3821 (county
attorney could not prosecute juvenile whose father was a former client and whose sister
was formerly employed as the prosecutor's secretary).
121 See, e.g., Alabama Op., supra note 119, at 89-08 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 901:1050 (grounds for withdrawal from the prosecution); see also Alabama Op. 85-
40 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1101 (conflict if prosecutor attempts to rely on prosecution
witness in one case while attempting to prosecute that witness in another unrelated case).
I" See Uviller, supra note 6, Art. X.1 (d), (f), at 1164; MODEL RULEs, supra note 3,
Rule 1.8(i).
128 The commentary to National Prosecution Standard 1.3 provides that:
The attorneys [the prosecutor] deals with as a public officer are the same ones
with whom he is expected to maintain a less formal and more accommodating
relationship as counsel to private clients. Similar problems may arise in the
prosecutor's dealings with his private clients whose activities may come to his
official attention. It is undesirable to place a prosecutor in a position in which
he must always be conscious of this potential for conflicts and be careful to
avoid improprieties or the appearance of conflict.
NATIONAL PROSECUToN STAmMS, supra note 21, at 12-13 (1977). Several state committees
have opined that a prosecutor may not also be a domestic relations commissioner or domestic
relations mediator. Legal Ethics Comm., Indiana State Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Indiana
Op.] 1 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:3301 (part-time deputy prosecutor may
not mediate child custody dispute prosecuted by another attorney in firm); Kentucky Op.,
supra note 4, E-214 (1979), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3902; Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary
Op. [hereinafter Kentucky Jud. Op.] JE-79 (1990), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Winter 1990, at 39
(stating assistant county attorney may not hold office of domestic relations commissioner).
See also O'Hara v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 535 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. App. 1975) (holding com-
monwealth's attorney and trial commissioner of juvenile court may not be members of
same firm); Kentucky Ops. E-97 (1974), MARu, supra note 8, No. 8560 (Supp. 1975), and
E-94 (1974), MARu No. 8557 (Supp. 1975) (trial commissioner may not share office space
with county or commonwealth attorney).
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In most states, the Code of Judicial Conduct disqualifies a
judge if the judge, his or her spouse, or any person within the
third degree of relationship to the judge (according to the civil law
system) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. 129 This means, of
course, that a prosecutor who is married to or closely related to a
judge should not practice before that judge. 30 In theory this prob-
lem might be waived. 131 However, it is difficult to see why waiver
should be attempted, let alone tolerated, in criminal cases. 32 One
might guess that a problematic relationship between a prosecutor
and a judge would rarely rear its ugly head. One would be wrong.
133
'19 See, e.g., Ky. Sup. CT. R. 4.300, CODE OF JUrIcIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3.C. (Dis-
qualification) (1)(d)(ii) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992). A new 1990 version of the ABA Code
of Judicial Conduct moves this to Canon 3.E.(1)(d)(ii).
,w How close is too close? See supra note 129 and accompanying text. According to
Kentucky Jud. Op., supra note 128, JE-48 (1984), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Apr. 1984, at 19, a
judge need not disqualify herself if the judge's first cousin is acting as a lawyer in the case.
Supreme Court of New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. [hereinafter
New Jersey Op.] 627 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:5810, concedes that a
second cousin relationship is too remote to trigger disqualification. Of considerable impor-
tance is the fact that most (but not all) of the authorities decline to disqualify all members
of a lawyer-relative's firm from appearing before the judge. See, e.g., Kentucky Jud. Op.
JE-8 (1979); see also JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL.., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 512
(1990) (discussing "Commentary" to Code of Judicial Conduct); E. WAYNE THODE, RE-
PORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 67 (1975); Kentucky Jud. Op. JE-82 (1992)
(stating that judge need not step down from case just because judge's spouse sometimes
represents litigant (as an independent contractor rather than employee) in other litigation
cases unless fees paid by the litigant to the spouse represent a substantial part of the judge's
family income) (citing DEBORA L. SOLOMON, THE DIGEST OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ADvIsoRY
Opn-IoNs 359 (1991)).
M' See Kentucky Jud. Op., supra note 128, JE-I (1979) (providing steps for waiver of
judge's disqualification when his son is an attorney appearing before him). Judges are not
supposed to twist arms. See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3.D. (pro-
posed 1990 Code Canon 3.F.) and Kentucky Jud. Op. JE-15 (1980) (referring to JE-1 as
revised to allow waiver in criminal cases). In practice, some judges twist arms.
12 Most lawyer codes suggest that lawyers should be disciplined if they induce judges
to commit such violations of the judicial code, or "knowingly assist" the judge in the
commission of an offense. See, e.g., KY. Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Rule 8.3(e) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1992); Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-351 (1992), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Summer 1992,
at 34.
" See Kentucky Jud. Ops., supra note 128, JE-1 (1979); 8 (1980), Ky. BENCH & BAR,
Oct. 1980, at 8; 34 (1982), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Apr. 1982, at 30; and 48 (1984), Ky. BENCH
& BAR, Apr. 1984, at 19. For "foreign" authorities see Ethics Comm. of the Alaska Bar
Ass'n Op. 82-2 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:1201 (recommending "safe-
guards" when husband is a trial court judge and wife is an assistant district attorney);
Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan Op. [hereinafter
Michigan Op.] CI-703 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4833 (judge may not hear cases in
which his son, an assistant prosecutor, is appearing, but may hear cases in which other
members of the prosecutor's office appear); Ethics Comm. of the Cuyahoga County [Ohio]
Bar Ass'n Op. 82-1 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4833 (judge who is son of county
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A lawyer who represents a judge should not appear before that
judge.134 This is an unlikely scenario, but not an impossible one,
in states where prosecutors may engage in private practice.
35
A lawyer's relationship with court personnel may also be a
source of conflicts, even if the court personnel are not directly
involved in the presentation of cases and decision-making. 36 How-
ever, there are few cases and opinions on the subject.
The problem of "spousal conflicts" loomed large1 37 prior to
the appearance of Model Rule 1.8(i), which provides:
A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or
spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly
prosecutor must disqualify himself in all cases in which prosecutor or any of his assistants
appears!).
For opinions dealing with a judge who was once in partnership with a commonwealth
attorney, see Kentucky Jud. Op. JE-63 (1988), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Winter 1988, at 29 (after
assuming office, judge may not preside over any part of criminal proceeding handled while
he was in practice, but future matters left to the judge's discretion); ABA Inf. Op., supra
note 64, 1524 (1987) (prior association with a lawyer in private practice not necessarily
disqualifying, but may be-two year rule alluded to). The latter opinion collects cases
involving such interesting issues as the disqualification of a judge when the prosecutor is
the judge's former law clerk. See, e.g., United States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 425-26
(8th Cir. 1984) (motion to disqualify denied, but "recusal period" proposed); see also
Michigan Op. RI-43 (1990), ABA/BNA Man. 901:4770 (former law clerk may not appear
as prosecutor in case on which he or she worked personally and substantially as a clerk,
but "screening" may prevent disqualification of other prosecutors in same office).
114 ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1477 (1981) (judge may not preside over case when
a party is represented by the judge's lawyer).
"I Cf. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing decision when
defense lawyer also represented prosecutor in unrelated civil case, and defendant did not
waive conflict), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1980); REsTATEMENT (TmiH) OF THE LAW
GovP.Rnio LAWYERs § 210 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
11 Michigan Op., supra note 133, RI-12 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:4766 (lawyer running for prosecutor whose wife is the court administrator should be
alert to possible conflicts, particularly regarding scheduling and administrative interpreta-
tion). Concerning law clerks, see UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 8, at 149 n.34 (Supp.
1991) (collecting cases); see also MODEL RuLrs, supra note 3, Rules 1.12(b), 1.ll(c)(2)
(concerning employment negotiations between government attorneys or judicial officials and
opposing parties or their representatives); AM. LAW. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 92, §
9.17 ("While a lawyer in public service is participating personally and substantially in a
matter in which a private attorney's client has a material interest, neither lawyer shall
comment to the other about the government lawyer's private employment possibilities.").
37 Kentucky ethics opinions include Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-305 (1985), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3914 (stating that spouse and associates of assistant com-
monwealth attorney must not accept criminal defense work); E-257 (1982), ABA/BNA Man.
801:3906 (commonwealth's attorney's spouse may not represent client in civil matter if
spouse is prosecuting client in criminal proceeding); and E-206 (1979), MARu, supra note
8, No. 11,178 (1980) (finding no per se disqualification when attorney represents client and
opposing counsel works in same firm as attorney's spouse).
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adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the
other lawyer except upon the consent by the client after consul-
tation regarding the relationship. 3 '
This new rule treats all family relationships equally,3 9 and has
the additional advantage of eliminating imputed disqualification in
cases in which the related lawyers are not in the same firm or
office. 40 The rule makes life simple, because it says, in no uncertain
terms, that there is no conflict (and no need for client consent)
unless the related lawyers are personally going "head to head."'' 1
If the related lawyers are going head to head, then client consent
may solve the problem, according to the rule.'4 2 The rule makes
no distinction between civil and criminal cases.
But there is the hang-up. We have already seen that some states
do not grant government entities the capacity to consent.' 43 In
'" MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.8(i).
I" Even relationships by marriage, of course. Professional Ethics Comm'n of the Bd.
of Overseers of the Bar Op. [hereinafter Maine Op.] 65 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:4212 boldly states that an "in-law" relationship between opposing lawyers does
not present the "same degree of intimacy as does a spousal lawyer relationship." This seems
like a sensible, if not politically correct, observation.
,40 "Rule 1.8(i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers
in the same firm are governed by Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in
Rule 1.8(i) is personal and not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are
associated." MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.8 cmt. 5; see also Virginia St. Bar Standing
Comm. on Legal Ethics Informal Op. [hereinafter Virginia Inf. Op.] 317 (1979), MARu,
supra note 8, No. 12,949 (not improper for a law firm that employs the spouse of a
commonwealth's attorney as a paralegal to defend criminal cases in the same jurisdiction).
1' Further, ABA Op., supra note 75, 340 (1975), recommended informing the client
whose lawyer was married to a member of an opposing firm of such information so that
the client could decide whether to change attorneys. Of course, a lawyer can insist that
there is no conflict and cite the Rule till the cows come home, but a client can insist that
there is a conflict and to hell with the Rule. The client has the last word on conflicts and
can always get another lawyer or firm.
Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Illinois
Op.] 85-8 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:3001, is an interesting "Code"
decision in that it states that a lawyer may defend criminal cases in the same county in
which his son is an assistant state's attorney, so long as the cases are prosecuted by someone
other than his son; the lawyer does not have to have his client's consent.
242 Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, State Bar of Cali-
fornia Op. 1984-83, ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:1701 (requiring consent of both
client and district attorney); Ethics Advisory Comm. on the South Carolina Bar Op.
[hereinafter South Carolina Op.] 90-15 (1990), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7911 (requiring consent
of all parties); South Carolina Op. 90-28 (1990), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7913 (allowing
consent in appellate cases); cf. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa
State Bar Ass'n Op. 88-12 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:3609 (allowing lawyer whose sister
is county attorney to defend criminal cases in county with consent of all parties).
"I See supra part III.D. Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct of the
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
other states, the notion of related lawyers (especially spouses) sit-
ting on opposite sides of the "v." in criminal cases has generally
been rejected, consent or no consent, rule or no rule.'" Further,
in a recent Texas case in which a member of the appointed defense
counsel's firm was married to the prosecutor, the court not only
rejected consent as a solution, but also imputed disqualification to
all members of the non-prosecutorial spouse's firm. 4 It is worth
noting that the lawyer and the other members of the lawyer's firm
were insisting on their own disqualification.
Even unrelated and nomnarried lawyers can be sufficiently close
to have conflicts problems.'" Just a hint of romance can be a
complication. Things do not have to be all that "intense."' 47 Au-
thority can even be found for the disqualification of close (but
"just") friends or roommates. 148
Ohio Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Ohio Op.] 87-5 (1987), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:6826, states that an assistant prosecutor may not appear in a case in which his brother
serves as opposing counsel, and that this conflict cannot be waived because the prosecutor
is a public employee. This Opinion was followed by Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and
Discipline of the Ohio Sup. Ct. Op. [hereinafter Ohio Sup. Ct. Op.] 91-22 (1991), ABA/
BNA Man. 901:6826 to the same effect. But see Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility of the Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter Pennsylvania Op.] 86-2 (1986),
ABA/BNA Man. 901:7302 (stating that the district attorney's office may consent); Maine
Op., supra note 139, 65 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4201 (alluding to the "attorney
general's informed written consent"); cf. Maine Op. 42 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4207
(requiring informed written consent of district attorney or attorney general).
'- See Committee on Professional Ethics, Connecticut Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter
Connecticut Op.] 86-15 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:2503; Maryland Op.,
supra note 64, 90-3 (1990), ABA/BNA Man. 9012:4328; Ethics Comm. of the Mississippi
State Bar Op. [hereinafter Mississippi Op.] 140 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:515, all of
which find that the state may not consent. In Pennsylvania Op., supra note 143, 86-2
(1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7302, the committee cited MoDEL RULEs, supra note 3, Rule
1.8(i), but proceeded to rule that (a) a prosecutor may not go head to head with his or her
spouse, even with the defendant's consent, and that (b) the defendant in a criminal case
must consent if any member of the defense firm is married to an assistant district attorney.
See also Alabama Op., supra note 119, 82-574 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1028. Wisconsin
Op., supra note 117, E-89-3 (1989), ABA/BNA Man. 901:9109, concedes that Rule 1.8(i)
says what it says, but adds that the rule may not reflect "prudent practice." Virginia Op.,
supra note 121, 780 (1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8704, comes right out and proclaims that
under the Virginia Code, "[s]pousal lawyers are per se disqualified if they represent opposing
interests."
"IS Haley v. Boles, 824 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). The court limited the
opinion to cases involving the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants who have no
alternatives, and really have little choice but to consent.
146 See Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-1130 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note
8, 901:4752 (engaged lawyers).
- See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 213 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1985) (reversing conviction
because of an undisclosed dating relationship between defense lawyer and prosecutor).
141 Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-607 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
[VOL. 81
PART-TImE PRosEcuTORs
Instances of prosecutorial sycophancy and favoritism must arise
with some regularity, since they are acknowledged in the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards 3-2.8(b) and (d) (Rela-
tions with the Courts and Bar), which provide:
(b) A prosecutor's duties necessarily involve frequent and
regular official contacts with the judge or judges of the prose-
cutor's jurisdiction. In such contacts the prosecutor should care-
fully strive to preserve the appearance as well as the reality of
the correct relationship which professional traditions and canons
require between advocates and judges.
(d) In the prosecutor's necessarily frequent contacts with
other members of the bar, the prosecutor should strive to avoid
the appearance as well as the reality of any relationship which
would tend to cast doubt on the independence and integrity of
the office.
49
Lawyers, including prosecutors, should not provide loans or
gifts to judges before whom the lawyer practices. 50 A lawyer may
extend "ordinary social hospitality" to a judge before whom he
or she practices, but this concept must be "tempered by the cir-
cumstances."'5 As a matter of judicial ethics, judicial candidates,
including incumbents, may accept campaign contributions from
lawyers, so long as such contributions are made through a cam-
paign committee. 52 According to the commentary to the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, the names of contributors should not
801:4818 (holding that roommates who are close friends may not be on opposite sides of
the "v.," and requiring consent from the defendant even if another prosecutor in disqual-
ified attorney's office handles the matter!).
249 CRIM. JusT., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standards 3-2.8(b), (d) (1980).
" MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4.D.(5) (1990).
'm N, supra note 130, at 202-03 (1990).
"' MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5.C.(2) (1990); Kentucky Op., supra
note 4, E-277 (1984), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Jan. 1984, at 49. But see KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 121.045, 121.990(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (prohibiting direct or indirect contri-
bution to official required by law to perform duties peculiar to the contributor or to
supervise, regulate, or control the contributor's affairs). For an omnibus opinion regarding
the proper relationship between lawyers and judges see Kentucky Op. E-351 (1992), Ky.
BENCH & BAR, Summer 1992, at 33. Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Ass'n of
Nassau County [NY] Op. [hereinafter Nassau County Op.] 87-22 (1987), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 901:6258 states that a lawyer who prosecutes in the judge's court on a daily
basis should not serve on the judge's re-election committee.
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be revealed to the candidate unless the candidate is required by
law to file a list of his or her campaign contributors.153
Fortunately, most part-time prosecutors try to maintain an aura
of impartiality in their dealings with other lawyers. 5 4 Nevertheless,
there will be occasions when a part-time prosecutor's relationship
with another lawyer will present rather glaring conflicts of interest
involving the lawyer's personal 5 or financial interests. 56 Such
financial or business dealings with lawyers, clients, and others are
addressed in the next section.
C. Prosecutor's Financial and Other Interests
The lawyer codes," 7 statutes,' and common sense all inform
the prosecutor that he or she should not allow political or financial
interests to interfere with the execution of his or her duties as a
public officer.
There are a number of interesting cases and opinions dealing
with the prosecutor's political and financial interests. Some involve
fairly venal conduct, or at least conduct that seems likely to, if
not calculated to, raise judicial and disciplinary eyebrows. For
example, it seems fairly obvious that a prosecutor should not
"' The object is "to insulate candidates from personal contact with contributors which
may lead to allegations of bias." SHAMAN, supra note 130, § 11.13, at 341-42; THODE, supra
note 130, at 99. I have received reports suggesting that some Kentucky judges are oblivious
to the need for such insulation.
-' But see In re Complaint of Rook, 556 P.2d 1351, 1356-57 (Or. 1976) (prosecutor
would not plea bargain with the clients of a lawyer against whom he held a grudge).
"I Virginia Op., supra note 121, 1203 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:8752
(dealing with conflicts created by contract with other lawyers to do collections); Virginia Op.
786 (1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8705 (stating that prosecutor may not prosecute unrelated
cases against clients of an attorney representing the prosecutor in a real estate matter).
IS Cf. Illinois Op., supra note 141, 89-2 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:3011 (stating that prosecutor should not accept referral fee from lawyer for wrongful
death case sent to that lawyer if prosecutor had initial discretion regarding prosecution of
an offense arising out of the matter). But see Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 1 (1982),
ABA/BNA Man. 801:5258 (part-time assistant prosecutor and part-time special assistant
public defender may act as co-counsel for plaintiff in personal injury case although defender
is representing a convicted defendant on an appeal).
'" CRaM. JUST., PROS CUnoN FUNCTON, supra note 19, Standard 3-3.9 (ABA 1980).
Discretion in the Charging Decision: "(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor
should give no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might
be involved . .. ."
I" See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.240 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (county
attorney may have no interest in any claim or contract with county); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986) (or in a road contract or public improvement).
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prosecute solely to gain fame or fortune, 59 or dismiss charges in
order to forestall inquiry into his or her own conduct.160 Should a
prosecutor have to be told that it might look bad if he or she were
to take large campaign contributions from a defendant or a defen-
dant's family?
1 61
Book contracts and media rights seem to have been almost as
much of a problem for prosecutors as for defense counsel, but at
least they are addressed in the codes. 162 In other respects, some
commentators criticize the codes for failing to stress the importance
of avoiding conflicts arising from the prosecutor's pecuniary stake
in an outcome:
[T]he prosecutor may be expected to shun financial interests
which might be affected by matters within his office. Perhaps,
little of the local prosecutor's work alters the financial condition
of any enterprise in which he is likely to own a share. Yet, it is
surely well to advise prosecutors to avoid investment (for exam-
ple) in taverns or construction and maintenance firms contracting
with the local government, for we would not want his investigative
or prosecutorial ardor cooled by the prospect of financial loss.'6
Of course, the financial interests of relatives'" and business
associates165 must also be factored into the equation '6
"I See Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 116-18 (5th Cir. 1972); CRuM. JUST., PROSE-
cu'noN FUNCTiON, supra note 19, Standard § 3-3.9(c); see also supra note 104 and accom-
panying text.
16 See In re Johnson, 477 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Wis. 1991). The mere fact that the defendant
files a civil suit against the prosecutor should not lead to automatic disqualification. The
question is whether the prosecutor's ability to exercise independent professional judgment
will be inhibited. See, e.g., Alabama Op., supra note 119, 89-22 (1989), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 901:1052; see also supra note 118 (citing cases in which prosecutor's profes-
sional judgment might be inhibited).
-' Small donations from a relative of an accused will not be disqualifying. See
Michigan Op., supra note 133, RI-23 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:4767.
162 See Shaw, 467 F.2d at 118-19. A prosecutor may sell media rights concerning his
or her role in a matter after representation has ended. New York Op., supra note 122, 606
(1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:6108 (alluding to MODEL RULS, supra note 3,
Rule 1.8(d), but warning lawyer about problems of confidentiality). Cf. Penguin Books
U.S.A., Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 781-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (allowing Iran-Contra
prosecutor to publish book on the affair), vacated as moot, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991).
13 Uviller, supra note 6, at 1161. Presumably it is unwise for a prosecutor to own any
interest in a whorehouse. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
I" See Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 15.733(2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), cited supra
text accompanying note 96.
M6 See Uviller, supra note 6, at 1162, citing Standard 1.2(b)(ii) of the Tentative Draft
of the ABA Standards, which identified a "debilitating conflict" when "a business partner
or associate or a relative has any interest in a criminal case, either as a complaining witness,
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The prosecutor should also consider the implications of busi-
ness relationships with other lawyers, particularly defense coun-




D. A Note on the Prosecutor as Witness
Many prosecutors regularly stub their toes on the advocate-
witness rule, which requires an attorney to withdraw from a case
if he or she anticipates that he or she or a member of his or her
firm will be called as a witness in that case. 69 However, the rule
is not really a "conflicts" rule at all, but is instead a rule designed
to separate advocacy (argument) from evidence. 7 0 For that reason,
I have decided to skip any extended discussion of the cases and
opinions concerning the advocate-witness rule in this article.
a party or as counsel"; see also Griffin, supra note 6, at 982-83; cf. Alabama Op., supra
note 119, RO 90-91 (prosecutor who is prosecuting worthless check cases for business owned
by city commissioner may not prosecute ethics case against commissioner); discussion of
prosecuting present clients infra part VI.A. In Kentucky, some rural prosecutors represent
coal companies and other local employers whose operations may be heavily regulated by
the state. This can lead to disqualification squabbles. See infra part V.C.
16 According to some opinions, the prosecutor's service on the board of a non-profit
agency or corporation can also be a source of conflicts if the prosecutor may be called
upon to prosecute individuals serviced by the agency or corporation. See South Carolina
Op., supra note 142, 86-12 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:7903. Others see
no conflict so long as the prosecutor has no knowledge of confidential information that
would be involved in the defense. See Pennsylvania Op., supra note 143, 88-264 (undated),
ABA/BNA Man. 901:7317. But see MODEL RuLns, supra note 3, Rule 6.3 (prescribing
safeguards for participants in legal service organizations).
167 See, e.g., Indiana Op., supra note 128, 2 (1982), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3304 (addressing "nonlegal business deals" between part-time prosecutors and. defense
attorneys); Ethics Comm. of State Bar of South Dakota Op. [hereinafter South Dakota
Op.] 90-1 (1990), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8002.
168 According to ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1419 (1978), a part-time public defender
may rent office space in building owned by a prosecutor. Accord New York Op., supra
note 122, 583 (1987), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:6103. Kentucky Op., supra note
4, E-322 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:3903, states that it may be permissible for a lawyer
who defends criminal cases to rent fully separate office space in a building that is also
occupied by a full- or part-time commonwealth or county attorney, but that it may be
necessary to meet witnesses and others elsewhere to avoid disclosure of information. Cf.
South Carolina Op., supra note 142, 85-17 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:7919 (regarding
attorney sharing office with prosecutor's spouse). Office-sharing is another matter entirely,
and will be discussed in part VIII.C.
16 As a disciplinary rule, this rule can be found in MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DRs
5-101(B), 5-102, and MODEL RULEs, supra.note 3, Rule 3.7. For an extensive collection of
cases involving violations of the rule by prosecutors see UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra
note 8, §§ 4.1 - 4.14 (1988).
'70 UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 4.1.
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For my purposes it is sufficient to alert the reader to the fact
that the rule may support a motion to disqualify the prosecutor or
provide the grounds for an attack on a conviction.' 7' The reader
may refer to the extensive literature on the subject for further
guidance.172
V. REPRESENTATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE STATE, COUNTY, OR
CITY
A. Criminal Defense
In virtually every state there are ethics opinions stating that a
part-time prosecutor may not defend in criminal cases-not just in
the prosecutor's own county7 3 but anywhere else in his or her
state. 74 In some states the prohibition has been enacted into stat-
"I See, e.g., People v. Paperno, 429 N.E.2d 797, 801 (N.Y. 1981) (stating defendant's
pretrial showing that prosecutor's investigative or prosecutorial conduct will be a material
issue may justify disqualification under advocate witness rule, but conviction will not be
reversed absent showing of substantial likelihood of prejudice); see also KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15.733(2)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU 1985) (requiring disqualification where attorney
or member of immediate family is likely to be material witness).
"I See generally Barbre, supra note 6.
"7 See, e.g., Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-160, MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,126
(1980); cf. Kentucky Op. E-102 (1974), MARu No. 8565 (1975) (statutory partner of county
attorney may not handle criminal defense cases in other counties); see also New Jersey Op.,
supra note 130, 478 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:5804 (finding that associate
of county attorney may not represent defendant convicted in same county on appeal).
'74 See Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-291 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3911; E-211 (1980), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3901; E-193 (1978), MA~u, supra note 8, No.
11,165 (1980); E-160 (1977), MARu No. 11,126 (1980); E-102 (1974), MARU No. 8565 (1975);
E-61 (1972), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3911; E-31 (1967), MARu No. 8493 (1975); Michigan
Op., supra note 133, CI-887 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4859; Ethics Comm. of the State
Bar of Montana Op. [hereinafter Montana Op.] 12 (1980), ABA/BNA Man. 801:5401;
Pennsylvania Op., supra note 143, 88-2 (undated), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4859. But see
Kansas Ops., supra note 125, 82-35 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3811 and 81-2 (1981),
ABA/BNA Man. 801:3805 (allowing defense in other counties). In Bjorkman, supra note
6, the author critieimes the South Dakota view that prosecutors may represent criminal
defendants in other counties of the state. Claims may be made that representation of a
defendant by a lawyer who was a prosecutor in a neighboring county amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 906 (4th Cir. 1965);
State ex rel. Starnes v. Erickson, 186 N.W.2d 502, 506-07 (S.D 1971) (discussed extensively
in Bjorkman's Comment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971). But cf. O'Melia v. State, 339
S.E.2d 586, 588 (Ga. 1986) (finding county solicitor's defense of accused felon in solicitor's
own county created actual conflict of interest that should have required disqualification,
but conviction affirmed in absence of showing of prejudice). For a disciplinary case see
Maginnis' Case, 112 A. 555 (Pa. 1921) (suspension for acting as assistant defense counsel
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utory law. 175 The ban sometimes extends to prohibit defense prac-
tice in federal court. 176 It has even been ruled that a prosecutor
may not defend in another state. 7 7 Typically, the partners and
associates of prosecutors are also prohibited from doing defense
work on just as broad a basis.
7 8
in another county).
It has been suggested that if a lawyer is appointed district attorney pro tempore as
opposed to being appointed special prosecutor for a single case, then neither he nor his
partners or associates may do defense work. See Wisconsin Ops., supra note 117, E-83-191
(1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9110, and E-81-19 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9105. This
may make it difficult to recruit experienced temporary prosecutors in rural areas where
there are few lawyers.
'- See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (Common-
wealth's attorney and county attorney not to represent accused): "The commonwealth's
attorney and county attorney shall not act as defense counsel in any criminal prosecution
in any state or federal court in this Commonwealth, except in cases in which he is a party."
(emphasis added).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6131. [Aiding defense where partner or self has acted as
public prosecutor; misdemeanor and disbarment] provides:
Every attorney is guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addition to the punishment
prescribed therefor, shall be disbarred:
(a) Who directly or indirectly advises in relation to, or aids, or promotes the
defense of any action or proceeding in any court the prosecution of which is
carried on, aided or promoted by any person as district attorney or other
public prosecutor with whom such person is directly or indirectly connected
as a partner.
(b) Who, having himself prosecuted or in any manner aided or promoted any
action or proceeding in any court as district attorney or other public prose-
cutor, afterwards, directly or indirectly, advises in relation to or takes any
part in the defense thereof, as attorney or otherwise, or who takes or receives
any valuable consideration from or on behalf of any defendant in any such
action upon any understanding or agreement whatever having relation to the
defense thereof.
Kizer, supra note 6, at 374, cites a West Virginia Trial Court Rule (IV(c)) that prohibits
the representation of criminal defendants by prosecutors and their associates.
-- Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); see also ABA Op.,
supra note 75, 262 (1944) (finding that even absent state law prohibiting the representation,
state prosecutor may not defend in criminal case in federal court, but may represent persons
before federal boards and bureaus in matters involving federal law only); South Carolina
Op., supra note 142, 2-77 (undated), MARu, supra note 8, No. 12,711 (Supp. 1980) (refusing
to allow full-time solicitor to handle criminal defense in federal courts or matters before
federal agencies).
1" ABA Op., supra note 75, 30 (1931); Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-102 (1974),
MARu, supra note 8, No. 8565. I must admit that I gave out the "wrong" answer once,
when I was "winging it." Sometimes I get things right, too. My critics explain this by
quoting Governor Combs, who once said, when he was criticized for conceding a point to
a political opponent, "Even a blind pig can find an acorn now and then."
,71 ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 922 (1966), MARu, supra note 8, No. 5516 (Supp.
1970) (forbidding criminal defense by a prosecutor or a member of the prosecutor's staff);
ABA Op., supra note 75, 142 (1935), MARu No. 142 (1970) (stating that prosecutor and
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The explanation for these rules is somewhat vague, although
the rules may be salutary. 7 9 It seems fairly obvious that the pros-
partner may not defend criminal cases); Alabama Op., supra note 119, 86-35 (1986), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:1005 (disqualifying members of city attorney's firm from
criminal defense); Illinois Op., supra note 141, 791 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3012
(disqualifying assistant attorney general's partners from criminal defense work); Kansas
Ops., supra note 125, 83-37 (1983), ABABNA Man. 801:3817 (forbidding participation by
partners and associates of county attorney in cases where state is plaintiff), 81-30 (1981),
ABA/BNA Man. 801:3809 (disqualifying county attorney's partner from representing crim-
inal defendants in other counties); Standing Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility of the State Bar of Nevada Op. [hereinafter Nevada Op.] 1 (1987), ABA/BNA Man.
901:5601 (disqualifying deputy district attorney and partner where charge is violation of city
ordinance). But see Wisconsin Op., supra note 117, E-86-7 (1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:9102
(allowing partner of city attorney to represent criminal defendants if specific criteria met);
cf. Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-322 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:3903 (permitting a
criminal defense lawyer to share office space with another lawyer who has contracted to
prosecute only URESA and TAPP cases for county attorney, although office sharer may
not defend URESA and TAPP cases); Virginia Op., supra note 121, 684 (1985), ABA/BNA
Man. 801:8841 (suggesting that if prosecutor only handles welfare fraud and chila support
cases, partners and associates might handle other types of defense cases). It seems pretty
obvious that a lawyer should not defend a case if his partner is or has been the prosecutor
in the case. See ABA Op. 16 (1929) (disallowing representation of a defendant who is being
prosecuted by another member of the same firm); Kentucky Op. E-18 (1963) (stating that
partner of city attorney who serves as police court prosecutor may not defend in that court).
But a surprising number of statutes on the books relate to this "obvious" issue. See, e.g.,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6131 (West 1990); NEW YORK JuD. LAw § 493 (McKinney
1983). The 1980 Discussion Draft of (then) Model Rule 3.10 provided that:
A lawyer for the accused in a criminal case, shall not:
(b) act in a case in which the lawyer's partner or other professional associate
is or has been the prosecutor; ....
MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 3.10 (Discussion Draft 1980), reprinted in STEPHEN
GIIunRs & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS' STATuTEs AND STANDARDS 125
(1989).
In some states, ethics opinions suggest that the partners and associates of a part-time
prosecutor may defend in jurisdictions other than that in which the prosecutor is employed.
See Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-612 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4818; Ethics Comm.
of the State Bar Ass'n of North Dakota 37 (1980), ABA/BNA Man. 801:6701; Pennsylvania
Op., supra note 143, 88-18 (undated), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7310 (suggesting that this is
allowed if all parties to the litigation consent); Virginia Op. 674 (1985), ABA/BNA Man.
801:8840. The Virginia Committee has opined that if a prosecutor has only limited assign-
ments (using welfare fraud and child support enforcement as examples) then other members
of his firm may defend in the same jurisdiction. Virginia Op. 684 (1985), ABA/BNA Man.
801:8841; see also Alabama Op. 454 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1013 (allowing assistant
attorney general who prosecutes only child support and paternity cases to represent criminal
defendants). But see New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 168 (1970), MARu, supra note 8, No.
6868 (Supp. 1970) (lawyer for county planning board may not represent criminal defendants
in the county). In Kentucky Op. E-248 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3905, the Kentucky
committee stated that even an assistant county attorney who did only Title IV-D (AFDC)
cases could not defend in-state criminal cases.
I" WoinRAM, supra note 8, § 8.9.4, at 455 (1986) ("Such strict conflict rules are
evidently designed to purchase public contentment with the unquestionable integrity of
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ecutor should not defend in his or her own county. Presumably, a
statewide ban could flow from the fact that the particular prose-
cutorial system is unified,180 or be based on the theory that a
prosecutor must not be disloyal to the state."8' It is not intuitively
obvious why a part-time state prosecutor may not defend in federal
court'82 or in a foreign jurisdiction. 8 3 These rules are usually jus-
tified in terms of "appearances," or on the ground that a defense
role might interfere with the ability or willingness of other police
prosecutions.... They may do so, but at a very high price.").
Elsewhere, Professor Wolfram has raised the suggestion that concern about appear-
ances may be too costly a public relations exercise. See supra note 86. The private bar has
never been particularly sensitive to public appearances. For example, James tells of an
eminent counsel who fixed on his coat of arms the motto "Si Nummis Immunis," which
James translates as "Down with the money and I'll get you off." James was taken by the
fact that this motto is a palindrome. JAmsS, supra note 55, at 591. My own motto would
be "I'll have to look into that."
110 Cf. Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 38-39.
-' See Kansas Op., supra note 125, 80-48 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3805; Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-291 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3911; Comm.
on Professional Responsibility, Vermont Bar Ass'n Op. 88-9 (undated), ABA/BNA Man.
901:8607; cf. ABA Op., supra note 75, 118 (1934), MARu, supra note 8, No. 118 (1970)
(refusing to allow county attorney to work to obtain parole for person convicted in another
county); Ethics Comm., North Carolina State Bar Ass'n Op. [hereinafter North Carolina
Op.] 425 (1963), MARu No. 3450 (1970) (prosecutor may not advise prisoner).
lu See Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 16 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:5258 (county prosecutor may represent potential federal defendant on federal charge
on which there could be no action by the county prosecutor); see also Alabama Op., supra
note 119, 84-14 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1071 (allowing associate of prosecutor to
defend in federal criminal cases so long as no facet of federal case will be subject matter
of state court proceedings and defendant will not be subject to state charges); Alabama Op.
81-547 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1024 (allowing associate of prosecutor to accept court
appointment to represent defendant in federal case); cf. statutes cited in note 175, supra.
One assumes that there would usually be a possibility of parallel state charges being filed.
"3 ALA. CODE §§ 12-17-195 and -196 provide:
Any assistant district attorney who acts as attorney for, represents or defends
any defendant charged with a criminal offense of any kind or character in
any court, state, municipal or federal, in this state, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than $100.00 nor
more than $1,000.00.
Any partner or partners of any district attorney or assistant district attorney
of this state who defend criminal cases of any character, kind or description
in any court in this state in which said district attorney or assistant district
attorney is the prosecuting officer shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction, shall be fined not more than $500.00.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Compare the language of Ky. Rav. STAT. AN. § 15.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985)
(no criminal penalty). For state opinions involving similar statutes see Maryland Op., supra
note 64, 86-76 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:4304; Nevada Op., supra note
178, 1 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:5601 (citing statute forbidding part-time county pro-
secutor's law partner from representing criminal defendant in any state court).
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forces and prosecutors to cooperate with the switch-hitter in other
cases. 114
In the introductory portions of this Article I alluded to the fact
that, at least in Kentucky, the work of the city attorney is often
"contracted out" to private firms.185 At one time, the city attorney
was assigned prosecutorial duties. 18 6 Furthermore, the city attorney
had, and in many areas still has, the duty of advising the city
police.8 7 The conventional wisdom in most states runs to the
proposition that a city prosecutor may defend outside of his juris-
diction,'88 but may not become involved in the defense of cases
that arise in his territorial jurisdiction, that would involve the
violation of city ordinances of his jurisdiction,8 9 or that would
I" ABA Op., supra note 75, 262 (1944), MARu, supra note 8, No. 262 (1970) (coop-
eration might be disrupted); ABA Op. 118 (1934), MARu No. 118 (1970) (might "undo the
work of another [prosecutor]" and cause a decline in public confidence). Cf. Michigan Op.,
supra note 133, CI-887 (1983), 4.BA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:4859; Montana Op.,
supra note 174, 25 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:5405. No special rule is needed to prevent
the part-time prosecutor from alluding to his public office. His public office is irrelevant
when he is representing a private party, and the prosecutor should not be permitted to
allude to it in an effort to enhance his or her position or to bolster the credibility of his or
her client. Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DRs 7-106(C)(1), (4) 8-101(2); MODEL RULES,
supra note 3, Rule 3.4(e).
May a prosecutor represent a person in an action to recover tangible items of stolen
property in the possession of the police or the court? If this is a major moral lapse then it
is not very obvious. Idaho Op., supra note 64, 16 (1959), MARU, supra note 8, No. 840
(1959), allows a prosecutor or deputy prosecutor to represent a plaintiff in a civil action to
recover stolen goods in another county, but not if the prosecutor's office was involved in
the related criminal action.
I do not recommend that a prosecutor attempt to represent a suspect or convicted or
acquitted defendant in such an action, nor do I think it is appropriate for state prosecutors
to appear opposite the federal government in "forfeiture" proceedings.
"' See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
'" See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-196 (1978), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,168
(1980) (noting that city attorney now handles only administrative affairs). However, a new
statute, KY. Ray. STAT. AmN. § 82.000 (Banks-Baldwin 1992), allows cities to criminalize
violations of city ordinances at the misdemeanor level and assign such cases to the county
attorney. The duty to prosecute parallel or alternative civil penalties is assigned to the city
attorney. These quasi-prosecutorial duties will exacerbate the conflicts problems. See Virginia
Inf. Op., supra note 140, 152 (undated), MAIu No. 10,082 (1975) (declining to sanction
city attorney's defense of city ordinance violations even if such cases are prosecuted by
commonwealth's attorney rather than city attorney).
" Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-196 (1978), MAU, supra note 8, No. 11,168 (1980).
lu See, e.g., Alabama Op., supra note 119, 82-648 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:1038; Illinois Op., supra note 141, 852 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3018; cf.
Wisconsin Op., supra note 117, E-81-6 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9104 (allowing prose-
cutor to defend cases involving violations of the ordinances of other municipalities).
'" See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-196 (1978), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,168
(1980); see also Alabama Ops., supra note 119, 90-42 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note
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involve the testimony of the police officers of his city. 9° It is not
as obvious why a city attorney who has no prosecutorial duties
and who has no formal duty to advise the police should be pro-
hibited from doing defense work in the city.19' In my experience,
a number of small towns and their lawyers have proposed special
contractual arrangements and "waivers" so that the partners and
associates of the city attorney might continue to maintain a defense
practice. However, in a recent ethics opinion the Kentucky Com-
mittee and Board of Governors declined to approve of these special
arrangements, opting instead to maintain a conventional bright-
line rule. 92 This opinion is sure to be controversial.
8, 901:1068 (concerning defendants charged with violations of city or municipal ordinances),
82-648 (undated), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1038; Illinois Op., supra note 141, 823 (1983),
ABA/BNA Man. 801:3015; New Hampshire Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Op. [hereinafter New
Hampshire Op.] 1987-8/13 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:5704; Ohio Sup. Ct. Op., supra
note 143, 88-8 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:6856; Virginia Inf. Op., supra note 140, 152
(undated), MARu No. 10,082 (1985) (finding it improper to defend violation of city ordinance
even if such cases are prosecuted by commonwealth's attorney rather than city attorney);
Wisconsin Op., supra note 117, E-81-3 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9104. For a disciplinary
case see State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Hollstein, 274 N.W.2d 508, 517 (Neb.
1979). In this case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reduced a city attorney's penalty from
suspension from the bar to censure when his appearance was based in part on the grounds
that the ethics opinion on which his suspension was based was unknown to him.
11 See Ethics Comm. of the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee Op. [hereinafter Tennessee Op.] 81-F-23 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:8105; New York Op., supra note 122, 544 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:6107.
In Kentucky Op., supra note 4, 225 (1980), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Apr. 1980, at 55, the
committee opined that the partner or associate of a city attorney may defend criminal cases
outside the city in which the city attorney is employed, but may not defend in any case if
the offense occurred in that city or if the city police investigated the criminal case. In People
v. Washington, 444 N.E.2d 753, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), the Illinois Court of Appeals
ruled that a part-time city attorney could not effectively cross-examine a city police officer
about the grounds for his client's arrest, and that his client, a murder defendant, received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
91 See, e.g., South Carolina Op., supra note 142, 84-21 (undated), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 801:7915 (permitting county lawyer who represents county officials in civil
matters to represent criminal defendants charged in the county employing the lawyer so
long as the lav~yer does not advise the sheriff's department regarding criminal matters). But
see ABA Op., supra note 75, 186 (1938), MARu, supra note 8, No. 186 (1970) (refusing to
allow county attorney who handles civil cases for the county to defend in cases prosecuted
by the county district attorney).
Can we distinguish someone holding the position of "city attorney" from a lawyer in
private practice who accepts some civil cases or other non-criminal contract work from the
city? In a "big-city" context, one assumes that much work will be contracted out. Should
such contract lawyers and their firms be prohibited from doing criminal defense work
involving the city police? If a firm does contract work in civil matters for a particular state
agency, should that firm be precluded from doing criminal cases? Such restrictions seem
terribly formal.
'1 The committee reasoned:
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In a few states, a case 93 or an ethics opinion'9 has approved
a plan or program allowing a local firm to "loan" one or more
associates or junior partners to the prosecutor's office without the
loan resulting in disqualification of other firm members from de-
fending in other criminal cases. The theory seems to be that the
public will get something for nothing 95 and that the firm members
will get some trial experience.'" Presumably, the prosecutor gets
something to crow about in the local newspaper, and in some cases
at least, a chance to cozy up to one or more large law firms. On
balance, these programs strike me as a bad idea.
In other states, there are opinions that permit prosecutors to
defend when they are appointed by the court. 97 Appointing pro-
It has been pointed out by advocates of the current and restrictive rule [KBA
E-196] that there are still conflicts of interest or risks of abuse in this context,
in spite of these special contractual provisions. For example, the city may be
a potential target of a 1983 action arising from the same facts of the case that
the lawyer is attempting to defend in his private capacity. In other circum-
stances the lawyer may be perceived as "advising" or otherwise steering the
police, who may be inclined to listen to the lawyer because of his or her role
as city attorney.
Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-349 (1992), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Spring 1992, at 46, discre-
tionary review granted sub nom. In re Redding, No. 92-SC-647 (1992).
"I See, e.g., Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436, 438 (Del. 1991) ("Lend-A-Prosecutor"
program).
"I See, e.g., Ethics Comm. of the Massachusetts State Bar Op. [hereinafter Massachu-
setts Op.] 91-2 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:4601 (discussing volunteer
program for work at both trial and appellate levels, and appropriate safeguards); see also
Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI 760 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4841 (allowing lawyer
who serves as special prosecutor for city who prosecutes ordinance violations on a pro bono
basis to defend criminal cases).
M" The public appetite for services that don't cost the public anything and the desire
of politicians to stay in the kitchen no doubt have something to do with the part-time
prosecutor problem, the pro bono debate, and so on. The list grows.
"1 In the old days, law firms were willing to train associates and absorb the cost of
training. Those days are long gone.
I" See Professional Ethics Comm. of the Florida Bar Op. [hereinafter Florida Op.]
72-48 (1973), MARu, supra note 8, No. 8187 (Supp. 1975) (approving federal judge's
appointment of state prosecutors to defend in federal court upon determination that "hard-
ship conditions" exist in a particular county); Idaho Op., supra note 64, [unnumbered],
MARu No. 8277 (Supp. 1975) (allowing lawyers in same firm to appear on opposite sides
after disclosure if court-appointed); Ethics Comm. of the Utah State Bar Op. [unnumbered]
(1972), MARu No. 9910 (Supp. 1975) (concerning city prosecutor defending in own juris-
diction pursuant to court appointment). Mississippi Op., supra note 144, 75 (1982), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:5103, suggests that conflicts considerations "weigh more
heavily on the attorney who acts as a private defense counsel as compared to one who
represents the indigent through court-appointment." See also ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64,
1285 (1974), MARu No. 7439 (Supp. 1975) (the final in a series of confusing opinions from
the ABA Committee on defense practice by city attorneys). On the other hand, in Haley v.
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secutors to defend seems to me to be the least desirable way to
provide legal services to the indigent, and presumably cannot be
allowed where statutes ban prosecutorial defense practice. 93 Of
course, "the law is what the court says it is," and prosecutors
should not be disciplined for following court orders.' 99
The rule that bars prosecutors from defending criminal cases
can cause some confusion when a defense lawyer runs for the
prosecutor's office. One assumes that a candidate may continue to
defend until such time as he is elected.2 May the lawyer continue
to defend in pending ("open file") cases after his or her election
but before he or she takes office? Some opinions can be found
allowing the lawyer to complete the defense of pending cases before
being sworn in, but warn that new cases should not be accepted if
they are likely to be incomplete when the lawyer assumes office. °0
Upon assuming office, the prosecutor and his staff will face new
problems in proceeding against the prosecutor's former client which
are addressed in Part VI.B. of this Article.
B. Suits Against the State
It is commonly assumed that a prosecutor may not represent a
private party whose interests are adverse to the state or county,2
Bowles, 824 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), discussed supra at note 145, the court
concluded that spousal conflicts presented non-consentable conflicts in cases involving court-
appointed criminal defense attorneys, because the indigent defendant has no real alternatives.
I" See, e.g., Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 15.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985), cited supra
at note 175.
199 See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.16(c).
m In Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Arizona Op.
[hereinafter Arizona Op.] 88-3 (1988), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:140, the com-
mittee stated that a lawyer who had been appointed to defend in a murder case may
continue to defend even after announcing his intention to run for county attorney, but that
he must seek permission to withdraw from the case if the client does not consent to the
representation.
201 See Virginia Op., supra note 121, 1319 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:8767; Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 85-80 (1985) (the prohibition against defending criminal cases
in KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.740 does not apply until the person appointed to fill the
vacancy in the commonwealth attorney's office assumes that office and takes the oath); cf.
South Carolina Op., supra note 142, 2-77 (undated), MARu, supra note 8, No. 12,711
(Supp. 1980) (cautioning appointed prosecutor to avoid cases that might relate to his
forthcoming prosecutorial duties); Nassau County Op., supra note 152, 88-1 (1988), ABA/
BNA Man. 901:6261 (dealing with defense attorney who has accepted job as prosecutor for
state prosecuting agency that is not prosecuting his client; he may continue to represent
that client with full disclosure and client's consent). But see ABA Op., supra note 75, 136
(1935), MARu No. 136 (1970) (lawyer who represents a convict before parole board must
discontinue this representation upon his election to office of county attorney).
See Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 40. Bjorkman cites Kizer, supra note 6, at 376-80,
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and this assumption appears to be central to our discussions-in
sections B and C of this Part. There are some opinions on the
books that allude to this proposition,23 and as government agencies
proliferate one assumes that more and more cases will be declared
"off limits" for the part-time prosecutor's private practice. Is there
a compelling rationale for this generalization?
The rationale seems to be based on the argument that "an
attorney-client relationship exists between the state, together with
its political subdivision, the county, and the state's attorney." 2°4 It
as support for the generalization that "[t]he ethics committees of most state bar associations
have unequivocally opposed the representation, by state's attorneys, of parties in opposition
to the interests of the county or of the state." However, Kizer does not make such a
sweeping statement. Rather, he notes that most bar associations find that prosecutors should
never represent private clients whose cases relate in any way to official prosecutorial duties.
Kizer, supra note 6, at 378.
- In Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 9 (1979), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,934
(Supp. 1980), the committee recommended that an attorney ask permission to withdraw
from a civil rights suit against a prison warden, various guards, and the state of Missouri
when he became the prosecutor in an adjoining county. However, if his motion to withdraw
were denied, the committee would allow him to continue. Cf. MODEL RULEs, supra note 3,
Rule 1.16(c) (noting that even a lawyer with a good reason to withdraw must obey a court
order to continue representation). In Indiana Op., supra note 128, 1 (1977), MARu No.
11,058 (Supp. 1980), the committee observed that deputy prosecuting attorneys are appointed
officials of the state, and found that such prosecutors may not represent criminal defendants
or clients with claims against the state in their private practices. In an unnumbered 1974
Idaho opinion, MARu No. 8271 (Supp. 1975), the committee opined that "[a] part-time
prosecutor may not represent a private plaintiff attacking the constitutionality of a state
statute, even though the prosecutor's office is not involved with the proposed suit. Such an
attorney is a public employee and may not represent an adversary to the state." In Arizona
Op., supra note 200, 242 (1968), MA u No. 5996 (Supp. 1970), the committee stated that
a county attorney may not represent a private client in a wrongful death action in which
the state, through its highway department, might be a defendant. I assume that some county
attorneys in Kentucky would take issue with this opinion, at least insofar as it would purport
to apply to cases arising outside of their county.
In Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-272 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3908, the com-
mittee ruled that a tenured law professor could not represent a plaintiff against his or her
own university over the university's objection. This seems odd, since a tenured professor
has no attorney-client relationship with the university. There may be a MODEL CODE, supra
note 16, DR 5-101(A) or MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b) conflict, but it seems to
me that the client (plaintiff) might rationally "consent" in appropriate circumstances.
Compare Illinois Op., supra note 141, 89-18 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:3013 (allowing part-time university instructor to represent, in a criminal proceeding, a
former university employee, so long as the client consents after full disclosure and the
lawyer is able to exercise his or her independent professional judgment). I also wonder why
the university would object; having a tenured law professor on the other side might very
well increase one's chances for winning.
2m Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 40 n.124. Who is the government lawyer's client? The
ethics codes answer the question with confusion. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES, supra note 3,
Rule 1.13 cmt. 7; Federal Bar Ass'n Committee on Professional Ethics, Ethical Consider-
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
seems to be taken as a given that a part-time prosecutor is a lawyer
for or servant of the state at all times, and for all purposes. If the
state is the prosecutor's present client, then the prosecutor should
not sue his or her private client, or represent adverse interests,
even in an unrelated matter or matters. 25 Another argument, which
often helps resolve individual cases, would be that a prosecutor
should not represent private litigants in matters in which he or she
might be called upon to perform his or her official duty.4' How-
ever, it can be seen that this is a much narrower proposition, and
it cannot account for all of the opinions prdhibiting representation
against the state or state agencies.
If a part-time prosecutor must at all times be loyal to the state,
then it would seem to follow that a part-time prosecutor may not
put on his or her private practice hat and sue the state. Commen-
tators usually support this proposition by citing cases and opinions
relating to condemnation matters, 2 7 or the occasional case in which
a prosecutor wishes to represent a private client in a suit in the
state court or board of claims. 2°8
Kentucky Opinion E-2412° is typical of the condemnation op-
inions. The issue was whether a commonwealth attorney or a
county attorney could represent a party other than the state in a
condemnation proceeding brought by the Kentucky Department of
ations For Federal Lawyers, F.E.C.-5.1, reprinted in STmPHN GnxERs & Roy D. SIMON,
JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (1989); WOLFRAM, supra note 8,
§§ 8.9.2, 13.9.1.
20 See MODEL RULEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmts. 3 and 8; see also ABA Inf. Op.,
supra note 64, 1495 (1982), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:340-1 (both the Model
Code and the Model Rules clearly prohibit a lawyer from representing one client in litigation
against another client the lawyer simultaneously represents in another case, even though the
matters are unrelated). If the "People" that the prosecutor is representing in a criminal
case is the same client (the state) that the prosecutor is suing when he or she is pursuing a
claim against the state, and is the same client that the prosector is opposing when he or
she represents a private client against the Department of Natural Resources, then this makes
some sort of sense. But see Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Rule 1.7 cmt. 14 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992) (noting that court will usually inquire into conflicts when attorney represents multiple
criminal defendants). Of course, this provides all the more support for the rule prohibiting
prosecutors from representing criminal defendants.
See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983) ("Is the contemplated civil represen-
tation related in any way to the statutory duty of said prosecutor to represent the Com-
monwealth in companion litigation?"); Kizer, supra note 6, at 378; see also infra parts
V.C. and D.
See Kizer, supra note 6, at 377, 380.
Id. at 377. I have provided informal opinions to part-time commonwealth attorneys
that they should not represent private parties with tort claims against the state (Board of
Claims cases).
209 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-241 (1981), Ky. BENcH & BAR, July 1981, 28, 29.
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Highways. In answering this question, the committee appeared to
draw several distinctions between the commonwealth attorney and
the county attorney, which, it seems to me, are frequently over-
looked.
The committee seemed to take the position that a common-
wealth attorney, a "Constitutional Officer," is a servant of the
state. The committee opined:
The Commonwealth Attorney should not represent a private in-
terest in condemnation proceedings since he is an officer of the
State, derives his authority from the state, is paid by the State,
and is an employee of the State. It is axiomatic that a lawyer
who is an employee will not take any action against the employer.
Since the Commonwealth is a party to a condemnation action,
the Commonwealth Attorney would have a conflict of interest in
representing the other side .... 210
As far as the committee is concerned, the state is the common-
wealth attorney's master. Elsewhere the committee alludes to the
biblical injunction that "no man can serve two masters." To put
it another way, the committee viewed this as a situation in which
the prosecutor was about to rob Peter to pay Paul.
Regarding the county attorney, the committee observed that he
or she is a "County Officer," as well as a "Constitutional Offi-
cer," to whom the legislature might assign duties pertaining to
state functions as well as county functions. 21' The committee con-
cluded from this exercise in state and local government law212 that
there may be some situations in which a county attorney may
handle a condemnation case, and some situations in which he or
she may not. At this point in the opinion, the committee noted
that the county attorney has the statutory duty to represent the
Department of Highways213 regarding matters in his or her own
county. This would suggest that the county attorney should be
precluded from representing private parties in condemnation cases
in his or her own county, but not necessarily in other counties.
So far so good. However, the committee continued:
210 Id.
221 Id.
2,2 This is a good example of how "ethics questions" cannot be answered until
questions of law are resolved. For examples of the difficulties faced by ethics committees
in this regard see Underwood, supra note 2, at 152-54.
23 See sources cited supra notes 46-47.
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The County Attorney is in somewhat a different situation [than
the Commonwealth Attorney]. He is elected by the people of his
county to serve the county in that office. The County Attorney
is paid by the county for performing the functions before the
Fiscal Court. The County Attorney also receives remuneration
from the state for prosecutorial functions in the district court.
214
Unfortunately, even if we accept these propositions, the com-
mittee did not tell us what follows. It did not say what it was
driving at. Is the point that the county attorney is not the state's
lawyer except when he or she is actually engaged in the performance
of some specific "state duty?" Apparently not, as further analysis
demonstrates.
The committee observed that in the normal condemnation case,
the county in which the property is located is a necessary party to
the litigation since there needs to be a determination as to the taxes
due on the property. The committee did not discuss this point
further. Perhaps the point was made to support the view that the
county attorney should not take a condemnation case in his own
county. However, this extremely formal point (the taxes may not
be disputed) adds little to the analysis that went before. Finally,
the committee concluded that "[it is our feeling that the County
Attorney like the Commonwealth Attorney may not represent a
private individual in a condemnation proceeding. ' 2' s This is a
proposition that is contradicted elsewhere in the opinion by the
suggestion that cases in other counties might be taken.
I have not undertaken a detailed review of this opinion just to
be hyper-critical. My point is that there seems to be some confusion
as to what the rules are and should be, or at least what the reasons
for the rules are. If I had to describe what I think is the position
of the committee and the board, based on the ethics opinions
discussed so far, it would be that part-time commonwealth attor-
neys may not sue the state, and that part-time county attorneys
probably can't either (then again maybe they can in some circum-
stances). This is not very helpful. 2 6 As we shall see in the next
214 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-241 (1981), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1981, 28, 29.
215 Id.
226 Again, we might ask who the client is. If a county attorney can be called upon to
represent the Department of Highways, or is in fact representing that agency in a pending
matter, does that mean that the county attorney is representing the same client (that abstract
"State") that a private client may want him to sue in the Board of Claims or in federal
court under § 1983? This seems a bit extravagant. On the other hand, if we accept the view
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section, there is at least one other Kentucky ethics opinion on
point. But it is clear that some simple and iron-clad rules would
be helpful, even if the theory behind the rules were lacking in
elegance.
C. Opposing State and Local Governments
The defense of a citizen in a criminal case, or the representation
of a "John Q. Public" in a civil damage action against the state,
is only part of the story. These are the most obvious instances of
"direct" conflict. 217 But the question is broader: Is a lawyer who
can fairly be said to be representing a governmental entity also
representing interests adverse to the that governmental entity? The
that a county attorney is deemed a lawyer for the Commonwealth and all of its instrumen-
talities because he or she regularly accepts a paycheck from the state treasury, perhaps we
need not engage in such close analysis.
In any event, prosecutors who call me about this type of conflict invariably cite
Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-210 (1979), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3901 and
E-66 (1974), MAgu, supra note 8, No. 8529 (Supp. 1975) (the latter "written" by the Court
of Appeals in response to an appeal of an ethics opinion). Those opinions state that
commonwealth and county attorneys may accept workers' compensation cases. However,
those opinions seem to be based on the premise that an action on behalf of a private client
for workers' compensation benefits is not an action against the Workmen's Compensation
Board (the State). Alluding to the statutory duties of commonwealth and county attorneys,
the committee observed:
The statute creates the possibility that any of three people may be called upon
to represent the Board in actions against it if it so desires. Above all else,
[Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.425 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990)] is designed to
afford a source of legal representation for the Board when the Board itself is
the real party in interest. It does not contemplate or encompass the normal
situation where counsel for a private party goes before the Board to seek an
award for a work-related injury or disease....
Since the Board acts in a neutral capacity in adjudicating claims before it,
surely the Board would not favor a county attorney's client simply because of
the remote possibility that the county attorney might some day be called upon
to represent the Board.
Kentucky Op. E-66, supra. See also West Virginia Op., supra note 64, 77-9 (1978), M.iu
No. 13,046 (Supp. 1980) (in most instances workers' compensation cases do not involve the
state and its interests, but if claimant were an employee of the state or of any of its agencies
or subdivisions, the public employer would be a real party in interest and the representation
would be improper). A nit-picker would point out that the old Kentucky opinions do not
take into account the existence of the Special Fund, which may be represented by an
assistant attorney general. See Illinois Op., supra note 141, 278 (1966), discussed infra note
224. Does it make a difference if the fund is a real party in interest? See the next section.
It makes my head hurt to think about all of this, and I do not find Kentucky Ops. E-66
and E-210 very helpful. I suspect that these opinions will continue to serve as a sort of
"Holy Grail" for prosecutors who want to take cases against the Commonwealth and its
boards and agencies.
21 See MoDEL Rumn, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(a).
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conflict-the opposition-may be "indirect. 2 18 This is where things
can get rarefied indeed.
I have already alluded to the fact that conflicts can arise
because the particular prosecutor has a statutory duty to represent
an entity, or a specific board or agency, in a particular type of
case. 2 9 Such conflicts will be catalogued in the next section. We
must also concede the general rule that a lawyer may not represent
interests adverse to a client with whom there exists an ongoing
attorney-client relationship.20 That conflicts rule is familiar to all
lawyers in private practice. But if a private citizen wants to bring
a case that will put that citizen at odds with a state or county
entity or agency, and if the prosecutor has no "open files"-
pending cases-in which he or she is representing the particular
entity or agency, and if it is highly unlikely that the specific
prosecutor or anyone in the prosecutor's office21 will actually be
called upon to represent the entity or agency in the matter at hand,
is acceptance of the representation improper? What is the basis for
an across-the-board rule against the representation, by part-time
prosecutors, "of parties in opposition to the interests of the county
or the state?2m2
When we are asked to acknowledge such a conflicts rule (at
least in its most extreme formulations or applications), it seems to
me that we are asked to assume that in accepting the office, and
in taking the periodic public paycheck (such as it is), the part-time
prosecutor is also accepting the proposition that he or she is a
lawyer for the check-paying entity and all of its agencies, commis-
sions, and boards at all times and for all purposes. The lawyer is
on a sort of public retainer, and has a present client relationship
with the retaining government and any and all of its departments
and subdivisions.
We may be able to agree on such a rule, and many prosecutors
seem to have already adopted it in practice.m In fact, such a rule
2r See id. Rule 1.7(b).
29 See discussion of condemnation cases, supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
22 See infra part VI.A.
221 See infra part ViII.
2n See Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 40.
22 Note that I am acting as something of a devil's advocate here. I am perfectly happy
to follow a restrictive rule if it is fairly announced. A lawyer on retainer for a corporation,
or a lawyer who regularly does work for a corporation, would not expect to be able to sue
or otherwise oppose that corporation or its subsidiaries. Do prosecutors protest too much
about restrictive rules that limit opportunity?
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played center stage in one Kentucky Bar Association ethics opin-
ion.224 In that opinion, the committee stated that neither common-
wealth or county attorneys nor their associates in private practice
could represent licensees in disciplinary actions before state licens-
ing boards or commissions, nor could they represent any such
licensee against any state board or commission in any district,
circuit, or appellate court. The Committee reasoned that "Com-
monwealth attorneys are compensated by the state and therefore
are employees of the state.'"'2 The committee extended the net of
this logic to county attorneys with the observation that "they
receive remuneration from the state for prosecutorial functions in
the district courts .... Therefore it is the opinion of this Com-
mittee that County Attorneys and their assistants are prohibited
from representing licensees in such disciplinary actions.
' ' n6
This is a sweeping and seemingly definitive ruling that is fully
consistent with the notion that no commonwealth or county attor-
ney may ever oppose any state agency or board. To the extent that
ethics committee advisory or interpretive opinions are persuasive,
this may be said to be the rule in Kentucky. But have we really
thought about the implications of such a rule?227 Do we want to
rethink it? If, after thinking about it, we still want such an across-
the-board rule, should we not spell it out clearly in a statute or
court rule? I pose these questions because, in my experience, most
lawyers do not read ethics opinions. When they do read them, they
do not always believe what they read.
The case of the county attorney might be distinguished from
that of the commonwealth or state's attorney. One Kentucky stat-
ute states: "[I]n no case shall the county attorney take a fee or act
as counsel in any case in opposition to the interest of the county."'
Although this sentence is well hidden, it is written (for the
most part) in words of one syllable, and does not leave much room
•2, Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-263 (1982), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1982, 44, 45.
Cf. Illinois Op., supra note 141, 278 (1966), MARu, supra note 8, No. 6620 (Supp. 1970)
(requiring a newly elected state's attorney to withdraw from the representation of a client
whom he has been representing in an appeal from the denial of a license from a state
agency when the appeal is opposed by the attorney general of the state).
I" Kentucky Op. E-263 (1982), supra note 224.
6 Id.
2" See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Oct. 1983, 52,
55a ("By becoming a candidate for Commonwealth or County Attorney, or accepting
employment as an assistant in either of these prosecutorial offices, the lawyer must consider
the number and types of cases that will be precluded in the private law practice .....
2 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 69.210(4)0b) (Michie/Bobbs-MerriU Supp. 1990).
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for misunderstanding. It rules out (in the absence of consentW 9)
representation of any party in any case in which the county or a
county board or agency has any adverse interest.20 This rule would
not necessarily prevent the lawyer from taking cases adverse to
other counties or the boards or agencies of other counties21 unless,
of course, positional or issues conflicts are to be taken seriously3
2
However, the statute says nothing about the status of the county
attorney as a lawyer for the state when he or she is not performing
the limited prosecutorial duties assigned to him or her by the state.
The fact that the county attorney prosecutes cases on behalf
of the state in the district court of his or her county,233 and the
theoretical possibility that the prosecutor might be assigned to a
29 See discussion supra part III.D.
2" See Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-167 (1977), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,143
(Supp. 1980) (lawyer who shares office space with part-time assistant county attorney may
not represent private parties in cases concerning the same matter handled by the county
attorney in the county attorney's court), E-159 (1977), MARu No. 11,135 (Supp. 1980)
(lawyer who shares office space with county attorney may not accept employment adverse
to county), and E-141 (1976), MARu No. 11,117 (Supp. 1980) (county attorney may not
represent county residents in dispute concerning legality of a garbage collection contract
between the county and a private business).
May a commonwealth attorney bring a case against the county? Compare New York
Op., supra note 122, 430 (1976), MAnu No. 12,195 (Supp. 1980) (refusing to allow part-
time county prosecutor who handles only criminal cases to represent client in civil damage
action against county, even though county has advice of a county attorney and case will be
defended by insurance defense counsel) and Virginia Inf. Ops., supra note 140, 253 (un-
dated), MA.u No. 12,885 (Supp. 1980) (stating that county's commonwealth's attorney may
not represent private parties in civil cases against that county) and 153 (undated), MARu
No. 10,083 (Supp. 1975) (finding it improper for commonwealth's attorney to represent
private clients in cases against county even though county attorney has been appointed)
with Alabama Op., supra note 119, 83-109 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:1059
(permitting part-time deputy district attorney hired by county commission to handle criminal
cases in county, but considered employee of the state, to represent deputy sheriffs in civil
suit against county commission on theory that case was not directly related to and would
not effect lawyer's payment by county commission-an odd opinion?), Indiana Op., supra
note 128, 4 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3306 (allowing part-time state prosecutor paid by
county to represent private clients against county if there is no probability of criminal
charges, no use of "inside information," no official duty to be performed by county
prosecutor, and consent by all parties) and Virginia Inf. Op. 315 (undated), MARu No.
12,947 (Supp. 1980) (noting that commonwealth attorney may not sue county, but part-
time county attorney who handles only civil cases may defend criminal cases in his or her
county as long as defendant is not charged with violations of county ordinances!).
21 May a county attorney represent a client in another county in a request for a zone
change? Yes. See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-193 (1978), MARU, supra note 8, No.
11,165 (Supp. 1980).
232 But see MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 8 (noting that government
lawyers may sometimes represent government employees against government agencies).
21 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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prosecution in another forum in a particular case, 2 4 may justify a
ban on defense practice, and even a rule against representation in
damage suits against the state.25 But unless it is probable that the
prosecutor will actually be called upon to become involved in the
matter at hand or a closely related matter in his or her official
capacity, or be called upon to prosecute his or her client, does it
follow that the county attorney may not represent private citizens
against, say, the Department of Natural Resources?
216
I admit that such conflicts are much more likely to be spotted
and argued when a commonwealth's attorney takes a case, since
the commonwealth's attorney is more easily identified with the
state (they call them commonwealth's attorneys, don't they?). But
the same questions might be raised. Is there a real and substantial
conflicts issue when a commonwealth's attorney represents a coal
operator who has been cited for violation of some administrative
regulation by the Department of Natural Resources? The depart-
ment will have its own lawyers. Must there be a substantial likeli-
hood that, in the particular case, the prosecutor will be called upon
to bring a charge or claim against the coal operator, or is the
representation improper simply because a state agency is the op-
posing party?
237
These are not merely academic questions. Prosecutors are tak-
ing cases like this every day, and state agencies, like the Department
-"' See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
23S For example, damage suits against prison authorities.
2% The answer must be "yes" if we are to follow Kentucky Op. E-263 (1982), supra
note 224. See also Professional Ethics Comm., State Bar of Texas Op. [hereinafter Texas
Op.] 323 (1966), Muu, supra note 8, No. 7247 (Supp. 1970), which informs us that county
attorneys and their partners may not represent clients in suits adverse to the state.
Of course, in the real world disputes over the application of ethics rules may sometimes
be affected by attitudes brought about by the distribution of power in a particular locale.
These influences may not be appreciated by outsiders. Consider the lyrics of Malvina
Reynolds' tune "Mrs. Clara Sullivan's Letter," which goes, with my additions [ ] and
deletions _..._: "[Prosecutor - ] he has it fine, he runs the law and owns a mine, in -
County." [0 Schroder Music Co. (BMI)]. Many critics feel that local prosecutors "run the
counties." They draw many conclusions from this major premise that are hostile to and
restrictive of the prosecutor. Arguments like this are hard to work into ethics opinions.
Nevertheless, I must concede that the positioning of a local public figure, especially one
associated with the law, on the side of a local citizen or local company in a dispute with
"outsiders" (especially "those people from Capitol City") will attract attention. Perhaps
this is what that "appearance of impropriety" language is all about.
See cases collected infra parts VI and VII; see also Sanders v. Mississippi State Bar
Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1985). In this case, a prosecutor tried to represent allegedly
corrupt school board members at a removal hearing. Because there were reasonable grounds
to believe that criminal charges were warranted, the attorney was reprimanded for violating
his obligation to aid uncompromisingly in the prosecution of persons for unlawful conduct.
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of Natural Resources, are responding with motions to disqualify.Yss
Cases are becoming bogged down because of these collateral dis-
putes.239 Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a consensus
regarding the answer to the conflicts question, regardless of what
the ethics committee may have said in an unread and, for that
matter, "unavailable" opinion.2 While the easy answer would be
to declare such cases off limits after subjecting them to the "smell
test," this lacks a certain intellectual elegance, and might be dif-
ficult to justify under the language of the Model Rules. 24' This is
the sort of question that might profitably be addressed in a sup-
plementary code or in a statute.242
It is worth noting that on one occasion the Kentucky ethics
committee opined that a private lawyer representing a state agency
on a personal service contract could not represent a private client
against that same agency in a different, unrelated matter, but that
the same lawyer could represent a private client against a different
state agency with consent of all parties after full disclosure.2 43 This
opinion makes sense if the agency qua agency is the client, and
not the "state" and any and all of its subdivisions, agencies, boards
and commissions." If only the particular agency is the client, then
the lawyer may not sue the present client,15 but may sue a related
"non-client" with consent after full disclosure. 24 However, it seems
to me that private lawyers on contract to handle a specific category247
of administrative cases may fairly be governed by a less rigorous
2 These motions are then passed on to the ethics committee by the courts. Judges do
not understand that ethics committees are not fact-finding bodies, and that such committees
properly defer to the courts when "ethics matters" are in litigation. See Maryland Op.,
supra note 64, 92-26 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:4305.
V. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 164-67.
mo See supra note 6 (discussing need for state bar handbooks).
241 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (regarding the deletion of the "appearance
of impropriety" from the Model Rules). And so the cry goes out: "They (or insert for
"they" the Ethics Committee Chairman, or better still, the Chief Justice: pick your "they")
are trying to take our private practices away from us!"
242 See proposals infra part IX.
141 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-281 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3909.
24 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
24' See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
246 Cf. MODEL Rutrm, supra note 3, Rule 1.7(b) and accompanying comments.
2 See, e.g., ABA Op., supra note 75, 262 (1944); ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 798
(1964), MARu, supra note 8, No. 5403 (Supp. 1970); Ethics Comm. of the Los Angeles




conflicts rule than full-time state employeesm or part-time prose-
cutors.249
As one might expect, the cases and opinions relating to city
attorneys are analogous to those dealing with commonwealth and
county attorneys. Neither a city attorney nor a lawyer who is on
retainer or contract for a city in a specific area should sue the city,
even in an unrelated matter,210 or represent adverse interests. 215 The
2" Cf. Maryland Op., supra note 64, 92-8 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
1001:4304 (refusing to allow a full-time assistant general counsel for a state agency to
represent a private client in a civil rights suit against another state agency). In Kentucky
Op., supra note 4, E-200 (1979), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,172 (1980), the committee
opined that a lawyer employed full-time by a government agency could not represent a
client before another governmental agency in a matter unrelated to his employment. The
same opinion stated that the full-time government lawyer could not represent another
employee of a different department in a disciplinary hearing, and could not represent a
client charged with a crime in a circuit court.
"I See Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 25 (1979), MAnu, supra note 8, No. 11,950
(Supp. 1980) (allowing "specially hired assistant prosecuting attorneys" to accept court
appointments to represent criminal defendants and to represent clients in civil or adminis-
trative cases before or involving state agencies, as well as to oppose other prosecuting
attorneys in civil litigation with the informed consent of all parties).
21 See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-190 (1978), MAu, supra note 8, No. 11,162
(Supp. 1980); Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland Ops. I-A
and I-A Supp. (1950-51), MARu Nos. 3555 and 3556 (1970) (lawyers who are police court
prosecutors, city council members, or police officers may not represent clients in matters in
which city has an adverse interest, even if limited to appearances before municipal admin-
istrative agencies and board of zoning appeals). Of course, if a lawyer has done work for
the city (e.g., bond work), the lawyer may not subsequently attack the validity of the bonds
on behalf of either a taxpayer or new city authorities. AEA Op., supra note 75, 71 (1932),
MARu No. 71 (1970). However, a city attorney may represent a private client charged by
other cities or villages with violations of their codes and ordinances. Illinois Op., supra
note 141, 543 (1976), MARu No. 10,935 (Supp. 1980); New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 314
(1975), MARu No. 8916 (Supp. 1975) (driver's license revocation for offenses in another
county).
In Los Angeles County Op., supra note 247, 77 (1934), MAU No. 6143 (Supp. 1970),
the committee opined that a special attorney who represented the city in commercial litigation
may represent a municipal fireman in a salary dispute with the city. So there is an opinion
for all occasions: cf. authorities supra note 248. On the basis of my experience, I would
say that this is a problem that deserves some consideration. Many lawyers would like to
have some kind of contract employment with a city while retaining the right to sue the city
and its agencies in unrelated cases, or do criminal defense work. See supra note 191 and
accompanying text. This problem may be exacerbated by the spreading around of city work
(dare I say, for political reasons?).
' See ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 691 (1963), MARu, supra note 8, No. 5309 (Supp.
1970) (dealing with the city attorney and conflicts of interest; good "omnibus opinion");
ABA Inf. Op. 1003 (1967), MARu No. 5590 (Supp. 1970) (city lawyer and members of firm
may not represent a client with an application for a liquor license before city council); see
also In re A & B, 209 A.2d 101, 103 (Nov. 1965) (lawyer may not represent municipality
and at same time act as attorney for developers); accord, New Jersey Op., supra note 130,
161 (1969), MARu No. 6861 (Supp. 1970) (office associate of municipal attorney may not
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rule against representation adverse to the city applies in appellate
matters as well as cases at the trial level. 252 In one state, the bar
committee opined that an attorney who has been appointed as a
municipal prosecutor and whose duties are limited to handling
traffic violations and criminal matters in municipal court may not
represent applicants before municipal boards or clients before the
board of adjustment, planning board, or municipal council of his
or her municipality, or employees of the municipality in workmen's
compensation cases in which the municipality appears as the re-
spondent.
253
Other part-time prosecutors should also think twice before
suing cities in their jurisdiction. 25 4 For example, it has been sug-
gested that a county prosecutor may not represent the plaintiff in
a suit against a municipality in the county and its police department
alleging false arrest, violation of civil rights, and the like. 55
The lawyer for an entity such as a county or city represents
the entity and not the individual officers or constituents of the
represent developer who is planning to build homes in the municipality).
In New Jersey Op. 140 (1968), MARu No. 6840 (Supp. 1970), the committee opined
that a municipal prosecutor could not defend a police officer charged with assault and
battery in the commission of an arrest; see also New Jersey Op. 104 (1967), MARu No.
6804 (Supp. 1970); cf. Maryland Inf. Op., supra note 64, 78-40 (1978), MARu No. 11,370
(Supp. 1980) (assistant state's attorney may not represent police officers before disciplinary
board); cf. ABA Inf. Op. 798 (1964), MARu No. 5403 (Supp. 1970) (attorney may represent
client before city council acting as zoning board while he represents city's urban renewal
authority in circuit court appeal, where urban renewal authority is autonomous body
separate from city and attorney will not be required to support city in rezoning that which
it is his duty to oppose for authority or vice versa).
'2 But see New York Op., supra note 122, 218 (1971), MARu, supra note 8, No. 8978
(Supp. 1975) (allowing part-time prosecutor who is not officer of city to appear against the
city on appeal).
25 New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 19 (undated), MARu, supra note 8, No. 1505
(1970). See New Jersey Op. 5 (undated), MARu No. 1491 (1970).
But see Virginia Op., supra note 121, 6 (1944), MARu, supra note 8, No. 4373
(1970) (allowing commonwealth's attorney to represent client against city although salary
paid in part by city).
21 See New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 162 (1969), MARu, supra note 8, No. 6862
(Supp. 1970); see also Indiana Op., supra note 128, 5 (1979), MARu No. 11,077 (Supp.
1980) (full-time county prosecutor may not represent plaintiff against police officers of city
in which prosecutor works, even if venue has been shifted to adjacent county, since he
works closely with police while discharging his official duties; there is also an "impression
of impropriety"); cf. ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1282 (1973), MARu No. 7436 (1975)
(refusing to allow city corporation counsel who "sought the confidences of the police
officers" in an action against city for police misconduct to represent either or both sides in
suit seeking indemnity from the officers; the officers had been warned that their statements
might be used against them, but a "statute in the jurisdiction" required corporation counsel
to represent police officers in civil cases).
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entity.25 6 Accordingly, there is not necessarily any prohibited con-
flict of interest when a county attorney investigates official mis-
conduct of county officials. 2- 7 On the other hand, it may very well
be wise for independent counsel to be hired.
D. Statutory Duties
"[The statutory duties of the position must be considered to
determine whether a prior legislative obligation to perform the task
prohibits the task from becoming a part of [the prosecutor's]
private practice." 238 The cases and opinions are legion.
We have already seen how the statutory duty to prosecute
criminal cases may require the prosecutor to decline civil cases. 259
Other governmental and administrative duties can also lead to
conflicts. The Kentucky Ethics Committee has stated that a county
attorney may not represent a resident of a nursing home in a suit
against the facility if, by virtue of his or her office, the attorney
is designated the president of a holding corporation that issued
bonds for the facility's construction, although the relationship
between the holding corporation and the facility was minimal.
26
0
Since the assistant county attorney has a statutory duty to assist
in the collection of dependency support payments, 26' a part-time
25' See MODEL RULEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.13(a); Michigan Inf. Op., supra note 133,
RI-i 12 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:4760 (county, not county commissioner,
is client of county attorney, so county attorney may bring an action against commissioner
under "incompatible offices" statute); West Virginia Op., supra note 64, 90-1 (undated),
ABA/BNA Man. 901:9003. But cf. Maryland Inf. Op., supra note 64, 78-35 (1978), MARu,
supra note 8, No. 11,364 (Supp. 1980) (in which it appears that the county attorney had
allowed an attorney-client relationship in fact, whether proper or not, to develop with the
county executive).
2 Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 12 (1978), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,870
(Supp. 1980). See also Indiana Op., supra note 128, 5 (1979), M u No. 11,077 (Supp.
1980).
"' Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Oct. 1983, 52, 56
(alterations in original). The condemnation opinions involve conflicts arising from statutory
duties as well as from obligations of loyalty to the relevant public entity. See Kentucky
Ops. E-241 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3903, E-80 (1974), MAu, supra
note 8, No. 8543 (1975), and E-75 (1973), MARu No. 8538 (1975).
" See Sanders v. Miss. State Bar Ass'n, 466 So. 2d 891 (Miss. 1985) (reprimanding
county attorney who represented school board members privately in civil case that could
have led to criminal prosecution for which he could have had substantial responsibility);
supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
21 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-56 (1971), KY. BENcH & BAR, Apr. 1972, at 52. But
cf. Kentucky Op. E-71 (1973), MARu, supra note 8, No. 8534 (1975) (commonwealth
attorney may represent public utility companies).
2K Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 407.190 and 407.250(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984). The
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
assistant county attorney may not represent the defendant in a civil
action to collect dependency support payments.262
Furthermore, an assistant county attorney in his or her private
practice may not seek dependency support payments for a fee.
Such a fee could be viewed as excessive as well as illegal,263 since
"[ilt seems inconceivable that a client would knowingly pay to
receive a service which an attorney is by law required to perform
and for which he has already received compensation by virtue of
his [or her] office." '264 Sometimes the question is much closer. For
example, may a prosecuting attorney charge a fee for helping the
victim of a crime recover compensation from the Crime Victim's
Compensation Board?265 May a commonwealth attorney or county
attorney be appointed to serve as a guardian ad litem? This may
county attorney also has a potential public duty to prosecute nonsupport cases. See Kentucky
Op., supra note 4, E-215 (1979), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1979, at 48. But see Kentucky
Op. E-257 (1982), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1982, at 44, suggesting that an attorney for the
commonwealth may "represent a wife in a civil action attempting to collect back child
support against a husband after the termination of a nonsupport action in favor of the
husband prosecuted by the attorney for the Commonwealth."
See Indiana Op., supra note 128, U3 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3309; Indiana Op. 7 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3303; Kentucky Op. E-215, supra
note 261. In Legal Ethics Comm. of the Oregon State Bar Op. [hereinafter Oregon Op.]
527 (1989), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7106, the committee opined that a district attorney
providing support enforcement services to a wife does not have an attorney-client relation-
ship with her, and may prosecute the wife for contempt, for support enforcement if a
change of custody occurs, and for a violation of the criminal law after the support
enforcement services have been provided.
203 See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.5(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 2-
106(A).
2" Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-76 (undated), Ky. BAR J., April 1974, at 12, 14
(alterations in original); Kentucky Op. E-275 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3908. See ABA Op., supra note 75, 261 (1944), MAU, supra note 8, No. 261 (1970)
(when statutes impose official duties on a prosecuting attorney in divorce actions, neither
he nor his deputies may ethically represent a private party thereto); see also ABA Inf. Op.,
supra note 64, 922 (1966), MARu No. 5516 (Supp. 1970) (district attorney and staff may
not represent wife or husband privately in domestic relations court or in preliminary
conference concerning agreed support order with member of probation staff where member
of district attorney's staff required by law to represent prosecutrix in support action).
20 I was asked this question once, and I did not think that this representation was
really adverse to the state or otherwise prohibited. On the other hand, I was not aware of
Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.140 - 346.110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983). See supra note 60
and accompanying text. Do these statutes make a difference? Incidently, my "hotline"
letter opinion to the inquiring lawyer was dated and mailed Feb. 14th, but not postmarked
until Feb. 17th, and not delivered until Mar. 30th, 1992. This is not too "hot." The victim
could have died of starvation waiting for the U.S. Mail.
Of course, the lawyer who represented the criminal defendant should not represent the
victim before the Compensation Board. Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-271 (1983), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3908.
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be a problem in light of the numerous assignments given to these
public lawyers.2" But the other side of the coin is that there may
be a scarcity of lawyers in some rural areas, and lawyers feel some
obligation to accept appointments.
2 67
VI. PROSECUTING CLIENTS
A. Prosecuting Present Clients
In 1985, the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Bar Association
observed that an assistant county attorney, though permitted to
engage in the private practice of law in Kentucky, should not be
permitted to handle civil cases on behalf of persons being prose-
cuted by his or her office on criminal charges, even when the
criminal case is unrelated to the civil matter. 268 This would involve
litigation against a present client, and would result in a division of
loyalty even though the matters are not substantially related. 269
The notion that a lawyer may not pursue litigation against a
present client is not simply mainstream: it is the rule in every
American jurisdiction. It has been the ABA view under both the
Code and the Model Rules.270 It is clearly stated in comment 8 to
Model Rule 1.7, which declares that: "Ordinarily, a lawyer may
not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some
other matter, even if the other matter is wholly unrelated." 27'
2" See, e.g., North Carolina Op., supra note 181, CPR-171 (1978), MARu, supra note
8, No. 12,423 (Supp. 1980) (suggesting that there is a conflict if the part-time county
attorney has past, present, or possible future involvement in the matter on behalf of county
department of social services); Washington Op., supra note 64, 74 (1960), MARu No. 4592
(Supp. 1970) (stating prosecutor of a sixth class city may not represent guardian or estate
of incompetent person); see also Arizona Op., supra note 200, 74-13, MARu No. 7615
(Supp. 1975).
m See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 6.2 (lawyer must show good cause to avoid
appointment as personal representative).
Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-291 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3911.
n9 See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); MODEL
CODE, supra note 16, DR 5-105.
21 ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1495 (1982), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:340.
See also Perfect v. State, 141 N.E. 52 (Ind. 1923) (concerning prosecutor who sought his
own disqualification and requested appointment of special prosecutor where defendant was
his long-time client); cf. ABA Op., supra note 75, 77 (1932), MARu, supra note 8, No. 77
(1970) (stating that lawyer prosecuting criminal charge against defendant may not represent
defendant in personal injury suit while indictment is pending).
"I MODEL Rur.s, supra note 3, Rule 1.7 cmt. 8. See discussion infra part VII.A.2.
There have been cases in which the prosecutor has accepted employment from the very
1992-93]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
Under the rules of imputed disqualification, the partners and
associates of the prosecutor are similarly constrained. 2 2 The com-
mittee stated:
[Flor one associated with an assistant county attorney to represent
a person who is being prosecuted by that county attorney's office
even on an unrelated matter would result in a division of loyalty.
In addition, the public would no doubt question the zealousness
of such a prosecution against a private client.
273
On the other hand, the committee recognized that there is no
compelling reason for such a disqualification to be extended state-
wide, even in a "unified" prosecutorial system.2 4 The committee
declared that "an assistant county attorney or his partner or as-
sociate should not be disqualified from representing clients in civil
matters simply because the client is beiilg prosecuted somewhere
else in the Commonwealth, or is taking a position adverse to the
Commonwealth in some other forum.
'275
defendant he was prosecuting. See L.C. DiStasi, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Rep-
resentation Of Conflicting Interests Subjecting Attorney To Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R.
3d 835, 851 (1968).
Some Kentucky case law and gloss seem to suggest that a lawyer might sue a present
client because "[r]epresentation of a client in one matter does not in and of itself create a
lawyer client relationship with respect to other, unrelated matters." Kentucky Op., supra
note 4, E-148 (1976), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Oct. 1976, at 30. See In re Advisory Opinion of
Ky. State Bar Ass'n, 361 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1962); Kentucky Op. E-281 (1984), Ky. BENCH
& BAR, Apr. 1984, at 45, 46 (citing Kentucky Op. E-148 (1976)). The quoted proposition
may be true enough in the proper context, cf. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky.
App. 1979), but it does not follow that a lawyer may sue a present client. If that is what
the Kentucky authority means to say, then the Kentucky authority is simply wrong.
m7 See WoLFRAM, supra note 8, § 8.9.4, at 456 (prosecutor may not obtain indictment
of party who is represented in related civil case by prosecutor's private law partner). Imputed
disqualification is discussed infra part VIII.
211 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-291 (1985), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Jan. 1985, at 50,
55.
14 See discussion supra part II.A.; see also State v. Klattenhoff, 801 P.2d 548 (Haw.
1990) (separate office of Attorney General not disqualified from prosecuting sheriff for
theft from Police Relief Association even though another office of Attorney General was
defending sheriff in unrelated civil case brought by a prisoner against sheriff for mistreat-
ment).
"I Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-291 (1975), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3911.
I have already noted that Kentucky prosecutors may not defend criminal cases. See discus-
sion supra part V.A. For a bizarre case of overreaching, see In re Lake, 737 P.2d 40 (Kan.
1987) (involving prosecutor who prosecuted client in one county while representing her on
criminal charges in another county, represented her former business associates in civil cases
that were adverse to her interests, and engaged in inappropriate business transactions with
her-and received only the dreaded "public censure"!).
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The reaction to this ruling was predictable. A group of "ad-
versely affected" prosecutors appealed the opinion to the Kentucky
Supreme Court. The appeal focused on the "unfairness" of a rule
that might require a prosecutor to withdraw from a "good [civil]
case," if, for example, his or her private client were "picked up
for a [DUI]" or the like. The appellants argued that the court
should announce a rule that there is no conflict unless there is a
substantial relationship between the private matter and the public
matter (the prosecution).2 76
Is there anything unfair in requiring prosecutors to abide by
the same conflicts rules that apply to private lawyers? If not, then
there is no reason to give prosecutors the benefit of a substantial
relationship test that would not otherwise be applied in the context
of a "present client v. present client" conflict. 277 Even if there
were any unfairness or hardship associated with applying the or-
dinary conflicts rules to prosecutors with private practices, it would
be preferable if we could ameliorate it in some way other than by
developing special ethics rules for prosecutors. 278 Ideally, we might
consider moving to a system using full-time prosecutors.
279
For present purposes it is useful to think of three categories of
cases in which the prosecutor's private client might be charged with
a crime. 2s0 In some cases, when the matters are unrelated, a pros-
r" In re Ky. Bar Ass'n Amended Advisory Op. E-291, 710 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1986).
Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.530(5) provides that:
Any person or entity aggrieved or affected by a formal opinion of the Board
[an ethics opinion approved by the Board of Governors and published in the
state bar journal] may file with the Clerk within thirty (30) days after the end
of the month of publication of the KENTUCKY BENCH & BAR in which the full
opinion or a synopsis thereof is published, a copy of the opinion, and, upon
motion and reasonable notice in writing to the Director, obtain a review of
the Board's opinion by the Court."
See generally Underwood, supra note 2, at 136.
7n See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-257 (1982), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3906 (in a
pre-Rule 1.8(i) opinion the committee opined that the spouse (in a separate law office) of
a prosecutor could not represent a client in a civil matter if the prosecutor was prosecuting
this client in a criminal matter).
21 1 am opposed to the development of special ethics rules for different segments of
the bar. It is frequently argued that the conflicts rules are too difficult to apply, too hard
on, or too inconvenient for big firms, little firms, urban firms, rural firms, etc. I fear that
special pleading has taken a toll on lawyers' ethics and exacerbated the problem of interest
group self-glorification, intramural bickering, and the fragmentation of the bar generally.
"9 See supra text accompanying note 21; infra note 459 and accompanying text.
"0 We are, of course, dealing with a continuum: the categories are artificial.
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ecutor will have no way of anticipating such a conflict.8 1 In a
greater (but perhaps still small) number of cases, there may be a
remote possibility-perhaps only a theoretical possibility-of crim-
inal charges being lodged against the client. Yet, in other cases-
the domestic relations case is the paradigm-the probability that
such charges will be brought is very high.
For an example from the second category, consider a case in
which the prosecutor is representing a home improvements con-
tractor and there are facts that suggest the possibility of fraud on
the part of the client. If there is a possibility of a charge being
filed against the client, and if the prosecutor's office would be
responsible for pursuing that charge during or even after the close
of the civil representation, 2 2 then it would be best if the prosecutor
declined the case or withdrew from the representation. 23 As an-
other example, assume that the part-time prosecutor is representing
a homeowner who claims that his insurer is denying a substantial
fire loss in bad faith.28 If the insurance company were to raise an
arson defense, and if the prosecutor's office were responsible for
investigating or pursuing cases of arson, then the prosecutor might
be faced with the unpleasant tasks of withdrawing from the civil
case and requesting a special prosecutor.25 These are cases in which
the prudent prosecutor might apply, as a personal guide (even if it
is not a rule of discipline), the Rule of Caesar's Wife .2 6 In the
language of Kentucky Ethics Opinion E-275,2 7 the prosecutor may
be alert enough to see that these cases relate to "possible criminal
litigation for which the attorney for the Commonwealth would be
n' Cf. In re Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d at 853-54 (Leibson, J., concurring)
(stating that lawyer should only be disciplined if Bar Association can prove intentional
misconduct).
m See infra part VII.B.
21 See Maryland Op., supra note 64, 87-28 (1987), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:4308; cf. Virginia Op., supra note 121, 1271 (1989), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8762 (pros-
ecutor must withdraw as defense counsel for two clients in a suit filed against them by the
beneficiaries of a will where it appears that the clients may have committed fraud); Maryland
Op. 81-64 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4311 (an assistant state's attorney may represent a
civil client who attempts to recover from a tortfeasor for property damage even though a
traffic citation had issued against his client, so long as the prosecutor's office is not involved
in the investigation or prosecution of the traffic charge).
In Kentucky, a "bad faith" claim may result in an award of extracontractual
compensatory and punitive damages, even in the first party context. In other words, these
can be "good" cases by anyone's standards. See, e.g., Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
784 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Ky. 1989).
21 Missouri Op., supra note 8, 10 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:5257.
21 See supra note 82.
23 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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responsible," and in which the contemplated civil representation is
likely to give rise to an "appearance of impropriety." 21s
Unfortunately, few prosecutors see these conflicts coming. Oth-
ers will take these cases even when they recognize the potential
conflict. But must all "good cases" be rejected on the theory that
there is a possibility of related criminal action? An insurance
company that will commit bad faith will also assert a frivolous
defense for tactical reasons. Must the prosecutor in our not so
hypothetical insurance case withdraw at the demand of the oppos-
ing party?2 9 Are we going to have a prophylactic rule that prose-
cutors may not take first-party fire insurance cases?
The difficulty in applying rules based on possibilities, and the
risk of tactical use of such rules, can also be discerned in the third
category of cases. In most states, part-time prosecutors are per-
mitted to take domestic relations cases, even if they involve custody
issues. 29° Logically, there is always a possibility that one of the
divorcing parties will file criminal charges against the other. Nev-
ertheless, the Kentucky committee and Kentucky's Board of Gov-
ernors have opined that an assistant commonwealth's attorney or
that attorney's associates may participate in divorce cases even
when children are involved:
An assistant Commonwealth attorney or his associates should be
very reluctant to take a civil case where there is a possibility of
further criminal action. However, if there is only a remote pos-
sibility of subsequent criminal proceedings the assistant Com-
monwealth attorney may take the case, since the attorney could
later excuse himself if the remote possibility develops into a
reality. 291
10 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3908.
2" See infra notes 446-47 and accompanying text.
21 Virginia Op., supra note 121, 594 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:8828
(a part-time or assistant commonwealth's attorney may handle civil domestic relations
proceedings for private clients if the opposing party is not facing or expected to face the
attorney in any criminal proceedings); Virginia Op. 675 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8840
(custody cases). But see Illinois Op., supra note 141, 503 (1975), MARu, supra note 8, No.
10,912 (Supp. 1975) (state's attorney may not represent a party in divorce or custody
matters).
2I Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-210 (1979), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3901.
In Virginia, a commonwealth's attorney may represent a private party in a domestic
relations, child custody or child support proceeding if the following conditions are met: 1)
no criminal proceedings are pending or being considered against any party or witness; 2)
no opposing party or witness is the subject of any criminal investigation; 3) as a public
employee, the commonwealth's attorney has no substantial responsibility for the matter;
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Since E-275 specifically cited and approved this language, and
even extended it to county attorneys, 292 it is apparent that there are
"possibilities," and then again there are "remote possibilities." So
long as part-time prosecutors are permitted to practice divorce
cases, there will be a need for some flexibility. Any time the part-
time prosecutor is representing a person in a civil action, there is
a theoretical possibility that one or the other of the parties will
file a criminal charge against the opponent. 293 As the Kentucky
Committee observed in yet another opinion:
This situation generally arises in a pending divorce case where
one spouse takes out a criminal complaint against the other
spouse.
If the criminal complaint is taken out by the spouse who is
represented by the Attorney for the Commonwealth, the Attorney
for the Commonwealth may prosecute the criminal action against
the other spouse. However, the Attorney for the Commonwealth
must withdraw as soon as practical from the civil action.29"
If the criminal complaint is taken out against a client whom
the Attorney for the Commonwealth represents in the civil case,
the Attorney for the Commonwealth must disqualify himself from
the prosecution of the criminal action and must withdraw from
and 4) there is no implication that the prosecutor's public office will enable him or her to
improperly influence the court's decision. See Virginia Op., supra note 121, 594 (1984),
ABA/BNA Man. 801:8828; Virginia Op. 600 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8829; Virginia
Op. 613 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8836; see also discussion infra part VII. In contrast,
an Oregon opinion suggests that domestic relations cases should be shunned unless there
are no children in the marriage and no custody issues. Oregon Op., supra note 262, 380
(1978), MARu, supra note 8, No. 12,646 (Supp. 1980).
m Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-275 (1983), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Oct. 1983, at 54, 56
("These opinions [Kentucky Ops. E-210 and E-66] would also be applicable to the county
attorney.").
293 In rural states like Kentucky, it seems that "taking out warrants" against other
folks is a popular sport. Even the availability of cable TV has not made a dent in the
popularity of this activity. If A and B file cross-complaints against each other for assault,
and each consults with the prosecutor, does the prosecutor have a conflict? Missouri Inf.
Op., supra note 124, 10 (1978), MtAu, supra note 8, No. 11,810 (Supp. 1980), suggests
that such a scenario is fraught with conflicts, and that separate prosecutors may be required.
But see West Virginia Op., supra note 64, 90-2 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:9004, which points out that the complaining witness is not the prosecutor's client (the
state is) and that consolidation promotes judicial economy. Accord Virginia Op., supra
note 121, 1415 (1991), ABA/BNA Man. 1001:8704 (prosecutor may prosecute all four
parties to a dispute and alleged fight even though three are subjects of cross-warrants).
2" This suggestion, as well as other suggestions in this opinion, will be reconsidered
in part VII, which involves the criminal prosecution of persons with whom the prosecutor's
private client is embroiled in civil litigation.
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the civil action as soon as practical without taking further action
on behalf of the client in the civil action.2
95
Clearly, an opponent may be tempted to file a criminal charge
to set up the part-time prosecutor for disqualification. It is not
apparent why we should invariably deny a part-time prosecutor an
opportunity to resist disqualification in good faith if he or she
reasonably believes that the motion and related criminal charges
against the client are frivolous and made solely to gain some tactical
advantage in the civil litigation. On the other hand, it is also
difficult to have very much sympathy for prosecutors who take
divorce cases in the face of a rather strong likelihood that substan-
tial conflicts will arise.
296
Before moving on I want to allude to yet another perplexing
wrinkle. How do we analyze a case in which a part-time prosecutor
is assigned a duty to represent a citizen under one statute, and is
then assigned a conflicting obligation. Given the legislature's (the
People's) propensity to assign new duties to county and common-
wealth's attorneys, this sort of thing is worrisome. The best ex-
ample I can think of arises from the county attorney's duty to
prosecute misdemeanors and his or her duty under Title IV-D of
the Social Security Act29 to assist parents in the collection of child
support. Suppose that the prosecutor has undertaken the child
support collection case for a mother, and then is called upon to
I" Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-257 (1982), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1982, at 44;
see also Virginia Op., supra note 121, 696 (undated), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:8843 (providing guidelines for determining when a part-time prosecutor must decline or
withdraw from a civil case).
29 See Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-294 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:3912 (giving a "qualified yes" answer to the question of whether it is ethical for a
commonwealth's attorney to continue representation of a party in a contested custody
matter although the opposing party, on the advice of counsel, had sought and been refused
a criminal complaint from the county attorney relative to the custody issue). In this particular
scenario, the judge before whom the case was pending denied a motion to disqualify. All
too often judges refuse to act on such motions, suggesting that the ethics committee decide
such issues. Of course, ethics committees are not elected or appointed to decide disqualifi-
cation motions. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 128-31.
I gather from discussion of the Kentucky Board of Governors that it may revisit this
area and consider a ban on defense practice by commonwealth's and county attorneys.
Meanwhile, other states are grappling with the same problem. For example, the West
Virginia Supreme Court recently announced that a county prosecutor cannot represent a
private client in domestic relations matters if the client could potentially be a party to a
proceeding including the prosecutor's office, such as an action brought under the state's
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. State ex rel. Bailey v. Facemire, 413 S.E.2d 190 (W.
Va. 1991).
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
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try. a misdemeanor case against her. Or suppose that the complain-
ant in a criminal case is the party from whom the prosecutor is
attempting to collect child support. 298 Some would distinguish these
cases on the ground that in neither scenario is the prosecutor
representing a private client voluntarily, for a fee. And there may
be more fundamental differences between these cases and the cases
discussed previously. In the first scenario, some state bar opinions
assert that there is no attorney-client relationship between the gov-
ernment attorney and the recipient of the child support.299 In the
second scenario, I would think that the complainant is clearly not
the prosecutor's client. However, it is also clear that it would be
preferable if someone else prosecuted the criminal case.3°°
B. Prosecuting Former Clients
Surely prosecutors should be aware of the difficulties inherent
in prosecuting former clients. The familiar substantial relationship
test30' and the general obligation not to use protected client
information3°2 against the present or former client apply to prose-
cutors in the same way that they apply to any other lawyer. When
2" The problem of leveraging and "over-prosecution" is discussed in part VII. In
Kentucky Op. E-257, supra note 295, the committee opined that a part-time assistant county
attorney could not prosecute a criminal nonsupport case and a civil back child support case
against the same person "at the same time," but could pursue the civil case once the
criminal case had "terminated." Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1982, at 44.
2" Indiana Op., supra note 128, 3 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3303
(prosecutor representing petitioner under Title IV-D (42 U.S.C. §§ 651-69 (1988 & Supp.
1992)) may simultaneously prosecute petitioner on criminal charges, since the relationship
is mandated by Title IV-D as that of assignor-assignee rather than attorney-client); Oregon
Op., supra note 262, 527 (1989), ABA/BNA Man. 901:7106; cf. Missouri Inf. Op., supra
note 124, 18 (1979), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,924 (Supp. 1980) (dealing with AFDC
funds).
3w See qupra part IV.A.
30, See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.9; UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra
note 8, § 14.3.4 (Supp. 1992). There are many state bar ethics opinions on this subject.
See, e.g., Arizona Op., supra note 200, 81-29 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:1310; Virginia Op., supra note 121, 726 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8847. If the cases
are unrelated and there will be no use (or misuse) of protected client information, then
there may not be any prohibited conflict or grounds for disqualification. See West Virginia
Op., supra note 64, 84-1 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9004; Griffin, supra note 6, at 958
(1970); see also Havens v. Indiana, 793 F.2d 143, 144-45 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 935 (1986). Havens is a particularly useful case regarding what is and what is not
protected information of the former client, as it alludes to matters of "public record" and
other information that "anyone prosecuting the defendant would have had access to." Id.
' MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 4-101(B)(2) and (3) (1981); MODEL RULES, supra
note 3, Rules 1.6, 1.8(b), and 1.9.
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the prosecutor attempts to prosecute a former client, the filing of
a motion to disqualify is foreseeable, 33 and the trial judge should
err in favor of disqualification.
304
Prosecutors are sometimes caught napping and are disqualified
as a result of past interviews of potential clients whose cases were
not taken. 05 This is so because "a duty to maintain the confiden-
tiality of information relating to the prospective representation may
arise under [the Model Code or Rules] even though the lawyer
performs no legal services for the would-be client and declines the
representation." 3°6 One assumes that this must be a particular risk
for a part-time prosecutor, since he or she may consult with a
great number of potential defendants in his or her private practice.
A prosecutor may also be disqualified from prosecuting a de-
fendant if the prosecutor previously represented the defendant's
co-conspirator or co-defendant. 30 7 The rules of vicarious disquali-
fication, which allow the conflict of one partner or associate to be
- See Griffin, supra note 6.
-4 See Reaves v. State, 574 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1991); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591
(Miss. 1976). For a case of "switching sides," see State v. Chambers, 524 P.2d 999, 1004
(N.M. Ct. App. 1974). At least one case has found a violation of due process in this
context. United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 566 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1098 (1986).
Satterwhite v. State, 359 So. 2d 816, 818 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); see also State v.
Fitzpatrick, 464 So. 2d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 1985) (concerning disqualification of entire office);
Gray v. State, 469 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Miss. 1985) (concerning prosecutor who had consulted
with defendant for 45 minutes at the jailhouse while in private practice); Mattress v. State,
564 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (concerning prosecutor who had represented
defendants on unrelated criminal charges before assuming office).
1w ABA Op., supra note 75, 90-358 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:132.
This valuable and practical opinion provides guidance on how the lawyer might avoid
disqualification by limiting information imparted by the would-be client at the initial
interview. It also provides specific examples of instances in which disqualification should
be granted or denied (for example, when the aggrieved party did not interview in good
faith, but with a view to setting up the lawyer for disqualification). Cf. Alabama Op.,
supra note 119, 82-586 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:1029 (social conversation with the
alleged defendant not disqualifying where no attorney-client relationship formed and lawyer
received nothing that could be used against the defendant and favorably for the state);
Kentucky Ops., supra note 4, E-316 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:3902 (limiting disquali-
fication to circumstances in which lawyer has established client relationship or had obtained
confidential information from prospective client) and E-58 (1972), MARu, supra note 8, No.
8521 (Supp. 1975) (allowing lawyer who conferred with plaintiff to defend insurer-defendant
where no confidential relationship was formed with plaintiff).
mo See, e.g., Banton v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. App. 1985); Arizona Op:, supra
note 200, 85-6 (1985), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:1324. But see Martin v. Com-
monwealth, 361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962) (declining to disqualify attorney who represented
one jointly indicted but separately tried co-defendant when attorney joined prosecutor's
office and helped prosecute non-represented defendant).
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imputed to another, are a factor that can lead to further compli-
cation and possible embarrassment. °8 Vicarious or imputed dis-
qualification will be addressed in some detail in Part VIII of this
article.
Sometimes a problem of "subsequent representation" will sur-
face when the prosecutor's office hires a lawyer who has been
practicing on the defense side of the "v.," and the new prosecutor's
former client moves to disqualify all members of the prosecutor's
staff.3°9 It may also arise when a prosecutor is seeking enhanced
punishment based on prior offenses if the prosecutor himself served
as defense counsel in the earlier case.3 10 In the first scenario, some
courts are reluctant to disqualify an entire prosecutor's office for
fear of discouraging competent practitioners from engaging in pub-
lic service.311 Other courts are more doctrinaire and treat the pro-
secutor's office as a law "firm" for purposes of imputed
disqualification, even to the extent of disallowing "screening" or
"walling off. 312
The same split of authority can be found in the responses to
the second scenario (enhanced punishment). In In re Ockrassa,313
a former public defender turned prosecutor sought enhanced pun-
ishment for a DUI defendant on the basis of prior convictions in
cases in which the prosecutor had served as the defendant's counsel.
The Arizona high court suggested that "even minimal research"
would have informed the lawyer that the situation presented a
30 These scenarios can get fairly convoluted. For example, a defendant (DI) might
object to being prosecuted by a prosecutor (P1) who is the partner of another prosecutor
(P2) who previously prosecuted the defendant's co-defendant (D2). Virginia Op., supra note
121, 562 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:8823.
The fact that a prosecutor used to work for a firm that represented the defendant may
not be disqualifying if the prosecutor had no personal involvement in the earlier represen-
tation. Virginia Op. 1043 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8737; Wisconsin Op., supra note
117, E-88-2 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:9107; see also MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rules
1.9(b), 1.10(b).
30 See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 524 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 524 P.2d
988 (N.M. 1974); State v. Cooper, 409 N.E.2d 1070 (Ohio C.P. 1980); cf. People v. Doyle,
406 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (disqualifying prosecutor and entire staff due to
personal relationship between prosecutor and defendant).
310 See In re Ockrassa, 799 P.2d 1350 (Ariz. 1990); Cole v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.2d
468 (Ky. 1977).
3 Cf. Summit v. Mudd, 679 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1984).
312 See cases cited supra note 41. RESTATEMENT (TH1u) oF THE LAW GovmuN
LAWYERS § 203 cmts. d(iii) (regarding prosecutors' offices) and d(iv) (regarding public
defenders' offices) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) impute disqualification if the lawyers have
access to each other's files.
3. 799 P.2d 1350 (Ariz. 1990) (the validity of prior DUI cases was at issue).
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hopeless conflict.3 14 On the other hand, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held in Cole v. Commonwealth3 5 that since prior convictions
are a matter of public record (provable by way of a certified copy
of a judgment of conviction or the testimony of a court clerk),
there should be no prohibitive conflict absent a good faith dispute
as to the validity of the earlier conviction or some other circum-
stance suggesting a lawyer-witness issue or a problem of confiden-
tiality.
316
VII. CiVI. LITIGATION AGAINST PERSONS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Nothing in the Model Code's Disciplinary Rule 7-105 or Ken-
tucky Rule 3.4(f) 317 exempts prosecutors from the prohibition against
threatening criminal prosecution solely for the purpose of gaining
an advantage in a civil matter. Nevertheless, I get reports of part-
time prosecutors engaging in such conduct on a regular basis.
Indeed, such conduct has been encouraged. It is good politics 318 to
keep the merchants happy and the rest of us scared witless. In
Kentucky, it was long the practice of at least some county attorneys
to serve as collection agents for local merchants. The business
community, and in turn the legislature, thought this was a splendid
development. Accordingly, the statutory definition of theft by de-
ception was amended to bless what otherwise might be viewed as
a questionable practice.3 9 Specifically, Kentucky Revised Statute
section 514.040 provides in pertinent part that:
11 Id. at 1353.
315 553 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1977).
311 Id. at 472; cf. Havens v. Indiana, 793 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.) (noting that information
used by prosecutor at trial of former client was not confidential because it was a matter of
public record), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935 (1986).
MI KY. Sup. Cr. R. 3.130, Rule 3.4(0 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) provides: "A lawyer
shall not... [p]resent, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disci-
plinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in any civil or criminal matter."
3,3 Some might say good economics, too. Lord Mansfield and Adam Smith might have
been gratified.
1,9 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 514.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); see generally
WOLFAm, supra note 8, § 13.5-.6 (discussing prosecutors who threaten prosecution). In
Idaho Op., supra note 64, 132 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:2902, the
committee indicated that a prosecutor may send a letter to a person who has written an
NSF check, and may threaten prosecution if the person does not make restitution. The
committee stated that because the prosecutor is not representing the victim as a private
client, the disciplinary rule does not apply. On the other hand, the committee suggested
that the prosecutor assumes the status of the victim's private counsel if he includes a demand
for payment or seeks collection, and that he may not allude to criminal prosecution in his
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(1) A person is guilty of theft by deception when he obtains
property or services of another by deception with intent to deprive
him thereof. A person deceives when he intentionally:
(4) For purposes of subsection (1) of this section, an issuer
of a check or similar sight order for the payment of money is
presumed to know that the check or order, other than a postdated
check or order, would not be paid if:
(b) Payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds,
upon presentation within thirty (30) days after issue, and the
issuer failed to make good within ten (10) days after receiving
notice of that refusal. An issuer makes good on a check or similar
sight order for the payment of money by paying to the holder
the face amount of the instrument, together with any fee to be
imposed pursuant to subsection 4(c) of this section; or
(c) If a county attorney issues notice to an issuer that a
drawee has refused to honor an instrument due to a lack of funds
as described in subsection (4)(b) of this section, the county attor-
ney may charge a fee to the holder of five dollars ($5), if said
instrument is paid.
32 0
Whatever the merits of this statute, I can only say that it is
very difficult to get prosecutors to take the anti-extortion provisions
of the ethics codes seriously in the face of such precedent.32 1
Furthermore, if government lawyers are "doing it," it is hard to
get other lawyers not to "do it.' '
3
2
or her letter. The distinctions made by the committee seem very fine indeed. Cases involving
debt collection by threat and leveraging are collected in Eclavea, supra note 6, at § 15. For
a case of relatively recent vintage, see In re Lantz, 420 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1981) (prosecuting
attorney may not file bad check cases in his private capacity as this gives appearance of
using pressure of public office to collect civil debts for private party).
320 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 514.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
321 Reasoning by false analogy, some prosecutors figure that merchants are always
right, and consumers must, therefore, always be subject to arrest-pending resolution of
any petty dispute in favor of the merchant. But see Armorie v. Delamarie. 93 Eng. Rep.
664 (K.B. 1722).
3,2 The "but everybody's doing it" approach to professional responsibility. "But the
county attorney is doing it" is even harder to contend with.
Enthusiasts of the "everybody's doing it" school of jurisprudence will appreciate
Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va.
1992). In this rather unconvincing opinion, Justice Neely theorized that MODEL CODE, supra
note 16, DR 7-105(A) had not been incorporated into the new Rules of Professional Conduct
because it was either "redundant [of what, we might ask?] or overbroad or both [isn't this
redundant?]." He then sidestepped or struck down (it is hard to tell which) W. VA. CODE
§ 61-5-19 by applying the "doctrine of desuetude." That statute prohibits offering not to
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Having looked at extortionate threats of prosecution, we are
ready to look at actual prosecutions of persons who are opponents
of the part-time prosecutor's clients in private civil litigation.
32
A. Simultaneously Pending Cases
In his book Ethical Issues In Prosecution, John Jay Douglass
makes the observation that "it is axiomatic [that] a prosecutor
should never try a defendant with whom he is embroiled in civil
litigation. ' ' 324 At first glance, this seems to sweep broadly. Perhaps
we should test it, as if it were a hypothesis.
1. Same Opponent-Related Criminal and Civil Cases
In 1973, the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Bar Association
was asked whether "an associate of a commonwealth's attorney
... [may] represent a plaintiff in a civil action against defendants
who have been charged with crimes arising out of the same subject
matter, and which [crimes] the commonwealth's attorney has a
duty to prosecute?" 325 The committee answered the question in the
prosecute a crime in exchange for restitution. To the author's surprise, the ABA Committee
subsequently issued Formal Opinion 92-363 (1992), which cites this West Virginia opinion
for the proposition that the Model Rules permit a lawyer to threaten criminal charges in
aid of a related civil claim. The committee's view of the propriety of threats should be
contrasted with the views of the leading commentators. See, e.g., WoLRAM, supra note 8,
at 718 (deletion of an explicit rule was a "clear, and unfortunate, diminution of the
protections afforded by the Code"); FREEDMA, supra note 14, at 227 ("[U]nfortunately,
there is no parallel to DR 7-105 in either the Model Rules or in the ABA Prosecution
Function Standards.").
12 The possibility of such a relationship is alluded to in Kizer, supra note 6, at 379:
The prosecutor cannot ethically use the weight and force of his office to gain
an advantage in private employment; for example, when he represents the wife
in domestic relations matters and brings nonsupport or criminal charges against
the husband. If a crime has been committed, the prosecuting attorney has a
duty to prosecute, but he must withdraw from the civil matter. If no crime is
involved, he violates the disciplinary rule which provides: A lawyer shall not
present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely
to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.
See also In re Williams, 50 P.2d 729, 732 (Okla. 1935), discussed infra note 351.
"I DouGLASS, supra note 6, at 130 (citing Blanton v. Barrick, 258 N.W.2d 306, 311
(Iowa 1977)); see also ABA Op., supra note 75, 30 (1931), MAu, supra note 8, No. 30
(1970).
32 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-64 (1973), Ky. BAP J., July 1973, at 10. The scenario
was a bit unusual in that the lawyer wanted to know if he could take a civil case against
the operators of overweight coal trucks, when, at the same time, there were criminal charges
pending against the same operators, which the lawyer's associate was under a duty to
prosecute as commonwealth attorney.
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negative, pointing out the "temptation to 'over-prosecute' in crim-
inal actions wherein the prosecuting attorney has a vested interest
in the outcome, because of his being retained to represent the
plaintiffs in a civil action involving the same subject matter. '3 26
The committee also alluded to DR 9-101(B), which states that "[a]
lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which
he had substantial responsibility while he was a public em-
ployee. "327 Perhaps the thought was that if successive employment
in a substantially related matter would be problematic, then it
necessarily follows that simultaneous employment would also be
problematic. Of course, the committee also made the obligatory
reference to an "appearance of professional impropriety. '3" 28
While this opinion was in the mainstream, 29 it was more than
a little vague. As Professor Wolfram notes:
It is clear in [such a] situation that the prosecutor is acting
consistently and not adversely to the interests of any present or
past client. But the serious objection remains that the prosecution
might be in aid of the part-time prosecutor's private client and
not because of an unencumbered exercise of prosecutorial discre-
"I Id. The committee alluded to an unspecified opinion in which it "frowned upon a
Commonwealth's attorney handling a civil action for past-due child support payments,
because he has a powerful lever at his command to force those payments by the threat of
criminal prosecution." Id. at 11. Note that the issue of imputed disqualification is not of
immediate concern. We will return to imputed or vicarious disqualification in part VI1.
For a recent and very interesting ethics opinion see Pennsylvania Op., supra note 143, 91-
79 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:7306, in which it was stated that a member
of a law firm should not take a civil case concerning an employment contract when the
matter was also the subject of a current criminal investigation and another member of the
firm was also a member of the prosecutor's office. One assumes that such a scenario could
lead to the appearance that the opponent might be "leveraged," or that charges against the
firm's client were not explored. Of course, the prosecution of a present client might also
result. Cf. North Carolina Op., supra note 181, 502 (1966), MARu, supra note 8, No. 9252
(Supp. 1975) (city solicitor may not represent B, C, and D in an intracorporate dispute with
A over suspected mismanagement of corporate funds where municipal court before which
solicitor practices has both civil and criminal jurisdiction over the matters).
3. MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B); see also MODEL RULEs, supra note 3,
Rules 1.11(a), (c)(2); AM. LAW. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 92, § 9.14 (Revised Draft
1982):
A lawyer shall not accept private employment relating to any matter in which
the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in public service.
... Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-64 (1973), Ky. BAR J., July 1973, at 10, 11 (citing
MODEL CODE, supra note 16, Canon 9 (1981)).
319 See In re Truder, 17 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1932), infra notes 347-50 and accompanying
text, also discussed in DiStasi, supra note 271, at 852; see also Kentucky Op., supra note




tion. The prosecutor's duties as a public officer and his or her
loyalties as a private practitioner conflict.
3 0
In other words, the conflict has something to do with abuse of
office as well as abuse of the defendant. 331 For example, in Ganger
v. Peyton,332 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed
that a prosecution by an interested prosecutor can collide with the
concept of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process Clause:
Because of the prosecuting attorney's own self-interest in the civil
litigation ... he was not in a position to exercise fairminded
judgment with respect to (1) whether to decline to prosecute, (2)
whether to reduce the charge to a lesser degree. . .. or (3) whether
to recommend a suspended sentence or other clemency. 333
Justice Brennan expressed similar views in Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 334 when he observed that prose-
cution by such an interested prosecutor
would violate the ABA ethical provisions, since the attorney could
not discharge the obligation of undivided loyalty to both clients
[the private client and the "People"] where both have a direct
interest. The Government's interest is in a dispassionate assess-
ment of the propriety of criminal charges. ... A prosecutor may
33 WoLuRm., supra note 8, § 8.9.4, at 455 (citations omitted).
311 See MODEL RuLES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11 cmt. 2:
A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to a private client might
affect performance of the lawyer's professional functions on behalf of public
authority.... Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the private client by
reason of access to confidential government information about the client's
adversary obtainable only through the lawyer's government service.
See also AM. LAW. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 92, § 9.13 (1982): "A lawyer in public
service shall not use the powers of public office for personal advantage, favoritism, or
retaliation."
332 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). That is not to say that an ethical violation of this
genre will necessarily result in the reversal of a conviction on the complaint of an aggrieved
defendant. See, e.g., Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 196-97 (6th Cir. 1989).
Ganger v. Peyton involved a classic scenario: The prosecutor was representing the wife
in a divorce while prosecuting the husband for assault of the wife. For like cases and ethics
opinions see In re Thrush, 448 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. 1983) (concerning prosecutor who
represented husband in dissolution proceedings while prosecuting husband for battery of
wife and was disciplined for refusing to disqualify himself); In re Schull, 127 N.W. 541
(S.D. 1910) (prosecutor represented husband in divorce and prosecuted wife for adultery);
see also South Dakota Op., supra note 167, 90-5 (1990), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:8002 (lawyer may not represent husband in divorce if his associate is a part-time
prosecutor who granted immunity to husband during investigation of wife for drug offenses).
31 Ganger, 379 F.2d at 713.
3- 481 U.S. 787, 803-05 (1987).
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be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a
course promises financial or legal rewards for the private cli-
ent.... Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to abandon a
meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the
private client is conditioned on a recommendation against crimi-
nal charges.33 5
This sort of conflict is also acknowledged in the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers33 6 section 216, which pro-
vides:
[A] lawyer may not represent a client in any matter with respect
to which the lawyer has a fiduciary or other legal obligation to
another person if there is a substantial risk that the obligation
would materially and adversely affect the lawyer's representation
of the client.
According to the Restatement "Rationale," the prosecutor's
fiduciary obligation to his or her office or to the public should be
treated as "analogous to an obligation to a client. ' 337 The Report-
er's Note338 links this notion (which parallels Justice Brennan's
analysis in Young) to Canon 5 of the Model Code (EC 5-1) and
Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules. Comment f(ii) to section 216 relates
its general blackletter terms to the prosecution function:
(ii). Service as a prosecutor. A prosecutor exercises wide
discretion over the decision whether to prosecute, what charges
to file, and what criminal sanctions to seek. Prosecutors deter-
mine who will have to incur the expense, loss of liberty, and
damage to reputation flowing from those decisions. Where re-
sponsibilities to a client other than the public might distort the
exercise of the prosecutor's discretion, it is improper for the
prosecutor to act.
3 9
The Restatement's "Illustration" of this comment describes a case
in which the prosecutor's private practice client was the victim of
"I Id. at 805. Justice Brennan also noted that a federal prosecutor might be charged
with committing a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 208(a). See text of § 208(a), supra note 95.
336 RESTATEMENT (rHmD) oF TH LAW GovwRNmu LAWYERS § 216 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991).
3 Id. § 216 cmt. b.
3-8 Id. § 216, at Reporter's Note.
33' Id. § 216 cmt. f(ii); cf. Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-171 (1977), MARu, supra
note 8, No. 11,147 (Supp. 1980) (stating that Office of Attorney General may not participate
in criminal case against individuals who were co-defendants with the commonwealth in civil




an assault by a juvenile. The prosecutor is said to violate section
216 by exercising discretion to charge the juvenile as an adult, the
argument being that "a lawyer with no prior relationship to the
victim must decide whether to charge the juvenile as an adult."34
While it seems to me that this is not the most illustrative of
"Illustrations," the Reporter's Note cites cases of both the "abuse
of office" and "leveraging" variety in support of the comment. 341
This brings us to the case of Kentucky Bar Association v.
Lovelace. 42 The prosecutor was charged with misconduct arising
in connection with three separate scenarios:
(1) A child was killed in a bus accident. The prosecutor filed
a civil suit on behalf of the child's parents, which was "primarily
handled by his law partner," while his assistant obtained an
indictment in a parallel criminal action.
(2) Following another accident, the prosecutor obtained per-
mission from a "neighboring" commonwealth attorney to present
the matter to the grand jury. He identified himself as being the
representative of the family and commonwealth attorney in an-
other district. Later, he actually participated in negotiations in
the parallel civil case and "attempted to use the promise of
probation in [the] criminal case as leverage to get money ... in
the civil action."
(3) In yet another accident case for which he had investigatory
responsibility, the prosecutor was hired to bring a wrongful death
action on behalf of the passenger. The driver was thereafter
indicted on felony charges, which were amended down to a
misdemeanor charge and a one-year suspended sentence of pro-
RESTATEmENT § 216 cmt. f.
',' Id. § 216, at Reporter's Note (citing Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987); see supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text; In re LaPinska,
381 N.E.2d 700 (III. 1978) (concerning situation where prosecutor's private client, as pur-
chaser of house, claimed fraud on part of seller, and prosecutor filed case charging a zoning
violation by seller to aid client's case); In re Lantz, 420 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1981) (prosecutor
filing bad check charges in aid of debt collection cases brought on behalf of private clients;
see discussion supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text)). Cf. WOLFRA., supra note 8, §
8.9.4 (citing In re Fisher, 400 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1980) (prosecutor represented the mother
in a child custody dispute against the father who was being prosecuted by the same
prosecutor's office). For more child custody cases see discussion supra notes 261-62. Pro-
fessor Wolfram also cross-references his discussion of the "tactical value of threats to
invoke the criminal process." WoLFRAm, supra, § 13.5.5, at 717 n.72 (citing In re Joyce,
234 N.W. 9 (Minn. 1930) (concerning county attorney disciplined for obtaining the indict-
ment of defendants in claims asserted by his private clients)). Many "leveraging" cases are
collected in Eclavea, supra note 6.
-' 36 Ky. L. Sumo&RY at 7, 7-9 (June 29, 1989), withdrawn, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Ky. 1989).
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bation. The civil case settled for the policy limits plus a personal
contribution from the driver.
43
The court concluded that DR 9-101(B)344 applies to concurrent
as well as successive representation of conflicting public and private
interests, and imposed a temporary suspension.345
In subsequent proceedings the court backed off a bit, observing
that in all but the last case the prosecutor did not intend to gain
an advantage, and reduced the punishment accordingly. Neverthe-
less, the court opined that:
A prosecutor must decline employment in any civil action when
there is any reasonable probability that criminal prosecution might
arise from the circumstances of the case. If after accepting em-
ployment in a civil matter, a criminal prosecution arises from the
circumstances of the case the prosecuting attorney must withdraw
from the civil proceeding and disqualify himself from handling
the prosecution. 314
Although this decision seems perfectly consistent with a host
of available precedent, there was a considerable outcry. One would
have thought that the court had plucked a pernicious new doctrine
out of thin air for the purpose of destroying private practices. But
the case might profitably be compared to In re Truder, 47 a classic
case discussed in Professor Douglass's handbook for prosecutors.3 48
In this case, a part-time prosecutor and his assistant brought a
voluntary manslaughter action against a defendant as a result of
an automobile accident. The prosecutors then accepted a civil case
for damages against the defendant on behalf of the personal rep-
resentative of a victim of the same accident, and offered to dismiss
the criminal charges as part of a settlement. The New Mexico
Supreme Court reacted with indignation:
It appears from statements by all counsel in the case that it is
not unusual practice in this state for district attorneys to engage,
as respondents admittedly did here, to prosecute a civil action
upon the same facts constituting a criminal action which they are
14 36 Ky. L. SuMMARY at 7.
34 MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B).
3,4 Lovelace, 36 Ky. L. SUMMARY at 9.
3 Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d at 653-54.
-1 17 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1932).
m DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 127-29. Similar disciplinary cases are collected in
Eclavea, supra note 6.
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then prosecuting, or may be called upon to prosecute; that no
statute prohibits this practice; that, as generally viewed, such
double employment, standing alone, while not entirely approved,
has not been deemed misconduct as could lead to disciplinary
measures; that, to make a case for disciplinary action, some actual
conduct must be shown in addition, violative of the public or
private duty of the attorney. We cannot accede to this view, and,
if the practice is so widespread as stated, we feel it our imperative
duty to condemn it at this first opportunity.
The incompatibility of public duty and private interest and
employment is too plainly illustrated in this case to require dis-
cussion. It scarcely aggravates the case to show that one of the
respondents actually uttered the suggestion which is implied in
the situation itself, that a payment of damages would moderate
the vigor or good faith, if not entirely end, the prosecution.
49
Lovelace and Truder are virtually identical, and both are con-
sistent with the Kentucky Bar ethics opinion with which we opened
our discussion. Nevertheless, these opinions go unheeded.350
A final point should be made with regard to the problem of
leveraging in "same opponent-related civil and criminal" cases.
The leveraging may also be done by a prosecutor who is repre-
senting the defendant in a civil case. Perhaps the classic illustration
of this point is provided by In re Williams,35's a venerable Oklahoma
case.
In this case Williams had represented one Radney in a criminal
matter. Some time later (after Radney had served his term in the
'19 DOUGLASS, supra note 6, at 127-29 (quoting In re Truder, 17 P.2d at 951-52).
-_ See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marcum, 830 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1992). In this case, a
malpractice action against a doctor was accepted by the prosecutor's private firm, hhile at
the same time the prosecutor was pursuing an indictment against the doctor for "trafficking
in controlled substances by dispensing controlled substances without a good medical reason."
The criminal offense allegedly arose from, the same facts as the civil case. The offending
lawyers received public reprimands. One assumes that the penalty was not more severe
because there was no proof of "pressure" or "leverage." This is not a Kentucky phenom-
enon by any means. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700 (Pa. 1992) (finding
that district attorney should have recused himself from prosecution of defendant when his
private law partners represented the victims of the crime). For a curious contrast compare
Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (Va. 1985) (reversing conviction where
private attorney hired by victim's family to pursue civil action arising from events underlying
prosecution also handled the prosecution, due to violation of due process) with Kentucky
Op., supra note 4, E-151 (1976), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,127 (Supp. 1980) (stating
that lawyer in private practice who represents the personal representative of a murder victim
in a wrongful death action against the alleged murderer may assist the commonwealth's
attorney in the murder trial, so long as the commonwealth's attorney has no interest in the
civil case and controls the murder trial).
M' In re Williams, 50 P.2d 729 (Okla. 1935).
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state penitentiary), Williams was elected county attorney. Williams
appointed Sasseen his assistant county attorney. At this point we
hear from the Campbells, who made the mistake of loaning money
to Radney and taking a mortgage in return. The promissory note
and mortgage associated with this transaction were sold to the
Speeds.
352
In due course Radney failed to pay, and the Speeds sued.
Radney consulted with Williams, who at this point was still serving
as county attorney, and Williams fixed Radney up with his minion,
Sasseen. Sasseen entered an appearance and filed an answer for
Radney, and moved to join the Campbells as parties, alleging
wrongdoing on their part as well as asserting the invalidity of the
note and mortgage. In aid of this contrived pleading and defense,
Williams then filed a criminai complaint charging the Campbells
with grand larceny and embezzlement growing out of the same
facts and circumstances that were pled by Radney as a defense in
the civil case. As an additional touch, Sasseen endorsed the criminal
information that resulted in the "bindover" of the defendants,
although he later testified that he made no investigation of the
facts !
53
Finally, Williams resigned as county attorney, but then accepted
employment by Radney in the civil case. After the smoke cleared,
both lawyers had been disciplined (again, the dreaded "public
reprimand").3 54 Williams clearly violated what was then Canon 38
of the Oklahoma professional rules and what is now either DR 9-
101(B) or Rule 1.11(a). 5  But the important holding of the court
was its scathing observation that "the powers of the office of
county attorney were thrown into the scale of a civil lawsuit in
3 Id, at 730.
311 Id. at 730-31.
3" Id. at 732.
Id. at 731, citing the equivalent of Canon 36 of the 1946 Kentucky Canons, which
provided:
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
See Ky. CT. App. R. 3.170 (1946) (adopting ABA Canons of Professional Ethics). Canon
36 and the successor DR 9-101(B) were construed in Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-212
(1979), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:3901 (former government lawyer may not accept
private employment in a matter pending in an agency if he gained substantial knowledge
but did not perform any official act and was not counsel of record with respect to the
matter, or if he performed any act with respect to the matter on behalf of the agency).
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favor of the defense when the county attorney's office by law and
by all ethics was required to be and remain neutral.
356
2. Same Opponent-Unrelated Criminal and Civil Cases
We have established that a part-time prosecutor who is repre-
senting clients in a civil matter should not simultaneously investi-
gate or prosecute the same or related matters as a prosecuting
attorney. 3 7 Is there a similar risk of "leveraging" and abuse of
office when the criminal charge is unrelated to the private civil
representation?
On the one hand, the relatedness of the cases may make it
possible for the prosecutor to exploit the fact-finding resources of
the criminal process in aid of the private client.35 8 But from the
standpoint of leveraging and interference with the prosecutor's
exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of the
public interest, it does not seem to me that the relatedness of the
criminal charges and civil claims is necessarily critical. 3 9 An unre-
lated charge, substantiated or contrived, might be threatened or
otherwise exploited in the same fashion. That is, "the weight and
force of [the prosecutor's] office [might be used] to gain an ad-
vantage in private employment" 36° whether or not there is any
relationship between the private client's civil case and the criminal
charge against the private client's opponent. Virtually all of the
scenarios addressed in reported appellate opinions and ethics opi-
nions involve "same facts" or related cases, and little attention
has been paid to the formulation of a more general principle.
B. Civil Case When Criminal Case Not Yet Initiated, or When
Criminal Case Already Completed
So far we have considered only those instances in which there
are simultaneously pending civil and criminal cases. However, al-
- Williams, 50 P.2d at 732.
-s Lyman v. Grievance Comm. of 8th Judicial Dist., 552 N.Y.S.2d 721 (A.D. 1990).
311 See MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(A), (B); MODEL RULEs, supra note 3,
Rule 1.11(a); cf. Kizer, supra note 6, at 379: "A prosecutor cannot profit from information
gained in the course of performance of his duties as such: he cannot participate in civil
actions when an investigation involving the situation in question and alleged criminal
offenses was conducted through his office."
" But see Missouri Inf. Op., supra note 124, 5 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note
8, 801:5261, which suggests the contrary.
mo Kizer, supra note 6, at 379 guideline (4).
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legations of abuse of office may be substantiated in cases in which
criminal action has not yet been instituted, or in cases in which a
parallel criminal action has been completed by the time that the
civil action is commenced.
Perhaps the most widely cited opinion suggesting that a pros-
ecutor should not take on private civil representation in a matter
that he or she investigated in his or her official capacity is an
ancient ABA opinion that states that a prosecutor who investigated
an automobile accident and decided against criminal prosecution
could not represent one of the parties to the accident in a subse-
quent civil suit.3 61 There are a number of possible reasons for such
a rule. The least obvious is that the possibility of civil employment
might influence the performance of the prosecutor's investigation.
There is also the possibility that once the prosecutor sides with one
of the parties in the civil case, he or she will be unwilling to
reconsider pressing criminal charges. In that regard it might be felt
that such cases should be declined routinely to head off public
doubts or any "appearance of impropriety." However, the opinion
seems to focus on the notion that a public officer or employee
should not appear to be generating business from the public office,
a proposition that harkens back to a more innocent age.362
This opinion is by no means unique. Another ABA opinion
stated that a prosecutor who investigated a fire for evidence of
arson but did not gather enough evidence to support a criminal
prosecution could not represent the owner in an action against the
owner's insurer.3 63 And in yet another opinion, the ABA committee
"' ABA Op., supra note 75, 135 (1935), MARu, supra note 8, No. 135 (1970).
In Illinois Op., supra note 141, 89-2 (1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:3011, the committee stated that a prosecutor could not accept a referral fee associated
with the referral of a wrongful death case involving a local ordinance because the prosecutor
had the initial discretion to prosecute or not prosecute. Accord, Professional Guidance
Comm. of the Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Op. 91-24 (1991), ABA/BNA Man. 1001:7503; see
also RES ATEMENT (TmRDc) op Ta LAw GovEaRsNG LAwyms § 214 cmt. d. (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991). In Pennsylvania Op., supra note 143, 88-167 (undated), ABA/BNA Man.
901:7315, the committee opined that a part-time prosecutor may not represent the wife in
a domestic relations case if the prosecutor may have to prosecute the husband for spousal
abuse. The committee also observed that in such a situation there is a risk that the prosecutor
might obtain and use information in the course of the criminal investigation that might
advance the wife's civil case. Cf. Alabama Op., supra note 119, 87-123 (1987), ABA/BNA
Man. 901:1032 (stating that assistant district attorney may not participate in prosecution of
husband for sexual abuse of daughter where the wife previously consulted the district
attorney's law partner about obtaining a divorce).
6 ABA Op., supra note 75, 39 (1931), MARu, supra note 8, No. 39 (1970); cf.
Massachusetts Op., supra note 194, 91-7 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 1001:4602
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stated that a former assistant attorney general could not represent
a class of plaintiffs in a matter that the lawyer investigated while
holding the public office, even though the attorney general had
made a determination not to proceed, the suit would not have been
adverse to the former government employer (the suit would have
been against the same private party that had been the subje'ct of
the public investigation), and the attorney general had no objection
to the lawyer's acceptance of the employment. 64
In the above scenarios, the prosecutor made an initial deter-
mination not to prosecute. Many state bar opinions deal with the
situation in which such a determination has not been made, and
in which it is likely that such charges will be filed. Virtually all of
these state that the prosecutor may not take the related civil case
because it would interfere with the prosecutor's "paramount duty
to the public."3 65
(stating that former district attorney who investigated but did not prosecute husband for
criminal battery of wife may not later represent wife, as private client against husband, in
a civil claim for battery). But cf. Virginia Inf. Op., supra note 140, 150 (undated), MARu
No. 10,080 (Supp. 1975) (allowing commonwealth's attorney to qualify as administrator of
deceased's estate although he had previously determined not to prosecute another party to
the accident in which the deceased died); see supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
I"ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1462 (1980), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:307.
In other words, the strict language of MODE. CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B) (now
MODEL Ru.Es, supra note 3, Rule 1.11) was applied to bar the representation even though
the subsequent private representation was not adverse to the government and the government
was willing to "consent." Professor Wolfram states that Model Rule 1.11(b) also compels
this result and alludes to the facts of General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d
639 (2d Cir. 1974). WoaRA m, supra note 8, § 7.6.4. But cf. Pennsylvania Op., supra note
143, 91-190 (1991), ABA/BNA Man. 1001:7312 (stating that part-time prosecutor may not
represent private clients in civil cases if those clients have previously been prosecuted through
his or her office, unless the appropriate government agency can and will give consent!).
10 Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-1170 (1987), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
901:4758. Some opinions, like this Michigan opinion, limit this prohibition to cases in which
the particular prosecutor was involved. See, e.g., Alabama Op., supra note 119, 90-39
(1990), ABA/BNA Man. 901:1067 (permitting assistant district attorney whose office pros-
ecuted husband for manslaughter of wife to represent victim's mother in custody action
and handle estate of decedent if prosecutor did not have "substantial involvement" in the
prosecution and gained no confidential information that could be used against the husband);
cf. Virginia Op., supra note 121, 942 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8722 (allowing former
prosecutor and/or the prosecutor's spouse or firm to represent the victim of a crime in a
subsequent civil action provided that the prosecutor did not participate in the prosecution
of the opposing party); Illinois Op., supra note 141, 84-5 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3021
(allowing prosecutor's firm to take the case if prosecutor was not personally involved). But
see South Carolina Op., supra note 142, 84-19 (undated), ABA/BNA Man. 801:7915 (stating
that an assistant solicitor, even one not assigned to the related criminal case, may not accept
the related civil case).
Florida Op., supra note 197, 59-2 (1959), MARu, supra note 8, No. 6227 (Supp. 1970),
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When it comes to civil representation after the completion of
criminal proceedings, the authorities are divided. Some state bar
committees appear to approve of the practice.3 6 For example, in
Kentucky, the ethics committee opined that at no time "may an
Attorney for the Commonwealth have at the same time pending a
criminal case of non-support and a civil case attempting to collect
back child support," but saw no problem with the prosecutor's
pursuit of a civil collection case "once the criminal action has
terminated."3 67 But at least as many, if not the majority, of these
opinions prohibit the prosecutor from taking a related civil case
even after the dust has settled on the prosecution.36 The cases are
also split, and a few examples will suffice to tell the tale of
confusion.
In State v. Basham,69 a South Dakota statute provided:
The state's attorney shall not receive any fee or reward from or
on behalf of any prosecutor or other individual for services in
is curious. It states that a county prosecutor may not represent a party in a civil action
arising out of an automobile accident (1) while he or some other officer is investigating to
determine whether criminal charges should be filed, (2) while a criminal action is pending,
(3) when his or her contact with the client arose from his or her work on the accident, or
(4) if thb defendant in the action "may receive the impression that criminal charges may be
filed unless he settles the civil action." However, the opinion goes on to suggest that the
prosecutor may take the civil case if (a) the investigation is over, and no charges will be
filed (subject to rules (3) and (4) above?), (b) "only simple negligence is involved and
prosecution will take place in another court," or (c) the prosecution has been terminated.
36 On the other hand, the drafters of state bar opinions do not necessarily have the
benefit of pertinent arguments and authorities. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 144-47.
"6 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-257 (1982), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1982, at 44. In
contrast see Kentucky Op. E-153 (1976), MAnu, supra note 8, No. 11,129 (Supp. 1980)
(stating prosecutor who has represented a party in a divorce may not subsequently prosecute
the adverse party for nonsupport); see also Florida Op., supra note 197, 59-2 (1959), MARu
No. 6227 (Supp. 1970). But see Virginia Op., supra note 121, 420 (1983), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 801:8806 (allowing part-time commonwealth's attorney to represent a client
in a custody case while at the same time pursuing the father of the client's child for support
payments as a public attorney).
m See, e.g., Illinois Op., supra note 141, 85-10 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note
8, 901:3001; Ethics Advisory Panel of the Rhode Island Sup. Ct. Op. 90-17 (1990), ABA/
BNA Man. 901:7809 (refusing to allow prosecutor who prosecuted defendant for "dangerous
driving" to represent the victim's father in a later wrongful death action); Virginia Op.,
supra note 121, 1114 (1988), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8743 (stating that after unsuccessful
criminal prosecution for reckless driving, prosecutor may not take wrongful death case
against the same defendant).
-" 170 N.W.2d 238 (S.D. 1969). This case has been read as supporting the broad
propositions that, in South Dakota at least, a state's attorney may not accept a related civil
case "even though the criminal proceeding concluded before the private employment was
accepted," and that "the state's attorney must refuse private employment in all matters
dealt with in his or her official capacity." See Bjorkman, supra note 6, at 35.
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any prosecution or business to which it shall be his official duty
to attend, nor be concerned as attorney or counselor for either
party, other than for the state or county, in any civil action
depending on the same state of facts upon which any criminal
prosecution commenced, but undetermined, shall depend; nor
shall any state's attorney while in office be eligible to hold any
judicial office whatever.
370
The facts of the case trace a common pattern. The defendant
was involved in a two-car collision in which the daughter of the
driver of the other car was killed. The defendant's blood alcohol
level was 0.15, and he was charged and convicted of DUI and
manslaughter. Alleging a violation of due process of law, the
defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that a member
of the prosecutor's office was employed by the family of the victim
on a contingent fee basis to represent the family in civil damage
suits against him.317 According to the opinion, the criminal prose-
cution was initiated by way of an information filed by a Deputy
State's Attorney Weisensee. Another deputy state's attorney, Sech-
ser, participated with Weisensee at the criminal trial.372 At a hearing
on the defendant's motion for a new trial, Sechser admitted that
during the pendency of the criminal case he was already retained
by the victim's family, and had informed Weisensee of this fact.
However, he also claimed that he had not discussed the merits of
the civil claims with his private clients. Furthermore, he informed
them that no suit would be commenced before the termination of
the criminal proceeding.3 3 It was urged by the state that the con-
viction should stand because the state statute "contemplates a
present interest in a civil action and since civil and criminal pro-
ceedings were not pending simultaneously the statute was not vio-
lated." 374 The Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected the state's
argument.375 Citing a similar Illinois precedent, 376 the court rea-
soned that it was
I" Basham, 170 N.W.2d at 240 (emphasis added). The court noted that the statute
had existed in South Dakota as far back as the 1880s. Similar statutes are discussed in
Moldoff, supra note 6.
171 Basham, 170 N.W.2d at 239.




376 People ex rel. Hutchinson v. Hickman, 128 N.E. 484 (111. 1920). See Moldoff, supra
note 6, at 782-83 (collecting cases).
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the purpose of the legislature to prevent any influence upon the
discharge of the duties of a state's attorney by reason of personal
interest on his part and that if it be held that a state's attorney
might be retained in a civil suit to be commenced after the
conclusion of the criminal prosecution, the holding would invite
evasion of the spirit of the law which prohibits his being interested
in a civil matter based on the facts of a criminal action.
377
This case should be compared with Maddox v. Lord, a recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 7 In that
case, a convicted murderess and habeas corpus petitioner alleged
that the supervising prosecuting attorney had a prohibited interest
in her conviction for the killing of her husband. The state conceded
that nine months after the petitioner's sentencing, the prosecutor
joined a firm that had had a contract with the sons of the victim
that provided an incentive to procure the disqualification of the
petitioner from sharing in the proceeds of her husband's estate. 79
3 Basham, 170 N.W.2d at 241. See Virginia Op., supra note 121, 942 (1987), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:8722 (allowing prosecutor to take civil case related to prior
criminal proceeding only if he or she did not participate in the prosecution); Virginia Op.
606 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8830 (suggesting that a prosecutor may not represent a
plaintiff in a personal injury claim against a defendant he or she prosecuted, but also stating
that the prosecutor's spouse may take such a case); Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-1136
(1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:4753 (stating that prosecutor may not take subsequent related
civil case, but an uninvolved assistant prosecutor may). Older Virginia opinions permitted
the prosecutor to take related civil cases once the prosecution had reached a "final dispo-
sition." See Virginia Op. 1 (1942), MAu, supra note 8, No. 4368 (1970) (stating that
prosecutor should not accept or negotiate for employment in a civil action arising out of
an automobile accident "until the final disposition of any criminal charge arising out of
the same accident which he has prosecuted," and in no event may the prosecutor appear
on behalf of the defendant in the civil case if that is the party he prosecuted); Virginia Op.
32 (1951), MARu No. 4400 (1970). Virginia Inf. Op., supra note 140, 146 (undated), MA.u
No. 10,076 (Supp. 1975), clearly states that once the lawyer's prosecution of a host driver
has fully terminated, then the prosecutor may represent the estate of the deceased guest
passenger. But see Virginia Inf. Op. 290 (1978), MARu No. 12,922 (Supp. 1980), which
states that a commonwealth's attorney who participated in a preliminary hearing at which
a charge of involuntary manslaughter against the potential defendant was dismissed may
not represent the estate of the victim in a wrongful death action.
Of course, a prosecutor may not defend a wrongful death case for the same defendant
he or she prosecuted, nor may a member of his or her firm conduct such a defense. See,
e.g., Virginia Op. 604 (1984), ABA/BNA Man. 801:8829 (citing MoDrnL CODE, supra note
16, DRs 9-101(B), 5-105(D)(E)); cf. ABA Inf. Op., supra note 64, 1104 (1969), MARu No.
5672 (Supp. 1970) (special prosecutor in jury-tampering case could not thereafter represent
defendant's counsel in disbarment proceedings). On the civil side, see Arizona Op., supra
note 200, 91-21 (1991), ABA/BNA Man. 1001:1404 (prosecutor who secured child support
order may not later attempt to have it reduced).
-- 818 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1987).
" Id. at 1063.
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The court of appeals returned the petitioner's case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the agreement for
representation had been initiated before or during her criminal
trial.1t It seemed very important to the court that no suggestion
be taken from the remand that the prosecutor had done anything
wrong.3"' It also seems significant that in Basham there had been
dealings between the private client and the prosecutor prior to the
completion of the criminal case, so the cases might be reconciled.
In any event, the cases addressing this issue are relatively few.
Once the criminal case has been completed, there seems to be
little risk of "leveraging." Such cases might be governed by a
different rule. On the other hand, in a small town, a formal
agreement prior to the completion of the criminal case between a
private client and a local prosecutor may not be needed to raise,
or even to substantiate, a suspicion concerning the existence of
"expectations" or tacit agreement.
Finally, I would point out that the language of Model Rule
1.11 is not identical to that of the Model Code's DR 9-101. Model
Rule 1.11(a) seems to address only subsequent representation that
is adverse to the government.31 2 But Model Rule 1.11(b) can be
read, at least in some cases, as also prohibiting subsequent repre-
sentation of a private client which is adverse to a party that he or
she prosecuted while in government service.383 And Model Rule
1.11(c)(2) suggests that a prosecutor ("a lawyer serving as a public
officer or employee") may not negotiate for employment with
anyone involved in a "matter" while the prosecutor "is partici-
pating personally and substantially" in the same "matter." 3 4 This
language would apply to the Basham scenario, but would not fit
the situation in which there had been no contact or "deal" prior
to the termination of the criminal case. In some cases, then, the
rulemaker may be left with vague, secondary arguments alluding
to appearances, concerns about "business-getting," the use of the
' Id.
ul Id. I do not know what the arguments of counsel were or whether cases like Basham
were briefed.
3 See supra note 364 and accompanying text. But see AM. LAW. CODE OF CoNDucT,
supra note 92, § 9.14, cited supra note 327.
'" MODEL RuLE, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(b); see supra notes 358, 362, and 365;
WoLFRAm, supra note 8, § 7.6.4.
3" MoDm. RuIEs Rule 1.11(c)(2).
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information-generating capacity of public office for private gain,385
and so on.
C. Parallel Cases on Behalf of the Government
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 38 6 the
United States Supreme Court held that the lawyer for an interested
private party should not serve as special prosecutor in a contempt
case.38 7 The rationale of the case has been applied to criminal
contempt prosecutions based on alleged violations of injunctions
obtained by government agencies, although the "interested" pros-
ecutor works for the government rather than for a private party.
In United States ex reL SEC v. Carter,388 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found it objectionable that SEC attorneys who
had been involved in the underlying civil case, rather than the U.S.
Attorney, had control of the contempt prosecution. 89 Furthermore,
the court suggested that certain conduct, or rather misconduct, on
the part of the SEC lawyers in the case raised serious doubts about
their ability to perform disinterestedly as prosecutors. The court
also alluded to language in Young that warned of the possibility
that a prosecutor's interest "theoretically could ... created temp-
"S The notion seems to be that a prosecutor may get the benefit of an inside track.
See MODEL RtLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(b), (e); New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 634
(1989), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:5811 (stating that lawyer who prosecuted
defendant for fraud and theft and who had "confidential information" regarding the matter
may not represent fraud victim in later civil case arising from the same facts); Texas Op.,
supra note 236, 332 (1967), MARI, supra note 8, No. 7256 (Supp. 1970), states that a
prosecutor may not take a civil case arising out of a matter that is the subject of a criminal
investigation or prosecution within the prosecutor's district, but exceptions may be made if
the prosecutor "has fully performed and terminated his duty" and has gained "no confi-
dential information."
3- 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (finding contempt for an alleged violation of an injunction
obtained in a trademark case). See supra notes 334-41 and accompanying text; see also In
re Sasson Jeans Inc., 104 B.R. 600, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (lawyer for trustee in bankruptcy
should not be appointed to prosecute contempt actions in bankruptcy proceedings). But see
Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 663 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing counsel for private, interested
party to assist so long as government retains actual control of prosecutorial decisions), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d. 882, 883-84 (Ky.
1989) (holding that victim's lawyer may serve as private prosecutor because Young invoked
only the "supervisory authority" of the Supreme Court over the federal courts, and because
private prosecutor may not become involved in any civil matter related to the prosecution).
I" Young, 481 U.S. at 790.
3- 907 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1990).
M9 Carter,'907 F.2d at 488.
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tation to use the criminal investigation to gather information of
use in . . . [a parallel civil] suit[] .... ,,3 0
Similar questions of misuse of power have been raised from
time to time in cases in which a staff lawyer for a government
agency has appeared in criminal proceedings (for example, before
a grand jury) as a prosecutor in order to present evidence relating
to a matter or matters investigated for his or her agency. Some
cases have suggested that such "double hatting" may involve a
conflict of interest or "over-prosecution," or may give rise to an
appearance of impropriety. 391 The majority of cases have refused
to disqualify agency counsel in the absence of an actual conflict
or investigatory misconduct. 392 To date, conflicts or abuses of this
nature have not attracted much attention at the state level.
D. Release-Dismissal Agreements
A release-dismissal agreement is an agreement offered by a
prosecutor conditioning a nolle prosequi or dismissal of charges
on a release of civil claims against the arresting officers or the
governmental entity employing them. To the extent that interests
other than those of the public are being served by such agreements,
it would seem that they involve a rather obvious potential for
conflict.393 Furthermore, if the charges to be dismissed are insub-
1"' Id. at 486 (citation omitted); cf. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1978). But see FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, 868 F.2d 315, 320 (9th Cir. 1989)
(refusing disqualification where participation of the FTC lawyers who handled the civil suit
was not substantial).
" In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (GM Corp.), 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1978), on
rehearing, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, GM Corp. v. United States, 440
U.S. 934 (1979). Cf. United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 419 (1983)
(refusing to allow attorneys for the Civil Division of the Justice Department to obtain
automatic [FED. R. Cnms. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(i)] disclosure of grand jury materials for use in a
civil suit); see also United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1987), which raises
questions about possible abuses of the "cross-designation" of federal and state prosecutors
by way of temporary assignments and joint investigations.
3M In re Paul Perlin, 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dondich, 460 F.
Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, United States v. Mays, 646 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, Dondich v. United States, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981). GUsHMAN, supra note 6, § 2-53,
places these among the "better reasoned" cases, but collects other cases in which specific
misconduct justified disqualification or other intervention, such as dismissal of indictments.
M" In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), Justice O'Connor criticized
deals in which "public criminal justice interests are explicitly traded against the private
financial interest of the individuals involved in the arrest and prosecution." Id. at 400
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). On the other hand, a
lawyer employed by a city is not automatically disqualified from representing both the city
and individual officers and employees who are co-defendants in a § 1983 suit. See Petition
for Review of Opinion 552, 507 A.2d 233 (N.J. 1986). Proof of an actual conflict may be
required before a court will disqualify counsel.
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stantial, "leveraging" the person charged in an effort to force him
or her to surrender substantial rights is hard to square with either
DR 7-103(A) or DR 7-10519 or Model Rule 3.8(a).3 95 Although
such an agreement may be voidable on grounds of duress, it may
be upheld in specific circumstances. In Town of Newton v. Ru-
mery,39 the United States Supreme Court held that a dismissal
agreement releasing claims under section 1983 is not per se inva-
lid. 39 This decision was immediately condemned by the commen-
tators,398 and attempts have been made to "reverse" it by way of
amendments to the ethics codes. The American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct provides:
A lawyer serving as a public prosecutor shall not condition a
dismissal, nolle prosequi, or similar action on an accused's relin-
quishment of constitutional rights, or of rights against the gov-
ernment, a public official, or any other person, other than
394 MODEL CODE, supra note 16, DRs 7-103(A), 7-105. The latter position forbids "a
lawyer" (no exception for prosecutors) from presenting or threatening to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil manner. Kentucky's Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.4(0 retains this rule, although the ABA Model Rules do not (at least not
explicitly). Model Code EC 7-21 (1981) elaborates at some length:
The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the settlement of
disputes between parties, while the criminal process is designed for the pro-
tection of society as a whole. Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process
to coerce adjustment of civil claims or controversies is a subversion of that
process; further, the person against whom the criminal process is so misused
may be deterred from asserting his legal rights and thus the usefulness of the
civil process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases of abuse
of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process tends to diminish
public confidence in our legal system.
A good illustration of these rules can be found in Stark County Bar Ass'n v. Russell, 495
N.E.2d 430 (Ohio 1986). In this case the part-time prosecutor represented the plaintiff in a
slander suit. In the course of taking a deposition in the case, and presumably in aid of it,
he threatened the deponent, suggesting that if he "got smart" he "[wouldn't] get out of []
town." After the deposition, the deponent responded by remarking that he "would nail
[the lawyer's] posterior to the wall," additional threats were exchanged, and the prosecutor
brought criminal charges for "aggravated menacing." The threats during the deposition
were found to have violated MODEL CODE DR 7-105 (threatening to present criminal charges
solely to gain an advantage in a civil matter), and the subsequent charges violated MODEL
CODE DR 7-103(A) (instituting criminal charges with knowledge that the charge is not
supported by probable cause). Russell, 495 N.E.2d at 431-32.
"' MODEL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 3.8(a).
3- 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
I" Id. at 397-99.
"3 See, e.g., discussion in FREEDMAN, supra note 14, at 225-27; cf. ALAN DERSHowrrz,




relinquishment of those fights inherent in pleading not guilty and
proceeding to trial. 99
The critics may protest too much. A plurality of justices seemed
to place the burden of proof on the issue of a release-dismissal
agreement's validity on the prosecutor,m and the court did not
purport to say anything definitive on the matter of legal ethics. 1
Indeed, several justices alluded to the fact that there might be
ethical implications in individual cases. 4°2
In fact, release-dismissal agreements have been ruled unethical
by some state bar committees and courts both before4°3 and after4°4
Town of Newton v. Rumery. Furthermore, it seems that the public
interest may be served by a release-dismissal agreement in a specific
case. 4o5
VIII. IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION
Throughout this Article, ethics opinions and cases have been
cited which have involved the disqualification of not only individual
prosecutors, but other lawyers associated with the prosecutor in
his or her public office or private law firm.4 Such imputed or
vicarious disqualification has become a hot issue as lawyers and
"9 Am. LAW. CODE OF CONDucT, supra note 92, Rule 9.6. According to Professor
Freedman, an amendment to the Model Rules similar to Rule 9.6 was rejected in the District
of Columbia. FREEDmAN, supra note 14, at 227 n.70.
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
,o1 Such matters have been left to state law, have they not?
Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394-96, 413-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4o1 See Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Op. 62 (1982), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:1903; Oregon Op., supra note 262, 483 (1983), ABA/BNA Man. 801:7111;
Virginia Op., supra note 121, 131 (1963), MARu, supra note 8, No. 4499 (1970). Cases
include Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975); McDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373
(9th Cir. 1970); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Hoines v.
Barney's Club, Inc., 620 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1980) (release upheld).
40, See New Jersey Op., supra note 130, 661 (1991) (improper per se for prosecutor to
condition acceptance of a guilty plea on a waiver of civil rights claims); Oregon Op., supra
note 262, 516 (1988), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:7104 (holding that such agreements
may be unethical, but also holding that they are not unethical per se because there may be
probable cause, charges are not "threatened" because they are already pending, and the
defendant's rights are not violated if his or her consent is fully informed and voluntary).
40 While the prosecutor does not represent the individual police officer or other official
subject to a potential civil claim, it does not necessarily follow that he represents or ought
to represent the interests of the claimant, or that the claimant's interests are congruent with
the public interest. Cf. MODEL RuLES, supra note 3, Rule 1.13.
,o6 See supra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
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courts have become more aware of prosecutors' conflicts of inter-
est.
A. The Prosecutor's Office as a Firm
Lawyers in private practice are familiar with imputed disqual-
ification of a lawyer's partners, associates, or affiliates.4 It is
presumed that lawyers within a firm share information about their
cases and experiences, or at least have access to such information.
A common economic interest will bolster a common interest in
winning particular cases, and this will in turn increase the incentive
to share information. 40 For present purposes the theoretical ques-
tion is whether these same opportunities and incentives are present
in the prosecutor's office. Should we treat it as a law firm for
purposes of the conflicts rules?
The ABA Code was silent on this issue. The Model Rules were
not silent, but they were not particularly bold. Professor Wolfram
points out that "interoffice imputed disqualification is not imposed
under Model Rule 1.11 for governmental law offices." 40 Further-
more, neither the definition of "Firm" in the "Terminology"
section of the Rules nor the comments to Rule 1.10 (Imputed
Disqualification) mention the prosecutor's office directly. 410 This
has left the courts and ethics committees to reason by analogy,
and the courts and ethics committees have, for the most part,
leaned in the direction of flexibility.
In marked contrast to the Rules, the Restatement refers specif-
ically to prosecutors' offices in comments to section 20341 that
,1, "Affiliates" is a term that was added to the Model Code DR 5-105(D) (1981) to
sweep up new forms of association. Cf. ABA Op., supra note 75, 84-351 (1984), ABA/
BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:121; Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-311 (1986), ABA/BNA
Man. 901:3901 (3-part test for existence of affiliation).
40 See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.10 cmts. (discussing lawyer's loyalty to the
firm).
WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 7.6.5 (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11(c)
cmt. 9: "Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the
lawyer in question has become associated").
4" Reference is made to "legal department[s] of ... corporation[s] or other organi-
zations" and to "legal services organization[s]." MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.10.
4" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 203 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1991) provides:
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations
and conditions provided in § 202 or unless imputation hereunder is removed
as provided in § 204, the restrictions upon a lawyer imposed by §§ 207-214
also restrict other lawyers who:
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take the position that "if prosecutors commonly discuss cases with
each other and have physical access to each other's files," then
disqualification is imputed.412 However, if there is no such access,
then the question is whether the lawyers work for the same "or-
ganization":
413
If prosecutors' offices are organized by county ... the county
ordinarily should be regarded as the common organizational em-
ployer; if an assistant prosecutor in the county is prohibited from
acting, all other prosecutors in that county should be prohibited
as well. If, instead, prosecutors ... were coordinated from a
central statewide office, even the fact that members of the office
were physically assigned across the state in geographically separate
offices might not eliminate the imputation because of the incen-
tive and opportunity to advance the interests of the prosecuting
agency.
414
The Restatement methodology is softened and flexibility is
provided by the availability of "screening" ("procedures for re-
moval of imputation") in section 204,415 which "can help minimize
(1) Are associated with that lawyer in rendering legal services to others through
a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship, or similar
association;
(2) Are employed with that lawyer by an organization to render legal services
either to that organization or to others to advance the interests of the organ-
ization; or
(3) Share office space under circumstances that fail to assure that confidential
client information will not be available to other lawyers in the shared office.
412 Id. § 203 cmt.
.' Id. § 203(2).
4" Id. § 203 cmt. (d)(iii).
41, Section 204 provides, with regard to "removing imputation":
The restrictions upon an affiliated lawyer specified in § 203 do not restrict
that lawyer when:
(1) The affiliation between the lawyer and the personally-prohibited lawyer
that created the imputed prohibition has been terminated and no confidential
information of the client, material to the matter, has been communicated to
the lawyer or any other lawyer who remains affiliated with the lawyer;
(2) The restriction is of representation adverse to a former client as provided
in § 213 and there is no reasonable prospect that confidential information of
the former client will be used with material adverse effect on the former client
because:
(a) The confidential client information communicated to the personally-pro-
hibited lawyer is not likely to be significant in the later case;
(b) Adequate screening measures are in effect to eliminate involvement by the
personally-prohibited lawyer in the representation; and




otherwise serious practical problems for the operation of a prose-
cutor's office. ' 4
16
The most common scenario raising the issue of imputed dis-
qualification in the prosecutor's office involves the hiring of a new
prosecutor who has been representing a criminal defendant or has
represented a defendant in the past, and who is now personally
disqualified from prosecuting the former client. 417 Professor Wolf-
ram identifies three possible solutions: (1) strict imputed disquali-
fication to all members of the prosecutor's office, (2) disqualification
of only those prosecutors in the same office who are subordinate
to the disqualified prosecutor, and (3) no imputed disqualification
if adequate screening is implemented. 4 8 The Restatement opts for
(3) The restriction is of a representation prohibited as provided in § 214 and:
(a) Adequate screening measures are in effect to eliminate involvement by the
personally-prohibited lawyer in the representation; and
(b) Timely and adequate notice of the screening has been provided to the
appropriate government agency.
416 Id. § 204. The Restatement allows private firms considerable leeway to screen. So
have the courts. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th
Cir. 1988); see also UNDERWOOD & FoRTuNE, supra note 8, § 3.8.4. In this regard prose-
cutors are not really getting the benefit of special rules or special treatment.
417 See supra notes 268-316 and accompanying text.
418 WOLFRAm, supra note 8, § 7.6.5. Recent cases include People v. Hernandez, 286
Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. App. 1991) (no disqualification of entire 900-person office when some
members prosecuted defendant who was state's witness in another case); People v. Spreitzer,
525 N.E.2d 30, 38 (Ill. 1988) (no per se conflict that would justify reversal of conviction),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 594 (1991); State v. McKibben, 722 P.2d 518, 525-26 (Kan. 1986)
(noting that no per se office disqualification has been required in majority of states);
Aldridge v. State, 583 So. 2d 203, 205 (Miss. 1991) (failure to screen a newcomer led to
disqualification of the entire office); State v. Camacho, 406 S.E.2d 868, 873-75 (N.C. 1991)
(disqualification should only be extended to lawyers who have been exposed to protected
(former client) information); State v. Stenger, 760 P.2d 357, 360-61 (Wash. 1988) (when
the disqualified lawyer is chief prosecutor and makes no effort to screen, entire office
should be disqualified); Banton v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1160, 1163-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)
(disqualifying entire prosecutor's staff when the prosecutor had defended co-defendant while
serving as public defender). Other cases involving the disqualificatiozi of entire offices
include People v. Doyle, 406 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1987); State v. Chambers, 524 P.2d 999
(N.M. App. 1974), cert. denied, 524 P.2d 988 (N.M. 1974); State v. Cooper, 409 N.E.2d
1070 (Ohio C.P. 1980); State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards, 793 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990) (disqualification of entire office was error).
Recent ethics opinions on the issue include Illinois Op., supra note 141, 88-2 (1988),
ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:3008 (discussing the details of "effective" screening);
West Virginia Op., supra note 64, 85-2 (1985), ABA/BNA Man. 801:9005 (rejecting imputed
disqualification in the context of government lawyers-"a prosecutor's office is not a 'law
firm' within the meaning of the Code"-but with caveats); Wisconsin Op., supra note 117,
E-86-15 (1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:9103 (good discussion of the "mechanics" of making
the move and screening); Wisconsin Op. E-86-18 (1986), ABA/BNA Man. 901:9104 (neither
newly elected district attorney nor member of his staff may prosecute cases of which the
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the screening solution, without regard to the size of the particular
office. Illustration 8 to section 203 provides:
Assistant Prosecutor A, who has recently joined a county prose-
cutor's office, represented Defendant at a preliminary hearing in
a pending case while in private practice. Assistant prosecutor B,
a member of the same county prosecutor's office, has been as-
signed to prosecute Defendant in the same matter. Unless impu-
tation is removed pursuant to § 204, B is disqualified from doing
so because A would be prohibited from prosecuting Defendant.
A prosecutor in an adjoining but jurisdictionally distinct county
ordinarily would, however, be permitted to act.4 19
In my opinion, this solution is reasonable for large counties,
but may be overly liberal for small rural counties with as few as
two prosecutors per office. The leading Kentucky case, Summit v.
Mudd,42° which adopted a liberal screening solution, involved the
large prosecutor's office in Jefferson County (Louisville). However,
prosecutors and members of the Attorney General's staff have, in
my experience, contended that Summit v. Mudd established a rule
that applies in all circumstances, regardless of the level of authority
of the prosecutor having the conflict, and regardless of the size of
the prosecutor's office.421
district attorney had actual knowledge prior to resigning his public defender position!).
A committee may not look as favorably on screening when a prosecutor takes a
conflict to a defense firm or to a public defender's office. See Alabama Op., supra note
119, 89-84 (1989), ABA/BNA Man. 901:1058 (stating that when prosecutor goes to private
firm, firm may not handle appeal of defendant prosecuted by newcomer, and screening
disallowed in this context); Alabama Op. 87-106 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:1030 (allowing
prosecutor who goes with firm to complete files as "special assistant prosecutor," but not
allowing firm to do any criminal work). But see Arizona Op., supra note 200, 80-19 (1980),
ABA/BNA Man. 901:8102 (allowing screening when former prosecutor hired by public
defender's office).
49 RSTATEMENT (Tm) oF Tm LAW GovnuiRN LAWYERS § 203 illus. 8 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
4- 679 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Ky. 1984). In this case, the prosecutor's office hired a public
defender, and the new prosecutor's former client moved to disqualify the entire prosecutor's
office. The court declined the invitation, probably out of fear of discouraging the hiring of
competent and experienced practitioners for public service. Summit v. Mudd at least partially
overrules Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-124 (1975), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,100
(Supp. 1980), which opted for the "traditional" rule of across-the-board imputed disqual-
ification.
For a federal case in the Sixth Circuit, see United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1149 (1982).
"I If screening (no matter how ineffective and empty a ritual) solves the problem, then
no special prosecutor need be supplied. For cases and opinions rejecting screening in the
small office see Turbin v. Arizona Sup. Ct., 797 P.2d 734 (Ariz. App. 1990) and Wisconsin
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B. The Prosecutor's Private Firm
In spite of tolerant court opinions allowing screening when the
disqualification of an entire prosecutor's office is the issue422 and
recent cases encouraging lawyers in private firms to serve as "vol-
untary" prosecutors, 423 there are still some limits to the confusion
of public and private roles. At least that is so according to the
case of State v. Ross. 424 In that case, the client hired a private law
firm to defend him in a civil action based on an alleged assault.
Unfortunately, the client was also being prosecuted in criminal
court for the same conduct. The client was not aware of the fact
that his lawyer was also a part-time prosecutor, and that another
member of the same firm had filed the criminal complaint against
him.425 Citing Rules 1.7, 1.10, and 1.11, the Supreme Court of
Missouri not only reversed the client's conviction, but also ordered
that the entire prosecutor's office be disqualified from participating
in any retrial of the case.
426
In short, courts and ethics committees are probably not going
to create exceptions or exhibit flexibility when the question relates
to the disqualification of members of the prosecutor's private firm.
In a recent Kentucky opinion, the committee stated:
A prosecutor's conflicts are imputed to his or her partners and
associates in private practice. See Rule 1.10. See also DR 5-105(D)
and KBA E-64 [(1973)]. It is no "solution" that the prosecutor
has passed the civil representation off to another member of his
[or her] private firm. Summit v. Mudd [679 S.W.2d 225 (Ky.
1984)] is not to the contrary. That case held that a former defense
lawyer who moved to an urban prosecutor's office and was
personally disqualified from prosecuting his former client, did
not pass the taint of disqualification onto other members of the
Op., supra note 117, E-86-8 (1986), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:9102. In Tennessee
Op., supra note 190, 87-F-111 (1987), ABA/BNA Man. 901:8102, the committee stated that
"office" disqualification would have to be considered on a "case-by-case" basis.
'22 See cases cited supra notes 418-20.
423 See cases cited supra notes 193-94.
414 829 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1992).
41 Id. at 949.
42 Id. at 951-52 (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rules 1.7, 1.10, 1.11). For
disqualification from a different direction see State v. Detroit Motors, 163 A.2d 227 (N.J.
1960), in which someone else in the prosecutor's private firm had represented the defendant
in a related civil matter, and the court disqualified the prosecutor from the criminal case.
This case is collected with others in Griffin, supra note 6. See also Virginia Op., supra note
121, 562 (1984), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 801:8823 (extending bar on prosecution
by commonwealth's attorney to attorney's close associate).
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prosecutor's office. That case does not authorize "hand-offs" in
the context of a prosecutor's private law firm, nor does it au-
thorize "screening" generally.
427
Efforts by elected prosecutors to manipulate appearances or
structure their relationships with private firms in order to avoid
conflicts or rules against private practice are almost certain to fail,
and to cause embarrassment. 418 Lawyers have successfully elimi-
nated conflicts by dissolving a partnership, but that seems a very
heavy price to pay to keep a case.
429
C. Office Sharing
In Kentucky, 430 as in many states, office sharers are affected
by imputed or vicarious disqualification in the same way as partners
and associates. The basic documents, 43' like the ABA Rules and
the Restatement, may be more liberal. Both of these authorities
421 Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-350 (1992), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Summer 1992, at
33. See also Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marcum, 830 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1992), discussed supra
notes 342-50; Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1989); AM. LAW. CODE
OF CONDUCT, supra note 92, § 9.15: "When a lawyer is disqualified from representing a
client under Rule 9.14, no partner or associate of the lawyer, and no one with an of counsel
relationship to the lawyer, shall represent the client."
"1 See, e.g., Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-521 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:4804 (describing disapproved scenarios suggested by a full-time elected prosecutor
who hoped to maintain an interest in a private law firm without actually practicing law in
the firm).
' See the discussion of this possibility in Alabama Op., supra note 119, 89-107 (1989),
ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:1061. This opinion seems "lawyer favorable" in that
it allows the lawyers to maintain an office-sharing arrangement so long as they preserve
client confidentiality and do not practice cases together. But see discussion infra subpart C.
4" Kentucky opinions on office-sharing and imputed disqualification include: Kentucky
Op., supra note 4, E-322 (1987), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8, 901:3903 (defense lawyer
may not share with full-time or part-time prosecutor, but may share with prosecutor whose
duties are specially limited, and may be tenant in building owned by full-time or part-time
prosecutor, with some caveats); Kentucky Op. E-243 (1981), KY. BENCH & BAR, July 1981,
at 30 (office sharer with county attorney may not defend criminal cases and may not oppose
county); Kentucky Op. E-238 (1981), Ky. BENCH & BAR, July 1981, at 28 (office sharer
with county attorney may not represent juvenile offenders); Kentucky Op. E-194 (1978),
MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,166 (Supp. 1980) (office sharer with commonwealth attorney
may not defend criminal cases); Kentucky Op. E-187 (1978), MARU No. 11,159 (Supp. 1980)
(lawyer may not share office space with judge before whom lawyer appears); Kentucky Op.
E-129 (1975), MARu No. 11,105 (Supp. 1980) (county attorney may share office space with
a city attorney, with caveats); Kentucky Op. E-128 (1975), MARu No. 11,104 (Supp. 1980)
(county attorney may not share office space with police court judge); Kentucky Op. E-44
(1971), MARu No. 8507 (Supp. 1975) (defense lawyer may not share office space with
commonwealth attorney).
4, The most up-to-date version of Model Code DR 5-105(D) (1981) extends imputed
disqualification to "any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm."
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appear to recommend a case-by-case or fact-sensitive approach to
imputed disqualification in the context of office sharing.
4 2
The Rules address office sharing in the definition of what is
and is not a "firm" for purposes of imputed disqualification.
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this defi-
nition can depend on the specific facts.... [T]wo practitioners
who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each
other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm.
However, if they present themselves to the public in a way sug-
gesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they
should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules .... [I]t
is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purposes
of the rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be consid-
ered as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer
should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might
not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information
acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other.
433
The Restatement has this to say about office sharing:
When lawyers share office space, they typically share some com-
mon costs such as rent, library, and office salaries, but the
lawyers do not often work on common cases and do not share
fee income. Section 203(3) governs imputation of conflicts in such
arrangements. The key inquiry is whether the physical organiza-
tion and actual operation of the office is such that the confidential
client information of each lawyer is secure from the others. Where
such security is provided and where no other plausible risks to
confidentiality and loyalty are presented, the conflicts of the
lawyers [are] not imputed to each other by reason of their office-
sharing arrangement. On the other hand, lawyers who in fact
associate in a matter, share fee income, or hold themselves out
as partners or members of a professional corporation (even if
that is not a fact) are held to the stricter rule applicable to
members of a firm .
4 4
This "facts and circumstances" approach focusing on access
to confidential material is reflected in the ethics opinions of a
412 See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 8, § 3.8.2.
411 MoDL RuLEs, supra note 3, Rule 1.10 cmt. 1.
434 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 203 cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
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number of states,435 and some opinions seem quite permissive.43 6
Lawyers may be in the same building without being office
sharers. Many committees that are otherwise very conservative on
the issue of office sharing concede this point.437 The Kentucky
committee has opined that an attorney who defends criminal cases
is not absolutely prohibited from renting office space in a building
that is also occupied by a full-time or part-time commonwealth or
county attorney if the offices are sufficiently separate. 438 On the
other hand, the committee added that the trial strategies or work
product of one attorney could be compromised by the knowledge
of his or her adversary as to who visits the other's office for
appointments. For example, in a particular case, it may be neces-
sary for the defense attorney to consider meeting witnesses undis-






At various points in this article, I have questioned the conven-
tional wisdom or pointed out the lack of consensus regarding a
particular issue in the law of conflicts of interest. I have not done
this because I have any axe to grind. Instead, as a neutral party,
" See, e.g., Ohio Op., supra note 143, 83-1 (1983), ABA/BNA Man., supra note 8,
801:6828 (finding they are not "associates" within meaning of Ohio version of DR 5-
105(D)). But see Illinois Op., supra note 141, 783 (1982), ABA/BNA Man. 801:3102
(requiring per se disqualification because office-sharing is a DR 5-105(D)) "affiliation");
Michigan Op., supra note 133, CI-706 (1981), ABA/BNA Man. 801:4833.
'-1 See, e.g., Alabama Op., supra note 119, 81-543 (1981), ABA/BNA Man., supra
note 8, 801:1024 (allowing lawyer to accept criminal appointments although he shares
facilities such as library with a part-time prosecutor, if they have no access to one another's
files). Virginia Op., supra note 121, 1416 (1991), ABA/BNA Man. 1001:8705, is in sharp
contrast to this Alabama opinion.
" See, e.g., Virginia Op., supra note 121, 1416 (1991), ABA/BNA Man., supra note
8, 8705.
"I Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-322 (1987), Ky. BENCH & BAR, Summer 1987, at 33
question 3.
43, Id., citing South Carolina Op., supra note 142, 85-17 (1985), ABA/BNA Man.,
supra note 8, 801:7919. Some would argue that a landlord-tenant relationship may raise a
Model Code DR 5-101 or Model Rule 1.7(b) issue. See supra part IV.B.
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I would urge that lawyers in each jurisdiction attempt to reach
some consensus and then state the rules unequivocally. Based on
my experience as a bar association ethics committee chairman, it
is my opinion that some issues need to be revisited so that realistic,
acceptable answers can be provided to the following questions:
(1) When, if ever, may a part-time prosecutor oppose the state,
or a state agency that the prosecutor is not actively representing?
(2) What rules should be applied to municipal attorneys re-
garding a) criminal defense work and b) representation in opposi-
tion to municipal agencies that the prosecutor is not actively
representing?
(3) Should part-time prosecutors be precluded from doing do-
mestic relations work?
(4) To what extent should conflicts rules be couched in terms
of possibilities and appearances, as opposed to substantial proba-
bilities? What are the roles of good faith and judgment?
(5) Should prosecutors be precluded from taking civil cases
against persons that they have prosecuted, when the civil case arises
out of the facts underlying the prosecution, but the prosecution
has terminated?
(6) Can a general rule or rules be formulated regarding prose-
cutors and imputed disqualification?
(7) Under what circumstances is "double disqualification" re-
quired, and what is the rationale for it?"0
Perhaps there is less confusion regarding these issues than I
suspect. In any event, it would not hurt to have answers in the
form of a readily available supplement to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
2. Provision of Special Prosecutors: The Question of Double
Disqualification
Both the ABA Standards441 and the (NDAA) National Prose-
cution Standards442 allude to the desirability of having some mech-
"' See infra notes 441-55 and accompanying text.
. CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standards 3-2.2(e) and 3-
2.10(b).
442 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 3.2 provides:
(A) Determination of Need
The prosecuting attorney shall have the discretion to petition the court to
assign a special prosecutor in cases where recognizable or potential conflicts
of interest exist in the prosecuting attorney's opinion.
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anism in place for the appointment of special prosecutors to take
over prosecutions when local prosecutors face conflicts. Kentucky
law443 provides that a local prosecutor may request that the attorney
general direct4" another commonwealth or county attorney or an
assistant attorney general to take over a prosecution if the local
prosecutor is "conflicted out." However, none of these standards
explicitly directs the prosecutor to decline or withdraw from any
private work because of a conflict. 445 Many prosecutors seem to
believe that the best approach to conflicts is to take the private
case and shirk the public duty. The argument seems to be that the
case on behalf of the private client may be kept if a special
prosecutor can be secured. If there is any doubt as to whether a
case should be taken or declined, the case will be taken, and a
request for an advisory opinion will go to the ethics committee.4"
The corollaries seem to be that the ethics committee must make
the decision and order the prosecutor to drop the private work, 447
or better yet, that the attorney general must provide a special
prosecutor so that the local prosecutor may attend to his or her
private practice.
This does not seem like a very good way to run a railroad. It
would be much more desirable if prosecutors placed the priority
on their public work. The commentary to National Prosecution
Standard 1.3(A) sums up the problem:
(B) Utilization
The special prosecutor shall have the authority to deal only with the case
assigned by the prosecuting attorney.
US KY. Ray. STAT. Ar. § 15.733(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
" KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.730 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) ("Commonwealth's
attorneys and county attorneys as special prosecutors") makes each regular commonwealth's
attorney and county attorney an ex officio special prosecutor of the commonwealth who
may be assigned outside of his or her judicial circuit or district. However, the Attorney
General has taken the position that upon noticing a conflict the local prosecutor should
make an attempt to arrange with another county attorney or commonwealth attorney to
serve as special prosecutor before making the statutory written certification requesting
assignment of a special prosecutor by the Attorney General. Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 83-206
(1983).
"I See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also Missouri Inf. Op., supra note
8, 5 (1977), MARu, supra note 8, No. 11,778 (Supp. 1980) (setting sympathetic guidelines
for a wide variety of hypothetical (but very common) situations that allow prosecutors to
"conflict out" of criminal prosecutions and still keep their civil cases).
"6 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
I A "stop me before I kill again!" approach to professional responsibility. Cf. KY.
Sup. CT. R. 3.130, Rule 1.7 cmt. 14 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992): "Resolving questions of




[T]here is a great risk that the part-time prosecutor will not give
sufficient energy and attention to his official duties. Since his
salary is a fixed amount, and his total earnings depend on what
he can derive from his private practice, there is continuing temp-
tation to give priority to private clients.
One might rely on the voters to throw out elected prosecutors
who don't perform their public duties, and who seem to rely too
heavily on special prosecutors. But voters often don't understand
what is going on or don't care. Some critics report seeing prose-
cutors in rural Kentucky counties who view defendants and victims
as not only potential voters but potential clients, who should be
catered to. Some go further and claim that there is a systemic
conflict of interest in any system that relies so heavily on part-time
prosecutors, since a prosecutor's actions are all too often driven
by a desire to please everyone-to "work things out"-rather than
take a hard line when it is needed. In some parts of the state,
rumors, presumably unfounded, abound about prosecutors. Does
the need to get along jeopardize appropriate prosecutorial zeal? 449
It must also be admitted that tactical disqualification motions
can be a problem. But sometimes disqualification is invited. It has
been reported that some part-time prosecutors are generous in their
definition of "present client," and that many a DUI repeat of-
fender has played the game of always having some kind of legal
matter entrusted to the county attorney. After all, it is not always
easy to get a special prosecutor to venture into the big woods.
While everyone waits, cases are consigned to limbo.
The Kentucky Supreme Court seemed to be addressing the
problem of priority in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Lovelace.4 0 In a
passage that most prosecutors seem bent on ignoring, the court
opined that "[ifn the future, whenever a public prosecutor deems
it necessary to [obtain a special prosecutor because of an apparent
conflict], he should also withdraw from any other case, civil or
criminal, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." ' 45 1
Elsewhere, the court returned to this theme:
A prosecutor must decline employment in any civil action when
there is a reasonable probability that any criminal prosecution
I NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 21, Standard 1.3(A) (emphasis
added).
"' See CIm. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standard 3-2.8(d), cited
in text accompanying note 150 supra.
"1- 778 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1989).
45! Id. at 653.
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might arise from the circumstances of the case. If after accepting
employment in a civil matter, a criminal prosecution arises from
the circumstances of the case the prosecuting attorney must with-
draw from the civil proceeding and disqualify himself from han-
dling the prosecution.
412
This double disqualification is not explicitly required by the
Rules of Professional Conduct4 3 or by Kentucky Revised Statute
section 15.733. 4 4 Furthermore, it is not clear whether the Court
intends to apply the same rule in all conflicts scenarios. 4"1 Indeed,
the Court did not spell out any rationale for double disqualifica-
tion. My guess is that the Court wants to remove the incentive for
prosecutors to drop public work (by passing it off to special
prosecutors) in order to pursue private work, and wants to dispel
the perception that prosecutors are using the office for personal
advantage. Certainly, one way to do that is to make the prosecutor
drop any related civil case when he or she opts out or is forced
out of a criminal case. Can we fashion a more flexible solution?
If we did, would it not simply invite abuse and evasion?
B. New Guidelines for the Prosecutor
1. Standards
Professor Uviller put his finger on the legislative problem when
he observed that: "Concededly, a hard choice must be made in
framing ethical standards. The formulation must be either broad
and open, in which case it is indefinite and difficult to enforce, or
it must be detailed and specific, in which case it is long but rarely
complete. ' ' 4
6
In my experience, prosecutors need something more detailed.
Furthermore, they need (and they will only follow) something more
412 Id. at 653-54.
" Logically, one might argue that the prosecutor could keep the civil case and refrain
from prosecuting, or (assuming that the prosecution is not against the prosecutor's client,
in which case Rules 1.6 and 1.9 would come into play) prosecute and withdraw from the
civil case. But see Kentucky Op., supra note 4, E-257 (Question 1) (1982), Ky. BENCH &
BAi, July 1982, at 44 (requiring double disqualification in some circumstances).
4'4 See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
41" The opinion refers to "same transaction or occurrence" scenarios. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Lovelace, 778 S.W.2d at 653. What should happen if the conflict arises in the
context of unrelated cases
4- Uviller, supra note 6, at 1163.
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available and more authoritative than an ethics opinion. They need
a supplementary code drafted by a representative body. The ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice (The Prosecution Function) Stan-
dard 3-1.1(d) seems to invite state bar associations or advisory
councils to formulate such guidelines: "The prosecutor should
make use of the guidance afforded by an advisory council of the
kind described in standard 4-1.4. '457
As an academic lawyer who teaches "legal ethics," and as a
member of a state bar ethics committee, I would urge the high
court of every state that relies on part-time prosecutors to consider
appointing a special committee to formulate such guidelines. I hope
that the codes, cases, proposals and materials in this Article will
provide some useful background material. I would also hope that
any special standards will conform as closely as possible to the
rules that apply to all other lawyers. 45 It would be far better to
switch to a system of full-time prosecutors than to accommodate
part-time prosecutors by watering down sound rules to facilitate
the seizing of perceived practice opportunities. 45 9
2. Special Ethics Committee
As a "part-time" chairman of a state bar ethics committee,
and as an academic lawyer who has handled few criminal matters
(none as a prosecutor), I am also keenly aware of the limitations
of advisory opinions and hotlines.4m One question that occurs to
me is whether, it might not make more sense for prosecutors to
have their own advisory ethics committee. The drafters of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice proposed that each state establish
"a state council of prosecutors" within each state,461 and also
41, CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standard 3-1.1(d); see also id.
Standard 3-2.5: "Prosecutor's Handbook; Policy Guidelines and Procedures" (each office
should develop policy and procedure handbook).
411 See infra notes 464-66 and accompanying text.
411 Many times have I been stopped at a Bar Association meeting and chastised by a
young lawyer for denying him or her "opportunities" by inventing these peculiar rules. It
is simply no use trying to explain that I neither legislate nor enforce. Cf. Lawlines v.
American Bar Association, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that ethics rules violate
neither antitrust statutes nor civil rights). Nor have I had any luck convincing the children
of the 80s that there is more to life than market forces. It's hard to be an Ethics Chairman.
See Underwood, supra note 2, at 125. "Blow, blow, thou winter wind, thou are not so
unkind as Man's [or Woman's] ingratitude." WiLiAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act
2, sc. 7.
4 Underwood, supra note 2, at 169-76.
46' CRIM. JUST., PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 19, Standard 3-2.2(c) [Interrela-
tionship of Prosecution Offices Within a State]: "A state council of prosecutors should be
established in each state."
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recommended that each state have an "advisory council on pro-
fessional conduct":
(a) In every jurisdiction an advisory body of lawyers selected for
their experience, integrity, and standing at the trial bar should be
established as an advisory council on problems of professional
conduct in criminal cases. This council should provide prompt
and confidential guidance and advice to lawyers seeking assistance
in the application of standards of professional conduct in criminal
cases.
(b) Communications between a lawyer and such an advisory
council should have the same privilege for protection of the
client's confidences as exists between lawyer and client. The coun-
cil should be bound by statute or rule of court in the same
manner as a lawyer is bound not to reveal any disclosure of the
client except
(i) if the client challenges the effectiveness of the lawyer's conduct
of the case and the lawyer relies on the guidance received from
the council, and
(ii) if the lawyer's conduct is called into question in an authori-
tative disciplinary inquiry or proceeding. 462
Kentucky has a "Prosecutors' Advisory Council," which is
responsible both for "the preparation of the budget of the unified
prosecutorial system" and for prosecutors' continuing legal edu-
cation.463 One assumes that this body corresponds, in some meas-
ure, to the "state council of prosecutors" alluded to in the ABA
Standards. Kentucky has no special "advisory council on profes-
sional conduct in criminal cases."' 464
I think that it might be helpful to have such a special ethics
committee in my state. It would cut the workload heaped on the
ethics committee and hotline volunteers, and the members of such
a special committee would have a better understanding of the work
assigned to part-time prosecutors. Of course, there is a down side
to all of this. There is much to be said for consistency, and it is
not desirable to have separate committees running amok, issuing
bizarre new interpretations of the Rules. Ethics committees repre-
senting specialists have been known to become a bit partisan, even
"2Id. at Standard 4-1.4 ("Advisory Councils on Professional Conduct").
40 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.705 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991). The council may
delegate most of these functions to the attorney general pursuant to Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.710 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
" The ABA Standards seem to contemplate a joint committee for both prosecutors
and defense lawyers. See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
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to the point of functioning like lobbyists pushing for (if not draft-
ing) interest group- or client-favorable rules and legislation.* How-
ever, these temptations are resistible. Certainly, before the opinions
of such an "advisory council on professional conduct" could be
given official status and full protective effect, some kind of review
or oversight by the ethics committee or the state bar association's
board of governors could be required. 46
X. CONCLUSION
For many jurisdictions, the need for part-time prosecutors is a
reality that will continue into the foreseeable future. The daunting
task of balancing a private practice with prosecutorial duties is
made all the more difficult by the lack of a coherent set of
guidelines for minimizing the impact of conflicts of interest. What
is needed is a set of guidelines flexible enough to permit attorneys
to balance the part-time prosecutor's dual practice yet concrete
enough to protect the system and its participants from conflicts of
interest. Of prime importance in establishing any such system is
the need for a clear statement of the boundaries. We need to
confront these issues more directly, and debate the problems of
part-time prosecutors more openly.
461 See Underwood, supra note 2, at 145-46.
"4 In Kentucky, such a committee would have to be accounted for in Ky. SUP. CT.
R. 3.530 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992), which authorizes the ethics committee and "hotline"
to issue advisory opinions that will insulate lawyers from discipline (if they follow the
committee recommendations).
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